GHSA-r4v7-6wcg-ghj5: FileBrowser: Missing Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint Enables Brute Force Attacks
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser (Go) 0.0.0-20260522161427-fa5abc8c67f3a.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser (Go) 0.0.0-20260522161427-fa5abc8c67f3a or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary The `/api/auth/login` endpoint does not implement rate limiting, account lockout, or progressive backoff for repeated authentication failures. As a result, an attacker can perform unlimited login attempts against the endpoint. When combined with the username enumeration timing vulnerability, valid accounts can be identified and then brute-forced without restriction. The risk is further increased by a weak default password policy that only enforces a minimum length of five characters. ### Details The authentication endpoint `/api/auth/login` does not enforce any form of rate limiting, account lockout, or progressive backoff for repeated failed login attempts. Testing confirmed that the endpoint accepts an unlimited number of authentication attempts from the same client without delay or restriction. This allows attackers to repeatedly attempt password guesses against valid usernames. Secure authentication systems typically enforce request throttling, temporary account lockout, or progressive delays after repeated failed login attempts to mitigate brute-force attacks. ``` $ python rate-limit-probe.py [*] Probing http://localhost/api/auth/login for rate limiting, lockout, and backoff behavior... Attempt 10: status=401, latency=0.0411s Attempt 20: status=401, latency=0.0411s Attempt 30: status=401, latency=0.0402s Attempt 40: status=401, latency=0.0420s Attempt 50: status=401, latency=0.0403s Attempt 60: status=401, latency=0.0423s Attempt 70: status=401, latency=0.0474s Attempt 80: status=401, latency=0.0417s Attempt 90: status=401, latency=0.0407s Attempt 100: status=401, latency=0.0407s --- CONCRETE EVIDENCE --- Attempts completed: 100 Total runtime: 4.17s Average request rate: 23.98 req/sec Unique status codes: [401] Average time (first 5): 0.0447s Average time (last 5): 0.0408s Latency delta: -0.0038s [RESULT] No HTTP 429 responses observed. [RESULT] No progressive backoff detected: response timing remained effectively constant. ``` #### Additional Context Password validation is implemented in `backend/database/storage/bolt/user.go` via `checkPassword()`, which only verifies that the supplied password length is greater than or equal to settings.Config.Auth.Methods.PasswordAuth.MinLength. In `backend/common/settings/auth.go`, the PasswordAuthConfig documents the default value of MinLength as 5. No additional complexity requirements, such as uppercase, lowercase, numeric, or special character checks, were identified in this code path. ### PoC The script below demonstrates the lack of rate limiting by performing a high volume automated authentication test. The script sends sequential login requests and monitors for HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests) status codes. ``` import requests import time import statistics URL = "http://localhost/api/auth/login" USERNAME = "admin" PASSWORD = "wrong-password" MAX_ATTEMPTS = 100 TIMEOUT = 10 latencies = [] statuses = [] print(f"[*] Probing {URL} for rate limiting, lockout, and backoff behavior...") start_total = time.time() for i in range(1, MAX_ATTEMPTS + 1): start = time.perf_counter() resp = requests.post( URL, params={"username": USERNAME, "recaptcha": ""}, headers={"X-Password": PASSWORD}, timeout=TIMEOUT ) duration = time.perf_counter() - start latencies.append(duration) statuses.append(resp.status_code) if resp.status_code == 429: print(f"[!] Rate limit detected at attempt {i} (HTTP 429)") break if i % 10 == 0: print(f" Attempt {i:3}: status={resp.status_code}, latency={duration:.4f}s") end_total = time.time() attempts_completed = len(latencies) print("\n--- CONCRETE EVIDENCE ---") first_five_avg = statistics.mean(latencies[:5]) if attempts_completed >= 5 else statistics.mean(latencies) last_five_avg = statistics.mean(latencies[-5:]) if attempts_completed >= 5 else statistics.mean(latencies) latency_delta = last_five_avg - first_five_avg print(f"Attempts completed: {attempts_completed}") print(f"Total runtime: {end_total - start_total:.2f}s") print(f"Average request rate: {attempts_completed / (end_total - start_total):.2f} req/sec") print(f"Unique status codes: {sorted(set(statuses))}") print(f"Average time (first 5): {first_five_avg:.4f}s") print(f"Average time (last 5): {last_five_avg:.4f}s") print(f"Latency delta: {latency_delta:+.4f}s") if 429 not in statuses: print("[RESULT] No HTTP 429 responses observed.") if abs(latency_delta) < 0.05: print("[RESULT] No progressive backoff detected: response timing remained effectively constant.") else: print("[RESULT] Latency variation detected: investigate possible throttling or environmental noise.") ``` ### Impact An attacker can perform unlimited authentication attempts against valid usernames. When combined with the username enumeration timing vulnerability, this enables targeted brute-force attacks against user accounts and increases the likelihood of credential compromise. Please let me know if you need any additional information or clarification. I'm happy to assist with testing or validating a fix.
- Published
- Jun 25, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-307
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | pkg:golang/github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | before 0.0.0-20260522161427-fa5abc8c67f3a | 0.0.0-20260522161427-fa5abc8c67f3a |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-mmpx-jh39-wrv6FileBrowser Vulnerable to Stored XSS via SVG File in Public Share (Missing CSP Header)21Monitor
- GO-2026-5776FileBrowser: Missing Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint Enables Brute Force Attacks in github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser0Monitor
- GO-2026-5511FileBrowser Vulnerable to Stored XSS via SVG File in Public Share (Missing CSP Header) in github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | 0.0.0-20260522161427-fa5abc8c67f3a | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-307 · Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication AttemptsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Dictionary-based Password AttackCAPEC-16likelihood: Medium · High
- Password Brute ForcingCAPEC-49likelihood: Medium · High
- Use of Known Domain CredentialsCAPEC-560likelihood: High · High
- Password SprayingCAPEC-565likelihood: High · High
- Credential StuffingCAPEC-600likelihood: High · High
- Use of Known Kerberos CredentialsCAPEC-652likelihood: Medium · High
- Use of Known Operating System CredentialsCAPEC-653likelihood: High · High
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.