GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc: Data race and double free via unsound `Send`/`Sync` in `reblessive`
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 31/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: surrealdb-core (crates.io) 4.0.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to surrealdb-core (crates.io) 4.0.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`dbs::Executor` drives every SurrealQL statement through `reblessive::tree::TreeStack`. In `reblessive 0.4.3` the runtime types unconditionally assert `Send`/`Sync` (`unsafe impl Send/Sync for Stack`, `TreeStack` and `Runner`), while the public entry points accept any future without a `Send` bound and store it type-erased in a bump allocator. Two safe-code consequences follow. First, `Runner::step_async`/`finish_async` return driver futures tied to the stack borrow rather than to `&mut self`, so a driver future can be duplicated; because `Stack` is `Sync` those futures are `Send`, and polling two copies on different threads runs `drive_top_task` concurrently — racy `Cell`/`UnsafeCell` access, double `pop_task()`/`pop_dealloc()` (double drop / double free) and a non-atomic `Option::take`. Second, `TreeStack: Send` lets safe code move a driver whose type-erased future captures `!Send` state (`Rc`, `RefCell`) to another thread while the creating thread keeps an alias of that state. No `unsafe` is needed at the call site. `surrealdb-core`'s own query futures are `Send` only because of the unsound `unsafe impl Send for TreeStack`, while the captured `&mut tree::Stk` is deliberately `!Send`. The unsound dependency was removed in 4.0.0 and the parser now uses plain recursion (commit `75407c4bcc`).
- Published
- Nov 3, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 6, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
31
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | surrealdb-core | from 0.0.0-0 · before 4.0.0 | 4.0.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:surrealdb-core | 4.0.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recorded+3 d
- TodayNov 17, 2026+14 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.