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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-j496-crgh-34mx: ibc-go: Potential Reentrancy using Timeout Callbacks in ibc-hooks

CriticalCVSS 9.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v4 (Go) 4.6.0; github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v5 (Go) 5.4.0; github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v6 (Go) 6.3.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v4 (Go) 4.6.0; github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v5 (Go) 5.4.0; github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v6 (Go) 6.3.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

**Name**: ASA-2024-007: Potential Reentrancy using Timeout Callbacks in ibc-hooks **Component**: ibc-go **Criticality**: Critical ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Critical; L:AlmostCertain) **Affected versions**: < v4.6.0, < v5.4.0, < v6.3.0, < v7.4.0, < v8.2.0 **Affected users**: Chain Builders + Maintainers # Summary Through the deployment and subsequent use of a malicious CosmWasm contract via IBC interactions, an attacker could potentially execute the same `MsgTimeout` inside the IBC hook for the `OnTimeout` callback before the packet commitment is deleted. On chains where ibc-hooks wraps ICS-20, this vulnerability may allow for the logic of the `OnTimeout` callback of the transfer application to be recursively executed, leading to a condition that may present the opportunity for the loss of funds from the escrow account or unexpected minting of tokens. # Affected Configurations Chains which satisfy all of the following requirements are considered to be impacted by this vulnerability: * Chain is IBC-enabled and uses a vulnerable version of ibc-go * Chain is CosmWasm-enabled and allows code uploads for wasm contracts by anyone, or by authorized parties (to a lesser extent) * Chain utilizes the ibc-hooks middleware and wraps ICS-20 transfer application # Next Steps for Impacted Chain Builders and Maintainers It is advised to immediately upgrade to the latest patch fix version of ibc-go for your chain. If you have already applied a soft-patch through private coordination, we recommend additionally updating to the latest ibc-go version via normal software upgrade governance. If you have not upgraded your chain yet, and you desire to mitigate exposure to this vulnerability in the meantime, it is advisable to limit code uploading for contracts to trusted parties on your chain. **If your chain only allows permissioned, access-controlled contract uploads, it is still strongly recommended to update to the latest patched ibc-go version for your chain per your normal software upgrade process.** # Preparing for future coordination If your chain would like to be included in future coordination efforts, please ensure your chain has a prominently displayed or otherwise easily available up-to-date email address for technical security contact available. A security.md file in the root of your projects’ code repository should contain this information. Additionally, please test this security contact with an unaffiliated email to ensure it works as expected and can receive emails from outside of your domain. To ensure that your chain is included in future impact assessments, please keep your chain information up to date in the [Cosmos Chain Registry](https://github.com/cosmos/chain-registry) with code location, network name, and public RPC and API endpoints in the details. We recommend that all chains configure and practice the use of the [Circuit Breaker module](https://docs.cosmos.network/main/build/modules/circuit) in the Cosmos SDK, as future vulnerability notifications may require the use of this mechanism as a mitigation against exploitation. # Recognition This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 3/26/24 by Maxwell Dulin (Strikeout) at [Asymmetric Research](https://www.asymmetric.re/). If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. # Notes Due to the critical nature of this issue, both the ibc-go team and Amulet independently performed impact assessments for the ecosystem, which informed a risk-driven private patching effort that preceded this public release. This private patching effort significantly reduced the exposure of the ecosystem to this vulnerability. We appreciate the diligence and professionalism of all chains and validators involved with this effort – your ability to move quickly while maintaining confidentiality was instrumental in protecting the wider Interchain Ecosystem. If you ever have questions about security coordination efforts, public or private, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about ibc-go, please see https://ibc.cosmos.network/main. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.

Published
Apr 5, 2024
Updated
May 20, 2024
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

36

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v4
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v5
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v6
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v7
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v8
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v2
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-gofrom 0—
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v2from 0—
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v3from 0—
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v4before 4.6.04.6.0
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v5before 5.4.05.4.0
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v6before 6.3.06.3.0
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v7before 7.4.07.4.0
Gogithub.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v8before 8.2.08.2.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v44.6.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v55.4.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v66.3.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v77.4.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/v88.2.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

References

All records