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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j: nono-cli'scregistry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent

MediumCVSS 6.6 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: nono-cli (crates.io) 0.61.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to nono-cli (crates.io) 0.61.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary Registry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant: - `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json` - `~/.config/nono/packages/<namespace>/<pack>/.nono-trust.bundle` Testing shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run. ## Affected behavior Observed with `always-further/claude`: 1. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`. Result: ```text nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force ``` 2. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle`. Result: the profile loads successfully. 3. Restore `.nono-trust.bundle` while the lockfile is still absent. Result: ```text nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force ``` ## Impact If both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification. This is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact. ## Root cause `verify_profile_packs` treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure. That creates a fail-open state: - lockfile entry missing - trust bundle missing - pack directory still present - profile can load ## Recommended fix For any registry pack selected for execution, require both: 1. A matching lockfile entry in `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`. 2. A present and valid `.nono-trust.bundle` in the installed pack directory. If either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example: ```text reinstall with: nono pull <namespace>/<pack> --force ``` This keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.

Published
Jul 28, 2026
Updated
Jul 28, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.6 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
crates.ionono-cli

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ionono-clibefore 0.61.30.61.3

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:nono-cli0.61.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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