GHSA-hff2-gcpx-8f4p: Apollo Router Core: Browser Bug Enables Bypass of XS-Search Prevention via Read-Only Cross-Site Request Forgery
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: apollo-router (crates.io) 2.10.2, 2.12.1, 1.61.13.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to apollo-router (crates.io) 2.10.2, 2.12.1, 1.61.13 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact In a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack, untrusted web content causes browsers to send authenticated requests to web servers which use cookies for authentication. While the web content is prevented from reading the request's response due to the Cross-Origin Request Sharing (CORS) protocol, the attacker may be able to cause side effects in the server ("CSRF" attack), or learn something about the response via timing analysis ("XS-Search" attack). Apollo Router has a built-in feature which prevents CSRF and XS-Search attacks: it refuses to process GraphQL requests that could possibly have been sent by a spec-compliant web browser without a protective "preflight" step. See [Apollo Router's docs](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/csrf) for more details on CORS, CSRF attacks, and Apollo Router's CSRF prevention feature. This feature is fully effective against attacks carried out against users of spec-compliant browsers. Unfortunately, a major browser introduced a bug in 2025 which meant in certain cases, it failed to follow the CORS spec. The browser's maintainers have already committed to fixing the bug and making the browser spec-compliant again. Even with this bug, Apollo Router's CSRF prevention feature **blocks** "side effect" CSRF attacks: Apollo Router will still correctly refuse to execute _mutations_ in requests that were not preflighted. However, some specially crafted authenticated GraphQL _queries_ can be issued across origins *without preflight* in buggy versions of this browser, allowing for XS-Search attacks: an attacker can analyze response times to learn facts about the responses to requests such as whether fields return null or approximately how many list entries are returned from fields. Apollo Router installations are only vulnerable if they rely on cookies (or HTTP Basic Auth) for authentication. ### Patches The vulnerability is patched in the following versions of Apollo Router: - 2.12.1 (latest) - 2.10.2 (v2.10 LTS) - 1.61.13 (v1; note that Router v1 reaches [end-of-support on March 31 2026](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/resources/runtime-release-lifecycle#end-of-support-eos)) These releases contain a single change: GraphQL requests sent in HTTP `GET` requests which contain a `Content-Type` header naming a type other than `application/json` are rejected. (`GET` requests with no `Content-Type` are allowed.) This change prevents XS-Search attacks even in browsers which are non-compliant in ways similar to this browser. There are no known cases where GraphQL apps depend on the ability of clients to send non-empty `Content-Type` headers with GET requests other than `application/json`, so this change has not been made configurable; if this change breaks a specific use case, contact support and more configurability can be added. #### Workarounds If upgrading is not possible, this particular browser's bug can be mitigated by preventing any HTTP request with a `Content-Type` header containing `message/` from reaching the Apollo Router (e.g. in a load balancer/proxy). If the load balancer cannot easily be updated to block these requests, it can also be done with a Rhai script within Router: ``` # config.yaml rhai: scripts: "/directory/with/rhai/script" main: "main.rhai" # main.rhai fn router_service(service) { const request_callback = Fn("process_request"); service.map_request(request_callback); } fn process_request(request) { if "content-type" in request.headers { if request.headers["content-type"].contains("message/") { throw "Error: invalid content type" } } } ``` While the patch prevents a broader class of similar issues, the only known way to exploit this vulnerability is against a particular browser which currently plans to ship a fix in May 2026. If it is already past June 2026 and this vulnerability has not been addressed yet, it is likely that the installation is not currently vulnerable. Upgrading to the latest version of Apollo Router is still recommended for the broader protection. ### Resources The browser bug causes a similar vulnerability in Apollo Server; see https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server/security/advisories/GHSA-9q82-xgwf-vj
- Published
- Mar 26, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 26, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-200
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | apollo-router | pkg:cargo/apollo-router |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | apollo-router | from 2.0.0 · before 2.10.2 | 2.10.2 |
| crates.io | apollo-router | from 2.11.0 · before 2.12.1 | 2.12.1 |
| crates.io | apollo-router | before 1.61.13 | 1.61.13 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:apollo-router | 1.61.13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| crates.io:apollo-router | 2.10.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| crates.io:apollo-router | 2.12.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-200 · Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-200 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
{
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],
"background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }
}Fixed
{
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- ExcavationCAPEC-116likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- FootprintingCAPEC-169likelihood: High · Very Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- FingerprintingCAPEC-224likelihood: High · Very Low
- ICMP Echo Request PingCAPEC-285likelihood: Medium · Low
- TCP SYN ScanCAPEC-287Low
- Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) RecordsCAPEC-290Low
ATT&CK techniques
- System Service DiscoveryT1007
- System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016
- Remote System DiscoveryT1018
- System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033
- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005
- Network Service ScanningT1046
- System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049
- Process DiscoveryT1057
- Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069
- System Information DiscoveryT1082
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Account DiscoveryT1087
- Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111
- Peripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
- System Time DiscoveryT1124
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-hff2-gcpx-8f4p
- github.com/apollographql/router/commit/a72e759bcdeef93fcd3dc928cf3c1f4bbebdcc65
- github.com/apollographql/router
- github.com/apollographql/router/releases/tag/v2.12.1
- www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/resources/runtime-release-lifecycle#end-of-support-eos
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.