GHSA-h37v-hp6w-2pp8: ml-dsa's UseHint function has off by two error when r0 equals zero
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.1.0-rc.5.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.1.0-rc.5 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary There's a bug in the `use_hint` function where it adds 1 instead of subtracting 1 when the decomposed low bits `r0` equal exactly zero. FIPS 204 Algorithm 40 is pretty clear that `r0 > 0` means strictly positive, but the current code treats zero as positive. This causes valid signatures to potentially fail verification when this edge case gets hit. ### Details The issue is in `ml-dsa/src/hint.rs` in the `use_hint` function. Here's what FIPS 204 Algorithm 40 says: ``` 3: if h = 1 and r0 > 0 return (r1 + 1) mod m 4: if h = 1 and r0 <= 0 return (r1 − 1) mod m ``` Line 3 uses `r0 > 0` (strictly greater than zero), and line 4 uses `r0 <= 0` (less than or equal, which includes zero). So when `r0 = 0`, the spec says to subtract 1. But the current implementation does this: ```rust if h && r0.0 <= gamma2 { Elem::new((r1.0 + 1) % m) } else if h && r0.0 >= BaseField::Q - gamma2 { Elem::new((r1.0 + m - 1) % m) } ``` The problem is `r0.0 <= gamma2` includes zero. When `r0 = 0`, this condition is true (since `0 <= gamma2`), so it adds 1. But according to the spec, `r0 = 0` should fall into the `r0 <= 0` case and subtract 1 instead. The result is +1 when it should be -1, which is an off by two error mod m. ### PoC Take MLDSA 44 where γ2 = 95,232 and m = 44. If `use_hint(true, 0)` is called: - `Decompose(0)` gives `(r1=0, r0=0)` - The condition `r0.0 <= gamma2` is `0 <= 95232` which is true - So it returns `(0 + 1) % 44 = 1` But FIPS 204 says: - `r0 > 0` is `0 > 0` which is false - `r0 ≤ 0` is `0 ≤ 0` which is true - So it should return `(0 - 1) mod 44 = 43` The function returns 1 when it should return 43. This can happen in real signatures whenever any coefficient of the `w'` vector happens to be a multiple of 2γ2, which makes its decomposed `r0` equal zero. It's not super common but it's definitely possible, and when it hits, verification will fail for a completely valid signature. ### Impact This is a FIPS 204 compliance bug that affects signature verification. When the edge case triggers, valid signatures get rejected. Since MLDSA is supposed to be used for high security post quantum cryptography, having verification randomly fail isn't great. It's also theoretically possible that the mismatch between what signing expects and what verification does could be exploited somehow, though that would need more looking into. The fix is straightforward, just change the condition to explicitly check for positive values: ```rust if h && r0.0 > 0 && r0.0 <= gamma2 { Elem::new((r1.0 + 1) % m) } else if h { Elem::new((r1.0 + m - 1) % m) } ```
- Published
- Feb 2, 2026
- Updated
- Feb 3, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-193
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | ml-dsa | pkg:cargo/ml-dsa |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | ml-dsa | before 0.1.0-rc.5 | 0.1.0-rc.5 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:ml-dsa | 0.1.0-rc.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
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No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
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Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-193 · Off-by-one ErrorCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.