GHSA-h4fw-6r7f-w494: Webauthn has a User Verification Downgrade via Default-Open ClientOverridePolicy
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 8/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Physical access to the device is required. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: web-auth/webauthn-framework (Packagist) 5.3.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-framework (Packagist) 5.3.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary In version 5.3.0 of the Symfony bundle, `Webauthn\Bundle\Policy\ClientOverridePolicy` defaulted to allowing all client overrides, including `userVerification`. A client could send `{"userVerification": "discouraged"}` in the assertion or attestation options request to override a server-configured `userVerification: required`, causing the emitted WebAuthn options to instruct the authenticator to skip user verification. The `CheckUserVerification` ceremony step then read the same downgraded options and skipped its check. ## Affected versions - **Vulnerable**: 5.3.0 - **Patched**: 5.3.1 5.3.0 was released on 2026-05-01 and 5.3.1 was published roughly 18 hours later, on 2026-05-02. Practical exposure window was minimal. ## Note on earlier 5.x versions Versions 5.0.0 to 5.2.x did not ship `ClientOverridePolicy` (introduced in 5.3.0), so the exact code path described above does not apply. However, on those versions the `ProfileBasedRequestOptionsBuilder` and `ProfileBasedCreationOptionsBuilder` already passed the client-supplied `userVerification` value directly to the options factory, where the profile value is only applied via `??=`. The functional outcome (a client can downgrade `userVerification`) is the same. The recommended mitigation (see below) applies regardless of the version, and users on 5.0.x – 5.2.x are encouraged to upgrade to 5.3.1 or later. ## Severity This is a **defense-in-depth** issue rather than a primitive that grants authentication on its own: - The attacker must already possess the victim's authenticator (a stolen security key, an unlocked device). Without that, the downgrade is inconsequential. - The framework exposes the actual UV outcome on the returned authenticator data (`AuthenticatorData::isUserVerified()`). Applications that gate sensitive operations on this flag — as documented — remain protected even on the vulnerable version. ## Mitigation Applications gating sensitive operations on user verification MUST re-check the `UV` flag on the returned authenticator data after a successful ceremony, regardless of what was requested in the options: ```php if (! $authenticatorData->isUserVerified()) { throw new AccessDeniedHttpException('User verification is required.'); } ``` This is the authoritative signal that user verification actually occurred. The hardened default in 5.3.1 closes the implicit profile-bypass; the application-level check remains the recommended defense in depth and is now documented explicitly in the [User Verification](https://webauthn-doc.spomky-labs.com/webauthn-in-a-nutshell/user-verification#checking-the-uv-flag) guide. ## Fix `ClientOverridePolicy::canOverride()` now defaults to `false` instead of `true`. The Symfony bundle DI configuration ships `user_verification` overrides as **disabled by default**, with a default `allowed_values` list that excludes `discouraged` even when an operator opts in. ## Credit Reported by @offset.
- Published
- May 7, 2026
- Updated
- May 7, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-863
Report tools
Action score
8
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 8 / 40 · 2.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-framework | pkg:composer/web-auth/webauthn-framework |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-framework | from 5.3.0 · before 5.3.1 | 5.3.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:web-auth/webauthn-framework | 5.3.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Physical access to the device is required.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-863 · Incorrect AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.