GHSA-v57x-gxfj-484q: Security Advisory for "Log4Shell"
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: com.hazelcast:hazelcast (Maven) 4.0.5, 4.1.8, 4.2.4; com.hazelcast.jet:hazelcast-jet (Maven) 4.5.3.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to com.hazelcast:hazelcast (Maven) 4.0.5, 4.1.8, 4.2.4; com.hazelcast.jet:hazelcast-jet (Maven) 4.5.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact A highly critical 0-day exploit (CVE-2021-44228) is found in Apache log4j 2 library on December 9, 2021. This affects Apache log4j versions from 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1 (inclusive). This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute code on the server if the system logs an attacker-controlled string value with the attacker's JNDI LDAP server lookup. Another vulnerability related to the same library, which was discovered on 12/14/2021 (CVE-2021-45046) and revealed another Remote Code Execution vulnerability, has been investigated by Hazelcast team as well and it is found that it does not affect Hazelcast Products under default configurations. The finding of CVE-2021-45105 on 12/14/2021, which can cause a Denial of Service attack, was investigated by Hazelcast team and it is confirmed that it does not affect Hazelcast Products under default configurations. The finding of CVE-2021-44832 on 12/28/2021, which is a medium vulnerability, is investigated by our security team as well, and not considered to be as critical. It requires attacker to be able to modify logging configuration, which means attacker can modify the filesystem and/or can already execute arbitrary code which is more of a general security breach rather than something log4j specific. Note that Hazelcast IMDG and IMDG Enterprise itself is not affected. However, given version distributions are considered to be vulnerable since related ZIP and TGZ distributions contain a vulnerable Hazelcast Management Center version. ### Patches CVE-2021-44228 is fixed in log4j 2.15.0. CVE-2021-45046 is fixed in log4j 2.16.0. CVE-2021-45105 is fixed in log4j 2.17.0. CVE-2021-44832 is fixed in log4j 2.17.1. As of 12/21/2021, Hazelcast team has released a new version of all affected products that upgrades log4j to 2.17.0 as listed below: Hazelcast Management Center 4.2021.12-1, Hazelcast Management Center 5.0.4. Hazelcast IMDG and IMDG Enterprise 4.0.5, 4.1.8 and 4.2.4. Hazelcast Jet 4.5.3. Hazelcast Platform 5.0.2. As of 01/06/2022, Hazelcast Management Center 4.2022.01 with the updated log4j 2.17.1 is released. log4j2.17.1 will be included in Management Center 5.1 that is expected to be released in February. Hazelcast recommends upgrading to the latest versions available. ### Workarounds For users that an upgrade is not an option, below mitigations can be applied. #### Disabling lookups via Environment Variable Setting the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS=true . This option is the easiest to apply for containerized environments. #### Disabling lookups in log4j2 configuration Another good option since there is no need to replace JARs or no need to modify logging configuration file, users who cannot upgrade to 2.17.0 can mitigate the exposure by: Users of Log4j 2.10 or greater may add `-Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true `as a command line option or add `-Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true` in a `log4j2.component.properties` file on the classpath to prevent lookups in log event messages. Users since Log4j 2.7 may specify `%m{nolookups}` in the PatternLayout configuration to prevent lookups in log event messages. As an example; users deploying Hazelcast Management Center via helm charts can do the following to disable lookups and restart in one command: `helm upgrade <release-name> hazelcast/hazelcast --set mancenter.javaOpts="<javaOpts> -Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true"` Where <release-name> is the release name and <javaOpts> is existing java options user has added previously. #### Removing the JndiLookup from classpath Remove the JndiLookup and JndiManager classes from the log4j-core jar. Note that removal of the JndiManager will cause the JndiContextSelector and JMSAppender to no longer function. ### References https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45046 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45105 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44832 https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/index.html ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [our repo](https://github.com/hazelcast/hazelcast) * Slack us at [Hazelcast Community Slack](https://slack.hazelcast.com/)
- Published
- Jan 21, 2022
- Updated
- Dec 4, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-20
Report tools
Action score
40
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.hazelcast.jet:hazelcast-jet | pkg:maven/com.hazelcast.jet/hazelcast-jet |
| Maven | com.hazelcast:hazelcast | pkg:maven/com.hazelcast/hazelcast |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.hazelcast:hazelcast | from 4.0.0 · before 4.0.5 | 4.0.5 |
| Maven | com.hazelcast:hazelcast | from 4.1.1 · before 4.1.8 | 4.1.8 |
| Maven | com.hazelcast:hazelcast | from 4.2 · before 4.2.4 | 4.2.4 |
| Maven | com.hazelcast:hazelcast | from 5.0 · before 5.0.2 | 5.0.2 |
| Maven | com.hazelcast.jet:hazelcast-jet | from 4.1 · before 4.5.3 | 4.5.3 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:com.hazelcast:hazelcast | 4.0.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:com.hazelcast:hazelcast | 4.1.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:com.hazelcast:hazelcast | 4.2.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:com.hazelcast:hazelcast | 5.0.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:com.hazelcast.jet:hazelcast-jet | 4.5.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-20 · Improper Input ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment VariablesCAPEC-10likelihood: High · High
- Server Side Include (SSI) InjectionCAPEC-101likelihood: High · High
- Cross Zone ScriptingCAPEC-104likelihood: Medium · High
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Object Relational Mapping InjectionCAPEC-109likelihood: Low · High
- SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter TamperingCAPEC-110likelihood: High · Very High
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
ATT&CK techniques
- Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Impair Defenses:Impair Command History LoggingT1562.003
- Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.006
- Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.