GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5: Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/rancher/rancher (Go) 2.6.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/rancher/rancher (Go) 2.6.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact The `restricted` pod security policy (PSP), provided in Rancher versions from 2.0 up to and including 2.6.3, has a deviation from the [upstream](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/6d22e08903d7dd44b049c4689fa882ae07f67de9/content/en/examples/policy/restricted-psp.yaml) `restricted` policy provided in Kubernetes, in which Rancher's PSP has `runAsUser` set to `runAsAny`, while upstream has `runAsUser` set to `MustRunAsNonRoot`. This allows containers to run as any user, including a privileged user (`root`), even when Rancher's `restricted` policy is enforced on a project or at cluster level. A new `restricted-noroot` PSP was created to prevent pods from running as `root` when this policy is enforced. This new policy was introduced, instead of patching the current provided `restricted` policy, in order to avoid breaking users' workloads that are using the `restricted` PSP and that might be running as a privileged user. **Note**: Running containers as `root` increases the risk of a compromised container being used by a malicious actor as an attack platform to further exploit the user's environment. It is a security best practice to avoid running containers as a privileged user and to limit its usage to workloads where it is strictly necessary. ### Patches Patched versions include release 2.6.4 and later versions. The existing `restricted` PSP in Rancher 2.6.4 was not modified and still allows containers to run as a privileged user, as explained above. This fix was not backported to previous releases. For Rancher 2.6.4 and later releases, users using the current `restricted` PSP and that want to prevent containers from running as `root`, are advised to migrate to the new `restricted-noroot` policy. Before doing this migration, it is necessary to verify if affected workloads are currently running as a privileged user and modify them accordingly to the users' own environment to run as a non-privileged user. A redeployment of the affected workload is necessary in order for the new PSP to take effect. ### Workarounds For users running Rancher 2.6.3 and previous releases, which did not received this backport and that want to benefit from this fix, they can manually create a new `restricted-noroot` PSP on their clusters through Rancher UI. The template of the `restricted-noroot` policy provided in Rancher 2.6.4 is available in the [source code](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/blob/7410cef256c9ed22e8bf4609e5b2e9a1f63a0d05/pkg/data/management/podsecuritypolicytemplate_data.go#L101-L145). As a reminder, it is also necessary to manually verify and redeploy the running workload before enabling a more restricted pod security policy. ### References For instructions on how to configure pod security policies using Rancher, please refer to the [documentation](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/pod-security-policies/) page. For more information on PSPs in Kubernetes, please refer to the Kubernetes [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy/) ([permalink](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/f5ec6b03db0925dc2b9cb9bbdc8135dcbeacbe0e/content/en/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy.md)). **Important reminder:** Pod security policies are considered deprecated since Kubernetes v1.21, and will be removed in Kubernetes v1.25. Consult Kubernetes' [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/migrate-from-psp/) ([permalink](https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/f5ec6b03db0925dc2b9cb9bbdc8135dcbeacbe0e/content/en/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/migrate-from-psp.md)) regarding how to migrate from PodSecurityPolicy to Kubernetes' built-in PodSecurity Admission Controller. For the list of supported Kubernetes versions in Rancher, please consult our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries. * Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository. * Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).
- Published
- Mar 3, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 23, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-862
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | pkg:golang/github.com/rancher/rancher |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | from 2.0.0 · before 2.6.4 | 2.6.4 |
| Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | from 2.0.0+incompatible | — |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-c45c-39f6-6gw9Rancher generated tokens not revoked after modifications made to authentication provider35Monitor
- GO-2026-4590Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user in github.com/rancher/rancher0Monitor
- GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmhExposure of SSH credentials in Rancher/Fleet0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/rancher/rancher | 2.6.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-862 · Missing AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.