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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-rqr8-pxh7-cq3g: Ethereum ABI decoder DoS when parsing ZST

MediumCVSS 4.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: eth-abi (PyPI) 4.2.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to eth-abi (PyPI) 4.2.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

With this notification I would like to inform about a DoS vector in the Ethereum ABI decoder. We have not yet found a way to exploit this with high impact, still the bug could potentially lead to a DoS in server systems. Feel free to ask about an extension of the embargo period. Trail of Bits is informing you and other vendors as a community service, and so we do not seek a bug bounty on these issues. ## BUG DESCRIPTION Parsers must be written in a robust way, which avoids for example unrecoverable crashes, misinterpretation, hangs, or excessive resource consumption. The recent news about the aCropalypse bug also highlights that more subtle bugs like blind spots in file formats can lead to serious implications. Sometimes the specifications are at fault and sometimes the implementations. In the case of the Ethereum ABI, I have to blame the specification more than the vulnerable implementations. The specification allows zero-sized-types (ZST), which can cause denial-of-service upon parsing a malicious payload and schema. If a ZST takes zero bytes when stored on disk, but after parsing occupies memory, then there is the possibility for a denial of service. For instance, what will happen if a parser expects an array of ZST? It will try to parse as many ZST as the byte array claims to contain. The following figure first shows a payload of 20 bytes which will deserialize to an array of the numbers 2, 1, 3. The second payload will deserialize to 232 elements of a ZST like an empty tuple or empty array. 20 bytes of data: ``` length=0x3u64 2u32 1u32 3u32 ``` 8 bytes of data ``` length=0xFFFFFFFu64 ``` Now, this is not a problem if the individual elements take zero memory after parsing. Though, a common flaw is at least during serialization a large amount of memory will be required. If this case is not handled explicitly in the implementation then we are facing a DoS vector. For example, an implementation could decide to represent an array of ZST differently than a normal array and parse it in constant time, instead of looping and naively adding elements to an in-memory array. I mentioned that I believe this is a flaw in the specification. The reason for this is that the Ethereum ABI could have decided to disallow ZST completely. Actually, it turned out that in the latest versions of Solidity and Vyper it is not possible to define ZST like empty tuples or empty arrays. Even though the languages do not allow it, it is still allowed in the ABI specification. ## POC We define the data payload as `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFF`. It consists of two 32-byte blocks, which describe a serialized array of ZST. The first block defines an offset to the array’s elements. The second block defines the length of the array. Independent of the programming language we will reference it always as payload. We will try to decode this payload using the ABI schemata ()[] and uint32[0][]. The former represents a dynamic array of empty tuples and the latter a dynamic array of empty static arrays. The distinction between dynamic and static is important here, because an empty static array takes zero bytes, whereas a dynamic one takes a few bytes because it serializes the length of the array. The following Python program uses the official eth_abi library and will hang and eventually cause an out-of-memory error. from eth_abi import decode data = bytearray.fromhex(payload) decode(['()[]'], data) ## SUGGESTED REMEDIATION We suggest to disallow the parsing of ZST.

Published
Nov 24, 2023
Updated
Nov 28, 2024
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

17

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
PyPIeth-abi

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIeth-abibefore 4.2.04.2.0

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:eth-abi4.2.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

osv

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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