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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5: Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/rancher/rancher (Go) 2.6.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/rancher/rancher (Go) 2.6.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Impact The `restricted` pod security policy (PSP), provided in Rancher versions from 2.0 up to and including 2.6.3, has a deviation from the [upstream](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/6d22e08903d7dd44b049c4689fa882ae07f67de9/content/en/examples/policy/restricted-psp.yaml) `restricted` policy provided in Kubernetes, in which Rancher's PSP has `runAsUser` set to `runAsAny`, while upstream has `runAsUser` set to `MustRunAsNonRoot`. This allows containers to run as any user, including a privileged user (`root`), even when Rancher's `restricted` policy is enforced on a project or at cluster level. A new `restricted-noroot` PSP was created to prevent pods from running as `root` when this policy is enforced. This new policy was introduced, instead of patching the current provided `restricted` policy, in order to avoid breaking users' workloads that are using the `restricted` PSP and that might be running as a privileged user. **Note**: Running containers as `root` increases the risk of a compromised container being used by a malicious actor as an attack platform to further exploit the user's environment. It is a security best practice to avoid running containers as a privileged user and to limit its usage to workloads where it is strictly necessary. ### Patches Patched versions include release 2.6.4 and later versions. The existing `restricted` PSP in Rancher 2.6.4 was not modified and still allows containers to run as a privileged user, as explained above. This fix was not backported to previous releases. For Rancher 2.6.4 and later releases, users using the current `restricted` PSP and that want to prevent containers from running as `root`, are advised to migrate to the new `restricted-noroot` policy. Before doing this migration, it is necessary to verify if affected workloads are currently running as a privileged user and modify them accordingly to the users' own environment to run as a non-privileged user. A redeployment of the affected workload is necessary in order for the new PSP to take effect. ### Workarounds For users running Rancher 2.6.3 and previous releases, which did not received this backport and that want to benefit from this fix, they can manually create a new `restricted-noroot` PSP on their clusters through Rancher UI. The template of the `restricted-noroot` policy provided in Rancher 2.6.4 is available in the [source code](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/blob/7410cef256c9ed22e8bf4609e5b2e9a1f63a0d05/pkg/data/management/podsecuritypolicytemplate_data.go#L101-L145). As a reminder, it is also necessary to manually verify and redeploy the running workload before enabling a more restricted pod security policy. ### References For instructions on how to configure pod security policies using Rancher, please refer to the [documentation](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/pod-security-policies/) page. For more information on PSPs in Kubernetes, please refer to the Kubernetes [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy/) ([permalink](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/f5ec6b03db0925dc2b9cb9bbdc8135dcbeacbe0e/content/en/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy.md)). **Important reminder:** Pod security policies are considered deprecated since Kubernetes v1.21, and will be removed in Kubernetes v1.25. Consult Kubernetes' [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/migrate-from-psp/) ([permalink](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/f5ec6b03db0925dc2b9cb9bbdc8135dcbeacbe0e/content/en/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/migrate-from-psp.md)) regarding how to migrate from PodSecurityPolicy to Kubernetes' built-in PodSecurity Admission Controller. For the list of supported Kubernetes versions in Rancher, please consult our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries. * Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository. * Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).

Published
Mar 3, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancher

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancherfrom 2.0.0 · before 2.6.42.6.4
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancherfrom 2.0.0+incompatible—

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-c45c-39f6-6gw9Rancher generated tokens not revoked after modifications made to authentication provider
    35Monitor
  • GO-2026-4590Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user in github.com/rancher/rancher
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmhExposure of SSH credentials in Rancher/Fleet
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/rancher/rancher2.6.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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