GHSA-rpj2-4hq8-938g: VCR.py: Arbitrary code execution via unsafe YAML deserialization of cassette files
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 31/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: vcrpy (PyPI) 8.2.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to vcrpy (PyPI) 8.2.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary vcrpy deserializes YAML cassette files with PyYAML's object-constructing loader (`yaml.CLoader` / `yaml.Loader`) instead of the safe loader (`yaml.CSafeLoader` / `yaml.SafeLoader`). A cassette containing a `!!python/object/apply:` (or similar) tag therefore executes arbitrary Python code the moment the cassette is loaded — including through the normal `VCR().use_cassette()` path, before any HTTP interaction is replayed. This is **not** limited to environments lacking the libYAML C extension. `CLoader` uses the C parser but PyYAML's full Python *constructor*, so Python object tags execute under `CLoader` exactly as under the pure-Python `Loader`. Confirmed against vcrpy 8.1.1 + PyYAML 6.0.3 with `CLoader` active. ### Affected component - `vcr/serializers/yamlserializer.py` — `deserialize()` → `yaml.load(cassette_string, Loader=Loader)` where `Loader` is `CLoader`/`Loader`. Reached on **every** cassette load. - `vcr/migration.py` (~line 107) — `yaml.load(preprocess_yaml(...), Loader=Loader)`. A second sink reached when the migration tool is run on a `.yaml` file. `preprocess_yaml()` only strips three known legacy tags, so other tags still execute. Present in all releases inspected, 1.0.0 through 8.1.1. ### Proof of concept ```python import vcr, requests # Attacker-supplied cassette. The payload sits in an ignored top-level key # so the rest of the cassette stays valid; it fires during load. open("evil.yaml", "w").write("""interactions: - request: body: null headers: {Accept: ['*/*']} method: GET uri: http://example.com/ response: body: {string: ok} headers: {Content-Type: ['text/plain']} status: {code: 200, message: OK} _x: !!python/object/apply:os.system ['touch /tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE'] version: 1 """) with vcr.use_cassette("evil.yaml"): # <-- /tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE created here requests.get("http://example.com/") ``` Loading the cassette creates `/tmp/VCRPY_YAML_RCE`, demonstrating arbitrary command execution. Any Python callable can be invoked this way. ### Impact Arbitrary code execution in the process that loads the cassette, with that process's full privileges. Realistic delivery paths: - A malicious cassette added in a pull request and loaded when CI runs the tests. - A poisoned shared test-fixture repository or cassette artifact store. - "Updated recorded HTTP fixtures" social-engineering. Because cassettes are typically loaded by test suites in CI/CD and on developer machines, the exposed secrets are exactly the high-value ones in those environments: CI deployment credentials, cloud IAM roles, registry/publishing tokens, and source access. ### Patch Use the safe loader in `vcr/serializers/yamlserializer.py`: ```python try: from yaml import CDumper as Dumper from yaml import CSafeLoader as Loader except ImportError: from yaml import Dumper from yaml import SafeLoader as Loader def deserialize(cassette_string): return yaml.load(cassette_string, Loader=Loader) ``` Apply the same `SafeLoader` change in `vcr/migration.py`. This is backwards compatible: vcrpy cassettes only contain standard YAML (scalars/lists/maps plus `!!binary`, all supported by `SafeLoader`/`CSafeLoader`), so existing cassettes load unchanged. vcrpy's `serialize.deserialize()` already catches `yaml.constructor.ConstructorError`, so a Python-tagged cassette now surfaces as the existing "old cassette format" `ValueError` instead of executing. Recommended hardening: add a regression test that loads a cassette containing `!!python/object/apply:os.system` and asserts a `ConstructorError`/`ValueError` and that no side effect occurs.
- Published
- Jun 19, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 19, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-502
Report tools
Action score
31
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | vcrpy | pkg:pypi/vcrpy |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | vcrpy | before 8.2.1 | 8.2.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:vcrpy | 8.2.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)
job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)
if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):
raise PermissionError("invalid signature")
job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.