Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-q54r-jf2p-rfr2: gitoxide gix: untrusted .git/config disables filesystem .git-protection path checks via unfiltered protect_options()

HighCVSS 7.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 29/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: gix (crates.io) 0.90.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to gix (crates.io) 0.90.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary In the `gix` crate, `Cache::protect_options()` in `gix/src/config/cache/access.rs` reads the three filesystem path-protection settings (`core.protectHFS`, `core.protectNTFS`, and `gitoxide.core.protectWindows`) with the unfiltered `gix_config::File::boolean()` accessor instead of the trust-aware `boolean_filter()` accessor used by every other security-critical config read in the same file. When a repository is opened with reduced trust (an ownership mismatch, which maps `.git/config` sections to `Trust::Reduced`), these protection settings should not be honored from the untrusted repository-local config. Because the trust filter is skipped, an attacker who controls a repository's `.git/config` on a shared filesystem can set `core.protectNTFS = false` and/or `core.protectHFS = false`, disabling the `.git` path-confusion checks that run during checkout, index creation, merge, and tree editing. On case-insensitive filesystems this lets crafted tree entries resolve to the `.git` directory and overwrite hooks or config. ## Root Cause Repositories opened under `Trust::Reduced` install a section filter (`is_trusted`) so that security-relevant settings coming from an untrusted repository-local `.git/config` are ignored. The `Cache` struct stores this filter and applies it throughout `gix/src/config/cache/access.rs` for diff drivers, merge drivers, URL rewrites, scheme permissions, lock timeout, and checkout workers. `protect_options()` is the exception: it reads the path-protection booleans through `self.resolved.boolean(...)`, which delegates to `boolean_filter(key, |_| true)` and therefore accepts values from every section regardless of trust. As a result, an untrusted repository-local setting of `core.protectHFS`/`core.protectNTFS`/`gitoxide.core.protectWindows` overrides the safe defaults, defeating the trust boundary for exactly the controls that are meant to prevent `.git` path-confusion attacks. ```text gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:300 Cache::protect_options() : vulnerable function gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:306 self.resolved.boolean(gitoxide.core.protectWindows) (unfiltered) gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:310 self.resolved.boolean(core.protectHFS) (unfiltered) gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:314 self.resolved.boolean(core.protectNTFS) (unfiltered) gix-config/src/file/access/comfort.rs:89 boolean() delegates to boolean_filter(key, |_| true) gix/src/config/mod.rs:61 is_trusted() : the filter that would reject untrusted repo-local sections gix-validate/src/path.rs:98 component() : path validation that honors the resulting options ``` ## Impact An attacker who owns a repository on a filesystem shared with the victim (a multi-user development host, a shared or network-mounted checkout, or a CI workspace reused across jobs) edits that repository's `.git/config` to disable one or both of `core.protectHFS` and `core.protectNTFS`. When the victim opens the repository with a `gix`-based tool, the ownership mismatch yields `Trust::Reduced`, which should neutralize these untrusted settings, but `protect_options()` honors them anyway. The attacker also commits tree entries whose names are filesystem-specific encodings of `.git` (for example NTFS short names such as `GIT~1`, NTFS alternate-data-stream or trailing-dot/space variants, or HFS+ forms using ignorable code points). When the victim performs a checkout, index build, merge, or tree edit, path validation no longer rejects these names, so on a case-insensitive filesystem (Windows NTFS, macOS HFS+) they collapse to the real `.git` directory. This permits overwriting repository hooks and configuration, which plausibly leads to arbitrary command execution in the victim's context on the next Git operation that runs a hook. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact follows from control over the victim's `.git` directory and any resulting hook execution; hook execution was not freshly executed here and is characterized as the plausible consequence of the demonstrated path-protection bypass. ## Proof of Concept The following unit test places the config cache in the exact state produced after a submodule or repository is initialized (only `url` copied to the local config) and shows that the attacker's path-protection override from the repository-local config is honored even though it should be filtered under reduced trust. The same `boolean()` vs `boolean_filter()` discrepancy is directly observable in source. ```rust // Demonstrates that core.protectNTFS from an untrusted repository-local // section is honored by the unfiltered read in protect_options(). use std::str::FromStr; // Trusted (system/global) config: protection on by default. // Untrusted repository-local config (.git/config) disables NTFS protection. let repo_local = gix_config::File::from_str("[core]\n protectNTFS = false").unwrap(); // Reading core.protectNTFS with the trust-aware filter would reject the // repository-local section; reading it unfiltered (as protect_options does) // returns Some(false), disabling the .git-confusion check. let filtered = repo_local.boolean_filter("core.protectNTFS", |_| false); // trusted-only let unfiltered = repo_local.boolean("core.protectNTFS"); // what protect_options uses eprintln!("filtered (trusted only) = {:?}", filtered); // None -> safe default kept eprintln!("unfiltered (vulnerable) = {:?}", unfiltered); // Some(Ok(false)) -> protection disabled ``` ```text filtered (trusted only) = None unfiltered (vulnerable) = Some(Ok(false)) ``` Source confirmation that `boolean()` performs no trust filtering: ```rust // gix-config/src/file/access/comfort.rs:89 pub fn boolean(&self, key: impl AsKey) -> Result<Option<bool>> { self.boolean_filter(key, |_| true) } ``` ## Attack Chain 1. **Exposure:** The attacker owns a repository on a filesystem shared with the victim; the victim opens it with a `gix`-based tool, and the ownership mismatch sets the repository's config sections to `Trust::Reduced` (`gix/src/open/options.rs:215` installs the `is_trusted` section filter). 2. **Control:** The attacker writes `core.protectNTFS = false` (and/or `core.protectHFS = false`) into the repository-local `.git/config`, plus tree entries whose names are filesystem-specific encodings of `.git`. 3. **Path:** During checkout, index build, merge, or tree edit, each call site invokes `protect_options()` (`gix/src/clone/checkout.rs:103`, `gix/src/repository/index.rs:206`, `gix/src/repository/merge.rs:153` and `:214`, `gix/src/object/tree/editor.rs:24`, `gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:362`). 4. **Guard:** The `is_trusted` filter (`gix/src/config/mod.rs:61`) would reject the untrusted repository-local section, but `protect_options()` reads via `self.resolved.boolean(...)` (`gix/src/config/cache/access.rs:306,310,314`), which delegates to `boolean_filter(key, |_| true)` and ignores the filter. 5. **Primitive:** `gix_validate::path::component()` (`gix-validate/src/path.rs:98`) receives `protect_hfs=false` and/or `protect_ntfs=false`, so the HFS+/NTFS `.git`-confusion checks are skipped. When only one protection is disabled, the combined-case fallback at `gix-validate/src/path.rs:137` does not run, and the remaining single-filesystem check does not cover the other filesystem's encodings. 6. **Result:** Crafted tree entries that encode `.git` pass validation and are written to disk; on a case-insensitive filesystem they resolve into the real `.git` directory, overwriting hooks and configuration and plausibly yielding code execution in the victim's context. ## Bypass Evidence The protection under test is the reduced-trust section filter that is supposed to stop untrusted repository-local config from altering security settings. The strongest counter-argument is the case-insensitive `.git` fallback in `gix-validate/src/path.rs:137`, which rejects a plain `.git` match when both HFS+ and NTFS protections are off. That fallback is insufficient for two reasons verified in source: it only runs when BOTH `protect_hfs` and `protect_ntfs` are false (`!(protect_hfs | protect_ntfs)` at line 137), so disabling a single protection leaves it inactive; and even when it runs, its exact `eq_ignore_ascii_case(b".git")` test does not cover filesystem-specific encodings such as NTFS short names (`GIT~1`), NTFS trailing-dot/space or alternate-data-stream forms, or HFS+ ignorable-code-point variants, which are precisely what the dedicated `is_dot_hfs`/`is_dot_git_ntfs` checks (now skipped) exist to catch. The `boolean()` accessor was confirmed to apply no trust filtering (`gix-config/src/file/access/comfort.rs:89`), and the sibling reads in the same file consistently apply `filter_config_section`, so the unfiltered read is a genuine deviation rather than an intentional exemption. This issue is distinct from the previously disclosed submodule command-execution bypass (CVE-2026-40034 / GHSA-f26g-jm89-4g65): that advisory's fix changed only the `gix-submodule` crate and `gix/src/repository/submodule.rs` and never touched `protect_options()`, so this code path and its remediation boundary are not covered by it. ## Affected Versions - **Ecosystem:** `rust` - **Package:** `gix` (crates.io) - **Confirmed affected range:** `>= 0.88.0, <= 0.89.0` - **Latest release checked:** `0.89.0` ([crates.io](https://crates.io/crates/gix/0.89.0)) - **Fix status:** `0.90.0` `protect_options()` was introduced in `gix` 0.88.0 and did not exist in earlier releases; before then the path-validation options were not configurable from repository config in this way. The unfiltered read is present from introduction through the latest published release (0.89.0). ## Suggested Fix Read the path-protection settings through the same trust-aware accessor used by the other security-critical reads in `gix/src/config/cache/access.rs`: replace each `self.resolved.boolean(...)` call in `protect_options()` with `self.resolved.boolean_filter(..., &mut self.filter_config_section.clone())` so that untrusted repository-local sections are excluded under `Trust::Reduced` and the safe defaults are retained. The fix must apply to all three keys (`core.protectHFS`, `core.protectNTFS`, `gitoxide.core.protectWindows`) so that no single protection can be disabled from untrusted config. As an interim mitigation, operators can avoid opening untrusted or other-user-owned repositories with `gix`-based tools on shared or case-insensitive filesystems; this does not remove the underlying bypass. --- Reported by zx.

Published
Oct 23, 2026
Updated
Oct 23, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

29

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
29 / 40 · 7.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-q54r-jf2p-rfr2

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools

Sign up with email · Have an account? Sign in

Free account, no card. Unfollow any time.

Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

—

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.iogixfrom 0.88.0 · before 0.90.00.90.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:gix0.90.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodayNov 17, 2026+24 d

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

All records