GHSA-m9c9-mc2h-9wjw: Lodestar snappy checksum issue
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: @lodestar/reqresp (npm) 1.25.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @lodestar/reqresp (npm) 1.25.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact Unintended permanent chain split affecting greater than or equal to 25% of the network, requiring hard fork (network partition requiring hard fork) Lodestar does not verify checksum in snappy framing uncompressed chunks. ### Vulnerability Details In Req/Resp protocol the messages are encoded by using ssz_snappy encoding, which is a snappy framing compression over ssz encoded message. In snappy framing format there are uncompressed chunks, each such chunk is prefixed with a checksum. Let's see how golang implementation parses such chunks - https://github.com/golang/snappy/blob/master/decode.go#L176 ``` case chunkTypeUncompressedData: // Section 4.3. Uncompressed data (chunk type 0x01). if chunkLen < checksumSize { r.err = ErrCorrupt return r.err } buf := r.buf[:checksumSize] if !r.readFull(buf, false) { return r.err } checksum := uint32(buf[0]) | uint32(buf[1])<<8 | uint32(buf[2])<<16 | uint32(buf[3])<<24 // Read directly into r.decoded instead of via r.buf. n := chunkLen - checksumSize if n > len(r.decoded) { r.err = ErrCorrupt return r.err } if !r.readFull(r.decoded[:n], false) { return r.err } if crc(r.decoded[:n]) != checksum { r.err = ErrCorrupt return r.err } r.i, r.j = 0, n continue ``` As you can see, if checksum is incorrect, decoder fails and returns error. Now let's look at lodestar decoder https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/blob/unstable/packages/reqresp/src/encodingStrategies/sszSnappy/snappyFrames/uncompress.ts#L17 ``` uncompress(chunk: Uint8ArrayList): Uint8ArrayList | null { this.buffer.append(chunk); const result = new Uint8ArrayList(); while (this.buffer.length > 0) { if (this.buffer.length < 4) break; const type = getChunkType(this.buffer.get(0)); const frameSize = getFrameSize(this.buffer, 1); if (this.buffer.length - 4 < frameSize) { break; } const data = this.buffer.subarray(4, 4 + frameSize); this.buffer.consume(4 + frameSize); if (!this.state.foundIdentifier && type !== ChunkType.IDENTIFIER) { throw "malformed input: must begin with an identifier"; } if (type === ChunkType.IDENTIFIER) { if (!Buffer.prototype.equals.call(data, IDENTIFIER)) { throw "malformed input: bad identifier"; } this.state.foundIdentifier = true; continue; } if (type === ChunkType.COMPRESSED) { result.append(uncompress(data.subarray(4))); } if (type === ChunkType.UNCOMPRESSED) { 1) result.append(data.subarray(4)); } } if (result.length === 0) { return null; } return result; } ``` As you can see, checksum is not verified, bytes are appended to 'result' ### Proof of Concept How to reproduce: get poc via [gist link](https://gist.github.com/gln7/aab55674431b1c8d42a59ccf9d7cbf60) and run it: ``` $ node dec1.mjs checking chunk type=255 checking chunk type=1 got uncompressed chunk.. Decompressed ok 124 bytes ```
- Published
- Jan 14, 2025
- Updated
- Jan 14, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-354
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @lodestar/reqresp | pkg:npm/%40lodestar/reqresp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @lodestar/reqresp | before 1.25.0 | 1.25.0 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-53rv-hcvm-rpp9Lodestar snappy decompression issue0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@lodestar/reqresp | 1.25.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
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Research context
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Timeline
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Patch and commit links
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Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-354 · Improper Validation of Integrity Check ValueAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.