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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-qwgh-2vcv-g2f7: block_buffer: panic corrupts inline buffer position

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: block_buffer (crates.io) 0.12.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to block_buffer (crates.io) 0.12.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary A caught panic may leave the cursor position of `EagerBuffer` or `ReadBuffer` in a corrupted state; this in turn allows out-of-bounds reads/writes. ### Details & PoC The following two tests fail miri: ```rust #[cfg(miri)] #[test] fn eager_digest_blocks_panic_corrupts_inline_position() { // `EagerBuffer` stores its cursor in the last byte of the internal block. // When `digest_blocks` completes a previously partial block, it overwrites // that byte with input data before invoking the caller-provided `compress` // callback. If the callback panics, safe code can catch the panic and keep // using the buffer while its cursor byte no longer satisfies the internal // `pos < block_size` invariant. Under Miri this `get_pos` call reaches the // `unreachable_unchecked` used for the assumed-valid cursor. let mut buf = EagerBuffer::<U4>::new(&[1, 2]); let _ = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { buf.digest_blocks(&[3, 0xff], |_| panic!("simulated compression failure")); })); let _ = buf.get_pos(); } #[cfg(miri)] #[test] fn read_buffer_generator_panic_corrupts_inline_position() { // `ReadBuffer` stores its cursor in `buffer[0]`, but `write_block` gives // `gen_block` mutable access to the whole internal block before restoring // `buffer[0]` to a valid cursor. If `gen_block` writes an arbitrary first // byte and panics, safe code can catch the panic and later observe an // invalid cursor. Under Miri this `get_pos` call reaches the // `unreachable_unchecked` used for the assumed-valid cursor. let mut buf = ReadBuffer::<U4>::default(); let _ = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { buf.write_block( 1, |block| { block[0] = 0xff; panic!("simulated block generation failure"); }, |_| {}, ); })); let _ = buf.get_pos(); } ``` They fail on an `unreachable_unchecked!()` under the invariant for the `pos` to always be within bounds of the block. ### Impact While the byte that overwrites `pos` may come from untrusted input and is therefore attacker-controlled, this still relies on the surrounding code catching the panic and carrying on, which should be uncommon in practice. For this to be exploitable, the attacker also needs a way to trigger a panic here; I have not investigated how feasible that is. ### Credits The issue was discovered by GPT-5.5

Published
Aug 19, 2026
Updated
Oct 30, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
crates.ioblock_buffer

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ioblock_bufferfrom 0.11.0 · before 0.12.10.12.1

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:block_buffer0.12.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

References

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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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