GHSA-m8jr-fxqx-8xx6: Apollo Federation has Improper Enforcement of Access Control on Transitive Fields
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @apollo/composition (npm) 2.10.4, 2.11.5, 2.12.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @apollo/composition (npm) 2.10.4, 2.11.5, 2.12.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# Summary A vulnerability in Apollo Federation's composition logic did not enforce that fields depending on protected data through `@requires` and/or `@fromContext` directives have the same access control requirements as the fields they reference. This allowed queries to access protected fields indirectly through their dependencies, bypassing access control checks. A fix to composition logic in Federation now enforces that dependent fields match the access control requirements from of the fields they reference. ## Details Apollo Federation allows users to specify [`@authenticated`, `@requiresScopes`, and `@policy` directives](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/authorization#authorization-directives) to protect fields at the field level. The `@requires` directive allows a field to depend on data from other fields in the schema, and `@fromContext` allows a field to use values from the execution context. However, Apollo Router does not enforce access control requirements on these transitively-accessed fields, and Apollo Federation did not require that fields using `@requires` or `@fromContext` have the same access control as the fields they depend on. At execution time, when a field decorated with `@requires` or `@fromContext` was resolved, the Router would fetch the required dependency fields from subgraphs without checking whether those fields had their own access control requirements. Access control directives applied to these dependency fields were only enforced when those fields appeared explicitly in the query. If the protected fields were accessed solely as transitive dependencies (in other words, fetched to satisfy `@requires` or `@fromContext` but not directly requested) their access control requirements were silently ignored. This discrepancy between where access controls could be defined (on any field) and where it was enforced (only on explicitly queried fields) leads to unexpected runtime security gaps. ## Who is impacted This vulnerability impacts Apollo Federation customers with supergraphs defining `@authenticated`, `@requiresScopes`, or `@policy` directives on fields that are also specified as dependencies in `@requires` or `@fromContext` directives. ### Scope of Impact The vulnerability could allow a malicious actor to craft a query that indirectly accesses protected fields, allowing them to bypass field-level access control. By querying only fields that depend on protected data (via `@requires` or `@fromContext`) without explicitly requesting the protected fields themselves, an attacker could retrieve sensitive information without meeting the access control requirements. ## Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in Apollo Federation by updating composition logic to validate that access control requirements on `@requires` and `@fromContext` dependency fields match the resolving field's requirements. _Note that this is a breaking change to Apollo Federation, as it no longer allows fields using `@requires` or `@fromContext` to have different access control directives from the fields they depend on. You will need to update your subgraphs to ensure that the access control requirements on fields using `@requires` or `@fromContext` match the access control directives on the referenced fields._ If you are using the Apollo Studio build pipeline with Federation version 2.9 or above, then this patch version update is automatic and you only need to adjust the access control requirements in your subgraph schemas as mentioned above. If you are using Apollo Rover for local composition, you will need to update its composition version (after updating Apollo Router, [if necessary](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/graph-management/updates#recommended-update-order)) to one of the following versions: - 2.9.5+ - 2.10.4+ - 2.11.5+ - 2.12.1+ You will then need to adjust the access control requirements in your subgraph schemas as mentioned above. ## Workarounds - If you are using Apollo Rover with an unpatched composition version or are using the Apollo Studio build pipeline with Federation version 2.8 or below, you should review your schema for any sensitive fields that are accessed via `@requires` or `@fromContext` and explicitly apply matching access control directives on those transitive fields. Alternatively, consider restructuring your schema so that protected fields are queried directly. * Customers not using Apollo Router access control features (`@authenticated`, `@requiresScopes`, or `@policy` directives) or not using `@requires` or `@fromContext` directives in combination with field-level access control are not affected and do not need to take action.
- Published
- Nov 14, 2025
- Updated
- Nov 14, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-863
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @apollo/composition | pkg:npm/%40apollo/composition |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @apollo/composition | from 2.10.0-alpha.3 · before 2.10.4 | 2.10.4 |
| npm | @apollo/composition | from 2.11.0-preview.1 · before 2.11.5 | 2.11.5 |
| npm | @apollo/composition | from 2.12.0-preview.0 · before 2.12.1 | 2.12.1 |
| npm | @apollo/composition | before 2.9.5 | 2.9.5 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@apollo/composition | 2.10.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:@apollo/composition | 2.11.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:@apollo/composition | 2.12.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:@apollo/composition | 2.9.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-863 · Incorrect AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/apollographql/federation/commit/09e596e6a0c753071ca822e84f525d73ada395cf
- github.com/apollographql/federation/commit/0d8fca1c8cc375bb8486f11f339984b69267417d
- github.com/apollographql/federation/commit/20c75d1d60a48fc289d88c8d29652f1afc7553e4
- github.com/apollographql/federation/commit/e1c58611c3c996b4fff98a54e49f00549ff2115d
- github.com/apollographql/federation
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.