Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj: iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (Go) 2.33.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (Go) 2.33.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

# Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder ## Summary The Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired. The fix introduces `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. **The new limit is opt-in**: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. **Upgrading to `v2.33.0` alone does not mitigate the issue** — consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set `MaxMapAllocSize` on their `avro.Config`. ## Description Avro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a `long` element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries. Pre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer: - No per-block element-count check. - No cumulative across-block element-count check. - No memory-budget check before `make(map[...]..., n)` or before growing the map. The slice decoder had been hardened via `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own — Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries — *before* the block's entries are decoded into the map — and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap. Two decoder variants were affected, both in `codec_map.go`: - `mapDecoder.Decode` — string-keyed maps. - `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` — `encoding.TextUnmarshaler`-keyed maps (e.g. `map[CustomKey]V` where `*CustomKey` implements `UnmarshalText`). ## Affected components | File | Symbol | Pre-fix behavior | Post-fix behavior | |------|--------|------------------|-------------------| | `config.go` | `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` | Field did not exist | New `int` field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat) | | `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoder.Decode` | Read block count, grew map unbounded | Validates cumulative count against `MaxMapAllocSize` at each block header | | `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` | Same | Same | PR [#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5) (`fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass`) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in `534c7518` — the slice *logic* was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete. ## Technical details The fix mirrors the slice decoder's pattern: 1. At each block header, read the element count as `int64`. 2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop. 3. If the running total exceeds `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block's entries. 4. Otherwise, decode the block's entries into the map. Per-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, *before* per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc. `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` semantics match `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize`: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size). ## Fixed behavior `v2.33.0` adds the `MaxMapAllocSize` configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit. Tests added in PR #5 cover, for both `mapDecoder` and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler`: - Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation). - Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold). - Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally). ## Affected versions - `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` — all versions up to and including `v2.31.0` (repository is read-only upstream). - `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` — all versions prior to `v2.33.0`. Note: `v2.33.0` and later are vulnerable *by default* and only protected when `MaxMapAllocSize` is explicitly configured — see Mitigation. ## Fixed versions `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` `v2.33.0` and later, **with `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` explicitly set to a non-zero value**. A bare upgrade to `v2.33.0` without setting `MaxMapAllocSize` leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as `v2.32.0`. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade *and* a configuration change. There is no upstream fix for `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` — module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation. ## Mitigation Migrate from `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` to `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >= v2.33.0` **and** configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating `avro.DefaultConfig`: ```go cfg := avro.Config{ MaxByteSliceSize: 102_400, MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000, MaxMapAllocSize: 10_000, }.Freeze() decoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader) ``` Choose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2–10× that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory. For consumers that prefer the original import path, a `replace` directive in `go.mod` is supported: ``` replace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 => github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0 ``` `replace` is honoured only for the **main** module of a build — transitive consumers must add their own `replace`, or migrate the import path directly. If you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires. ## Proof-of-concept input Two attack shapes, both targeting `map[string]int`: **Single-block, oversize block count.** Emit one block header declaring `n = 2³¹ − 1` (or any value whose `n × averageEntrySize` exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates `make(map[string]int, n)`, which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached. **Chunking bypass.** Emit `k` blocks each declaring `n / k` elements, with `n / k` below any plausible per-block threshold but `n` itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with `MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000`, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000. Either shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no `iskorotkov/avro` writer is needed to generate them. ## References - Fix PR: [iskorotkov/avro#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5) - Fix commit: [`5192df9`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/5192df96a158999344ac96ebcb1f7461d626f6d7) (`codec_map.go`, `config.go`, tests) - Slice-path chunking-attack test coverage added in the same PR: [`534c7518`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/534c7518152a893d8b4dea962669bd1123308a00) - Release: [`v2.33.0`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/releases/tag/v2.33.0) - Security policy: [`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/blob/main/SECURITY.md) - Related advisories on this fork: [`GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv) (integer overflow), [`GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w) (CPU exhaustion — the same chunked-payload shape may trigger both before allocation pressure kicks in) - Cross-module precedent on `hamba/avro`: [`GO-2023-1930`](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1930) / `CVE-2023-37475` / `GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45` - Upstream (read-only): [`hamba/avro`](https://github.com/hamba/avro) ## Credits - **Fix author** (commit `5192df9`, PR #5 — `MaxMapAllocSize` config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov ([@iskorotkov](https://github.com/iskorotkov)) - **Review** (commit `a5fbddcb`, "address review comments"): Daniel Błażewicz ([@klajok](https://github.com/klajok)) ## Timeline - **2026-04-30** — `MaxMapAllocSize` introduced (`5192df9`); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (`534c7518`). - **2026-05-01** — PR #5 merged into `main`. - **2026-05-06** — `v2.33.0` tagged and released. - **2026-05-07** — Advisory published. - **2026-05-15** — Advisory revised.

Published
May 18, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/hamba/avro/v2from 0—
Gogithub.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2before 2.33.02.33.0

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5048Denial of service via unbounded map allocations in github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 and github.com/hamba/avro/v2
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v22.33.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records