GHSA-h9mw-h4qc-f5jf: kubernetes-graphql-gateway: GraphQL Endpoint Vulnerable to Authenticated Denial-of-Service via Unrestricted Query Execution
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway (Go) 1.2.9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway (Go) 1.2.9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
**CVSS 6.5 Medium** — The GraphQL API served by kubernetes-graphql-gateway is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks due to a complete absence of query resource controls (depth limiting, complexity analysis, response size capping, and rate limiting). An authenticated attacker can craft queries that force the server to compute and serialize multi-megabyte responses, consuming significant CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. Repeated requests can exhaust server resources and degrade or deny service to legitimate users. > **Note:** A previous version of this advisory (based on pre-v1 code) documented an unauthenticated attack surface via an HTTP GET method bypass in the former `registry.go`. That bypass has been removed in v1 — all requests now require a Bearer token. The CVSS score has been adjusted from 7.5 to 6.5 accordingly (Privileges Required: None → Low). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) no longer applies. ## Root Cause The kubernetes-graphql-gateway uses the `graphql-go/graphql` library (v0.8.1) with the `graphql-go/handler` HTTP handler. The handler is instantiated in `gateway/gateway/graphql/graphql.go` with only cosmetic configuration — no resource limits: ```go // gateway/gateway/graphql/graphql.go — CreateHandler() func (s *GraphQLServer) CreateHandler(schema *graphql.Schema) *GraphQLHandler { graphqlHandler := handler.New(&handler.Config{ Schema: schema, Pretty: s.config.Pretty, Playground: s.config.Playground, GraphiQL: s.config.GraphiQL, }) return &GraphQLHandler{ Schema: schema, Handler: graphqlHandler, } } ``` The `handler.Config` struct does not include `MaxDepth`, `MaxComplexity`, `MaxResponseSize`, or any equivalent fields. Neither the `graphql-go/handler` nor the underlying `graphql-go/graphql` library provides built-in query depth or complexity analysis. The application configuration (`gateway/gateway/config/config.go`) has no fields for resource limits: ```go // gateway/gateway/config/config.go — GraphQL config type GraphQL struct { Pretty bool Playground bool GraphiQL bool } ``` No rate limiting, throttling, or request size controls exist anywhere in the codebase. ## Authentication Model All requests pass through the HTTP handler in `gateway/http/http.go`, which extracts a Bearer token and injects it into the request context: ```go // gateway/http/http.go — Token extraction (applied to all methods) s.Handle("/api/clusters/{clusterName}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { clusterName := r.PathValue("clusterName") authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization") token := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") ctx := utilscontext.SetToken(r.Context(), token) ctx = utilscontext.SetCluster(ctx, clusterName) c.Gateway.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx)) })) ``` The token is enforced at the Kubernetes API layer via `gateway/gateway/roundtripper/bearer.go`, which returns HTTP 401 for requests without a valid token. However, the GraphQL execution engine (query parsing, schema validation, introspection) still runs **before** the Kubernetes API is contacted — meaning authenticated users can trigger expensive operations that consume server resources without hitting the K8s API at all. ## Attack Vectors ### 1. Nested Introspection Field Expansion The GraphQL schema contains 3,508 types (Kubernetes resources + platform CRDs). Introspection meta-fields (`__schema`, `__type`) allow recursive field expansion. Each additional nesting level multiplies the response size exponentially. A single full introspection query generates ~5.2 MB of response data in ~1.15s. ### 2. Parallel Request Amplification Without rate limiting, an authenticated attacker can issue many concurrent expensive queries. 5 parallel requests generate ~18.6 MB total response in under 4 seconds with no throttling. At scale (e.g. 999 concurrent requests), the backend becomes unresponsive and returns 503 to all users. ### 3. Subscription Resource Exhaustion The `HandleSubscription()` method in `gateway/gateway/graphql/graphql.go` processes SSE (Server-Sent Events) subscription requests. A malicious authenticated client can open many subscription channels simultaneously, holding server connections and memory indefinitely: ```go // gateway/gateway/graphql/graphql.go — HandleSubscription() subscriptionChannel := graphql.Subscribe(subscriptionParams) for res := range subscriptionChannel { // ... marshal and flush indefinitely ... } ``` There is no limit on the number of concurrent subscriptions, no idle timeout, and no per-client connection cap. ### 4. Deep Query Execution Authenticated users can submit arbitrarily deep and complex GraphQL queries. The GraphQL execution engine processes the full query — consuming CPU and memory for schema validation, field resolution, and error/response formatting — before any Kubernetes API authorization is checked. The request handling in `gateway/gateway/endpoint/endpoint.go` passes directly to the handler with no query guards: ```go // gateway/gateway/endpoint/endpoint.go — ServeHTTP() func (e *Endpoint) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if e.handler == nil || e.handler.Handler == nil { http.Error(w, "Endpoint not ready", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } if r.Header.Get("Accept") == "text/event-stream" { e.graphqlServer.HandleSubscription(w, r, e.handler.Schema) return } e.handler.Handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) } ``` ## Impact - **Availability (High):** Service denial achievable — concurrent expensive queries cause backend to become unresponsive (503 for all users). With 3,508 types and no depth limits, each introspection query generates a ~5.2 MB response. The absence of rate limiting, query complexity controls, and response size caps allows an authenticated attacker to exhaust server CPU, memory, and bandwidth. - **Confidentiality (None):** Information disclosure is covered in a separate finding. - **Integrity (None):** No data modification possible. ## Affected Components - `gateway/gateway/graphql/graphql.go` — Handler creation with no resource limits; subscription handler with no connection limits - `gateway/gateway/endpoint/endpoint.go` — Direct passthrough to handler, no query depth/complexity middleware - `gateway/gateway/config/config.go` — No configuration fields for resource limits - `gateway/http/http.go` — No rate limiting middleware - `graphql-go/graphql` library — No built-in depth/complexity limiting - `graphql-go/handler` — No resource limit configuration options ## Recommendations 1. **Disable Introspection in Production** — As a defense-in-depth measure, disable introspection in non-development environments. This removes the highest-cost query path. If GraphiQL/Playground must remain accessible for development, gate it behind an environment flag. 2. **Implement Query Depth and Complexity Limiting** — Implement middleware that parses the query AST and rejects queries exceeding configurable thresholds before execution. Recommended maximum depth: 10 levels. Assign cost values to fields and enforce a maximum query cost budget — introspection meta-fields (`__schema`, `__type`) should carry elevated costs. Alternatively, consider migrating to a GraphQL library with built-in depth/complexity support (e.g., `gqlgen` with its complexity extension, or `graph-gophers/graphql-go` with its `MaxDepth` option). 3. **Implement Rate Limiting and Response Size Controls** — Add per-user rate limiting on the GraphQL endpoint. Suggested thresholds: 60 requests/minute for authenticated users, 2 requests/minute for introspection queries. Cap response payload size (e.g., 5 MB). For subscriptions, enforce maximum concurrent connections per client, idle timeouts, and maximum subscription duration. 4. **Add Resource Limit Configuration** — Extend the `GraphQL` struct in `gateway/gateway/config/config.go` to expose all resource limits (max query depth, max complexity, max response size, rate limit thresholds) as configurable parameters. This ensures all protective thresholds can be tuned per environment without code changes. ## References - [OWASP GraphQL Cheat Sheet — Resource Limits](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/GraphQL_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [OWASP API4:2023 — Unrestricted Resource Consumption](https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0xa4-unrestricted-resource-consumption/) - [CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html) - [CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html) ## Classification - **CWE-770** — Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling - **CWE-400** — Uncontrolled Resource Consumption - **OWASP Top 10 2021:** A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration - **OWASP API Security Top 10:** API4:2023 — Unrestricted Resource Consumption - **STRIDE:** Denial of Service (D) ## Internal Reference HASI2026141-32 — Due: 2026-04-16
- Published
- Apr 8, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-400
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway | pkg:golang/github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway | before 1.2.9 | 1.2.9 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5420kubernetes-graphql-gateway: GraphQL Endpoint Vulnerable to Authenticated Denial-of-Service via Unrestricted Query Execution in…0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/platform-mesh/kubernetes-graphql-gateway | 1.2.9 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-400 · Uncontrolled Resource ConsumptionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Root cause
Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-400 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
function expand(node) {
return node.children.map(expand);
}Fixed
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;
function expand(node, depth = 0) {
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");
return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.