GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6: WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (Packagist) 5.3.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (Packagist) 5.3.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Impact `Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator` logs the full `Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request` object inside the log context of both `onAuthenticationSuccess()` and `onAuthenticationFailure()` at INFO level: ```php $this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [ 'request' => $request, 'firewallName' => $firewallName, 'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(), ]); $this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [ 'request' => $request, 'exception' => $exception, ]); ``` `Request::__toString()` returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for `LineFormatter`, `JsonFormatter` via `NormalizerFormatter`, etc.), sensitive headers such as `Cookie` (session identifier), `Authorization` and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text. Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions. ## Affected versions Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected. ## Patches The fix removes the full `Request` object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below. ## Workarounds Until the upgrade is applied, projects can: 1. Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production. 2. Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the `request` key from the context of these records before they are written. ## Credit Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of [Stepup-Webauthn](https://github.com/OpenConext/Stepup-Webauthn).
- Published
- Jun 26, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-200
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle | pkg:composer/web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle | before 5.3.4 | 5.3.4 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle | 5.3.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-200 · Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
osv
Root cause
The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-200 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
{
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],
"background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }
}Fixed
{
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- ExcavationCAPEC-116likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- FootprintingCAPEC-169likelihood: High · Very Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- FingerprintingCAPEC-224likelihood: High · Very Low
- ICMP Echo Request PingCAPEC-285likelihood: Medium · Low
- TCP SYN ScanCAPEC-287Low
- Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) RecordsCAPEC-290Low
ATT&CK techniques
- System Service DiscoveryT1007
- System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016
- Remote System DiscoveryT1018
- System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033
- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005
- Network Service ScanningT1046
- System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049
- Process DiscoveryT1057
- Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069
- System Information DiscoveryT1082
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Account DiscoveryT1087
- Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111
- Peripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
- System Time DiscoveryT1124
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.