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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf: gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: google.golang.org/grpc (Go) 1.82.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to google.golang.org/grpc (Go) 1.82.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in: - Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets. - Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ #### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` & `RequestedServerName` matchers - Affected Component: xDS RBAC - Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops. - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions. - If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine. As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized clients to access protected gRPC services or resources. #### HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Mitigation Bypass / Denial of Service via Stream Aborts - Affected Component: HTTP/2 transport - Impact: Earlier mitigations in grpc-go for HTTP/2 Rapid Reset only applied threshold checks to items that directly resulted in control frames being written back to the wire, such as `SETTINGS` ACKs or server-initiated `RST_STREAM`s. When a client initiated a rapid flood of stream creation (`HEADERS`) immediately followed by stream termination `RST_STREAM`, items queued up in the control buffer without counting against the transport response frame threshold. An attacker can repeatedly trigger this flood sequence to bypass reader blocking, resulting in high CPU usage, and Denial of Service (DoS). #### Denial of Service (Panic) in xDS RBAC Engine via Unsupported Fields inside NOT Rules - Affected Component: xDS RBAC - Impact: The xDS RBAC policy translators recursively generate matchers for nested rules. When a `NOT` rule wrapped an unsupported or unhandled field (such as `SourcedMetadata`), the recursive step returned an empty matcher. This could result in a runtime panic when the RBAC engine attempts to authorize an incoming request. An attacker or misconfigured/malicious xDS management server delivering an LDS/RDS update containing a `NOT` rule around an unhandled field causes the gRPC server process to crash immediately (CWE-248 / Denial of Service). ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ All three issues have been fixed in `master` and will be released in 1.82.1 shortly. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ If upgrading grpc-go immediately is not possible, apply the following workarounds based on your deployment architecture: * For xDS RBAC Vulnerabilities & Panics: Ensure that upstream xDS management servers do not push RBAC policies containing `Metadata`, `RequestedServerName`, or `NOT` rules wrapping unsupported fields (such as `SourcedMetadata`) to grpc-go servers. * For HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS: Configure upstream reverse proxies or load balancers (such as Envoy) with strict HTTP/2 `max_concurrent_streams` limits and active rate limiting on `RST_STREAM` frequency per connection. ### Severity | Vulnerability | Qualitative Severity | Approximate CVSS v3.1 Score | Primary Impact | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass** | **High** | `8.2` | Unauthorized Access / Fail-Open | | **HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS Bypass** | **High** | `7.5` | High CPU Consumption / Denial of Service | | **xDS RBAC Engine Server Panic** | **Medium** | `5.9` | Process Crash / Denial of Service |

Published
Jul 21, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogoogle.golang.org/grpc

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogoogle.golang.org/grpcbefore 1.82.11.82.1

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-m425-mq94-257ggRPC-Go HTTP/2 Rapid Reset vulnerability
    30Monitor
  • GO-2026-6061Vulnerabilities in the xDS RBAC authorization engine and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation in google.golang.org/grpc
    0Monitor
  • GO-2024-2978Private tokens could appear in logs if context containing gRPC metadata is logged in google.golang.org/grpc
    0Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierGO-2023-2153Nov 1, 2023 · Denial of service from HTTP/2 Rapid Reset in google.golang.org/grpc
    0Monitor
  • ← EarlierGHSA-xr7q-jx4m-x55mJul 5, 2024 · Private tokens could appear in logs if context containing gRPC metadata is logged in github.com/grpc/grpc-go
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:google.golang.org/grpc1.82.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-248 · Uncaught Exception

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

All records