GHSA-pfvm-w89x-94jw: SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP datagram crashes TurnServer receive loop with no restart, disabling TURN UDP relay for all clients (DoS)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: SIPSorcery (NuGet) 10.0.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to SIPSorcery (NuGet) 10.0.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `TurnServer.ReceiveUdpAsync` places its generic `catch (Exception)` OUTSIDE the `while` receive loop, and `Start()` launches the loop fire-and-forget with no supervision or restart. A single pre-authentication UDP datagram whose STUN header first byte is in `0x80–0xFF` causes `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` to throw `ApplicationException`, which unwinds past the loop and terminates it. The TURN UDP relay is then dead for ALL clients until the process is restarted. ## Root Cause `src/SIPSorcery/net/TURN/TurnServer.cs`: - `ReceiveUdpAsync` (:555-577): the inner `try` (:562-567) wraps only `_udpSocket.ReceiveAsync()`; `HandleUdpDatagram(result.Buffer, result.RemoteEndPoint)` (:569) is inside the `while` body but OUTSIDE that inner try. The generic `catch (Exception ex)` (:573) is lexically OUTSIDE the `while`. - `Start()` does `_ = ReceiveUdpAsync();` (:381) — fire-and-forget, no restart. - `HandleUdpDatagram` (:579) calls `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage(data, data.Length)` (:600) for any non-ChannelData datagram; `ParseSTUNMessage` (STUNMessage.cs:94) has no try/catch. ## Impact `ApplicationException` propagates out of the `while`, is caught at :573, logged, and the method returns. `_running` remains true but nothing re-invokes `ReceiveUdpAsync` → TURN UDP relay permanently unavailable for all clients (whole-server DoS). Pre-authentication: STUN parsing precedes any TURN allocation/credential check. ## Proof of Concept Send one UDP datagram to the TURN port (default 3478) with first byte `0x80` (e.g. `80 00 00 00`). `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40` → not ChannelData → `ParseSTUNMessage` → `ParseSTUNHeader` executes `if ((Array[startIndex] & 0xC0) != 0) throw new ApplicationException(...)` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172); `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0` → throws. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: one UDP datagram to the TURN port, first byte `0x80–0xFF`. Guard: ChannelData branch requires `(data[0] & 0xC0) == 0x40` (:583). Bypass: `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40` → falls through to `ParseSTUNMessage` (:600). 2. Sink: `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage` → `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172) throws `ApplicationException`. Guard: none before the throw; `ParseSTUNMessage` has no try/catch. Bypass: `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0` → throws. 3. Impact: exception unwinds past the `while` into `catch(Exception)` at :573 → logged → method returns → loop exits. Guard: none — no restart (`Start()` :381 fire-and-forget). Bypass: N/A. TURN UDP relay dead for all clients until process restart. ## Bypass Evidence - Loop/catch structure: catch at TurnServer.cs:573 is outside the `while` at :559; `HandleUdpDatagram` at :569 is outside the inner try (:562-567). - Unguarded `ParseSTUNMessage` at :600; throw at STUNHeader.cs:169-172. - Fire-and-forget start at :381 with no restart in `Start()`. - `TurnServerConfig.ListenAddress` defaults to `IPAddress.Loopback` (:42), but a functioning TURN server must bind a routable address to serve clients, so real deployments are exposed. Non-default config narrows the vulnerable population, not the attack difficulty → AC:L. ## Affected Versions `nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13` (TurnServer component present since 10.0.5; verified on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD). ## Dedup NOT a duplicate of GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93 (CVE-2026-54632), which covers the client RTP/ICE socket (`UdpReceiver`/`RTPChannel`). `TurnServer` is a distinct shipped RFC 5766 server component with its own loop and fix location. ## Suggested Fix Wrap `HandleUdpDatagram` in a per-datagram try/log-and-continue INSIDE the `while` (matching the drop-and-continue intent of fix bdb76cb), and/or add loop supervision/restart. --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use
- Published
- Aug 12, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 12, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-248
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| NuGet | SIPSorcery | pkg:nuget/SIPSorcery |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| NuGet | SIPSorcery | from 10.0.5 · before 10.0.14 | 10.0.14 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| NuGet:SIPSorcery | 10.0.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-248 · Uncaught ExceptionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.