GHSA-pm4j-7r4q-ccg8: Soroban: Muxed address<->ScVal conversions may break after a conversion failure
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: soroban-env-host (crates.io) 26.0.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to soroban-env-host (crates.io) 26.0.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Soroban host ensures that `MuxedAddress` objects can't be used as storage keys in order to proactively prevent the contract logic bugs. However, due to a bug in Soroban host implementation, a failure in `Val`->`ScVal` conversion during the storage key computation will have the flag indicating that storage conversion is happening stuck in the `true` state until the next storage access. While the flag is stuck in `true` state, any `MuxedAddress` object conversions to `ScVal` will fail, i.e. a failure will occur if a `MuxedAddress` is emitted in the event or is serialized to XDR via a host function. ### Impact The bug may cause unexpected contract failures in the rare edge case scenarios. In the worst case scenario the whole transaction will fail and the changes will be rolled back. Because the contract call is simply rolled back, there is no risk of the state corruption. An example scenario that would be affected by the bug is as follows: - Contract A calls contract B via `try_call` - Contract B calls a storage function (e.g. `put_contract_data`) with a non-convertible `Val` as a key (e.g. a `MuxedAddress` object, or a deeply nested vector) - Contract B fails - Contract A handles the failure gracefully and proceeds without accessing any storage methods - Contract A tries to emit an event with a `MuxedAddress` argument. That should be allowed, but instead of succeeding, contract A fails. ### Patches The bug will be fixed in protocol 26. ### Workarounds We believe that the bug is highly unlikely to occur in practice, as it involves three rare events happening simultaneously: `Val` conversion failure (these should normally not occur for the audited protocols), graceful handling of a cross-contract call failure (most protocols need cross-contract calls to succeed, or fail with a contract error), and `MuxedAddress` write (most of the contracts don't support `MuxedAddress` at all). In the case if the bug does occur, the mitigation depends on the reason of the value conversion failure: - If the conversion failure has been caused by a malicious contract, then either no action is necessary (because the whole interaction is malicious and has been correctly rolled back), or the contract invocation should be replaced by a non-malicious contract - If the conversion failure has been caused by a bad user input for a non-malicious contract (e.g. a bad user input passed to a legitimate protocol), then the user input has to be fixed In both scenarios the mitigation is to basically retry the transaction with proper arguments.
- Published
- Mar 7, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 7, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-681
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | soroban-env-host | pkg:cargo/soroban-env-host |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | soroban-env-host | before 26.0.0 | 26.0.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:soroban-env-host | 26.0.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-681 · Incorrect Conversion between Numeric TypesCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.