GHSA-q926-c743-49qj: Centrifugo's InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify flag silently disables JWT verification with no warning
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 (Go) 6.7.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 (Go) 6.7.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Centrifugo supports a configuration flag `insecure_skip_token_signature_verify` that completely disables JWT signature verification. When enabled, Centrifugo accepts any JWT token regardless of signature validity — including tokens signed with wrong keys, random signatures, or no signature at all. Critically, no warning is logged at startup or runtime when this flag is active, making it invisible to operators and security auditors. Note: This vulnerability requires the operator to have explicitly set insecure_skip_token_signature_verify=true. The core issue is the absence of any warning when this flag is active, making accidental production exposure undetectable. ### Details The flag is defined in `internal/configtypes/types.go`: ``` InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify bool `mapstructure:"insecure_skip_token_signature_verify"` ``` It is passed directly to token verification in `internal/client/handler.go`: ``` token, err := h.tokenVerifier.VerifyConnectToken(e.Token, cfg.Client.InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify) ``` In `token_verifier_jwt.go`, when `skipVerify=true` the entire signature block is bypassed: ```go if !skipVerify { // This block never executes err = verifier.verifySignature(token) } ``` The flag is configurable via multiple vectors making accidental exposure likely: - Config file: `insecure_skip_token_signature_verify: true` - Environment variable: `CENTRIFUGO_INSECURE_SKIP_TOKEN_SIGNATURE_VERIFY=true` - YAML, TOML config formats Despite `hmac_secret_key` being configured, startup logs show `"enabled JWT verifiers"` — falsely implying verification is active. ### PoC Config with legitimate HMAC key but skip flag enabled: ```json { "client": { "insecure_skip_token_signature_verify": true, "token": { "hmac_secret_key": "legitimate-production-secret-key" } } } ``` Token signed with completely wrong key is fully accepted: ``` VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED! Connected as user: {'client': '899dec73...', 'version': '0.0.0 OSS'} ``` No security warning emitted when insecure_skip_token_signature_verify=true:  Token signed with wrong key accepted, authentication bypass confirmed:  skipVerify flag propagated from config to all token verification calls:  ### Impact - Any unauthenticated user can connect as any arbitrary user ID - Complete authentication bypass — attacker sets any `sub` claim value - No indicators in logs that the server is operating insecurely - Easily triggered accidentally via environment variable injection in containerized deployments (e.g. misconfigured Kubernetes secrets) - Affects all connection types: WebSocket, HTTP-streaming, SSE, GRPC ### Suggested Fix 1. Emit a loud startup warning when flag is enabled: ```go if cfg.Client.InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify { log.Warn().Msg("SECURITY WARNING: JWT signature verification is " + "DISABLED via insecure_skip_token_signature_verify - " + "DO NOT use in production!") } ``` 2. Consider requiring an additional explicit `insecure_mode: true` flag to prevent accidental single-flag misconfiguration 3. Log a warning on every accepted token when skip is active
- Published
- Mar 13, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 27, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-285
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · 0.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 | pkg:golang/github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo | pkg:golang/github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v3 | pkg:golang/github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v3 |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v4 | pkg:golang/github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v4 |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v5 | pkg:golang/github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v5 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo | up to and including 2.4.0 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v3 | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v3 | up to and including 3.2.3 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v4 | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v4 | up to and including 4.1.5 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v5 | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v5 | up to and including 5.4.9 | — |
| Go | github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 | before 6.7.0 | 6.7.0 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-j9wf-6r2x-hqmxCentrifugo v6.6.0 dependency vulnerabilities0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6 | 6.7.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-285 · Improper AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLsCAPEC-1likelihood: High · High
- Cross Zone ScriptingCAPEC-104likelihood: Medium · High
- Directory IndexingCAPEC-127likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Malicious FilesCAPEC-17likelihood: High · Very High
- Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data TokensCAPEC-39likelihood: High · Medium
- Bypassing ATA Password SecurityCAPEC-402
- Buffer Overflow via Symbolic LinksCAPEC-45likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Data from Local SystemT1005
- Query RegistryT1012
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in RegistryT1552.002
- Impair Defenses:Impair Command History LoggingT1562.003
- Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data ManipulationT1565.002
- Hijack Execution Flow: Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessT1574.005
- Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.006
- Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
- Hijack Execution Flow: ServicesFile Permissions WeaknessT1574.010
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.