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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-qfc5-6r3j-jj22: Go package github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk module x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

Low—No exploit No fix recorded

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.

Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

# x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt ### Impact If an invariant check fails on a Cosmos SDK network and a transaction is sent to the `x/crisis` module to halt the chain, the chain does not halt. All versions of the `x/crisis` module is affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK. ### Details The `x/crisis` module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a `MsgVerifyInvariant` with the name of the invariant. Processing this message is supposed to cause the nodes to panic. However, because the panic is within a transaction, it is caught by the SDK’s built-in panic-recovery machinery and just treated as a normal “invalid” transaction (ie. it returns a non-zero abci Code). Thus the `x/crisis` transactions don’t actually cause chains to halt. If there is an invariant violation, it can be confirmed with an `x/crisis` transaction, but it won’t cause any nodes to halt, they will just continue processing blocks. That said, any node running with `start --inv-check-period X` will actually panic when it runs the periodic check (though it will still not panic just by processing an `x/crisis` transaction). Since this panic is located in EndBlock, it is not caught by the panic-recovery machinery and does actually crash the node. Presumably few if any nodes actually run with this in production because of how long the invariant checks take, and this runs all of them every `X` blocks. ### Patches No patches will be released. The `x/crisis` module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behaviour in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential [cost of halting increases](https://github.com/osmosis-labs/osmosis/issues/570), chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks, but may not be worth halting for. In some cases, chains have already broken the invariant calculations but have dealt with the consequences off-chain or during development. Halting these chains would be counter-productive. The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions. Hence, the decision was made that the `x/crisis` module will not be patched for chain halts. The module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities. ### Workarounds In case of a valid invariant check failure that requires a chain halt, the network validators are encouraged to coordinate off-chain for network halts. This has been an already established process for security patches. ### References SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706 Public report: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15325

Published
Jun 2, 2023
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
EPSS
—
CWE
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkfrom 0—
Gogithub.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkup to and including 0.47.2—

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-95rx-m9m5-m94vASA-2024-006: ValidateVoteExtensions helper function in Cosmos SDK may allow incorrect voting power assumptions
    28Monitor
  • GHSA-4j93-fm92-rp4mASA-2024-003: Missing `BlockedAddressed` Validation in Vesting Module
    26Monitor
  • GHSA-2557-x9mg-76w8ASA-2024-002: Default `PrepareProposalHandler` may produce invalid proposals when used with default `SenderNonceMempool`
    21Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • Later →GO-2023-1861Jun 22, 2023 · Cosmos "Barberry" vulnerability in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
    0Monitor
  • Later →GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pcJun 30, 2023 · github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
    0Monitor
  • Later →GO-2023-1821Jul 5, 2023 · The x/crisis package does not cause chain halt in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
    0Monitor

Remediation

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Technical details

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References

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