GHSA-gqqj-85qm-8qhf: Paperclip: codex_local inherited ChatGPT/OpenAI-connected Gmail and was able to send real email
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 34/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A Paperclip-managed `codex_local` runtime was able to access and use a Gmail connector that I had connected in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI, even though I had not explicitly connected Gmail inside Paperclip or separately inside Codex. In my environment this enabled mailbox access and a real outbound email to be sent from my Gmail account. After I manually intervened to stop the workflow, follow-up retraction messages were also sent, confirming repeated outward write/send capability. This appears to be a trust-boundary failure between Paperclip-managed Codex execution and inherited OpenAI app connectors, amplified by dangerous-by-default runtime settings. ### Details Successful runtime calls include: - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_profile` - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_search_emails` - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_send_email` The connected Gmail profile resolved to my personal account. Inside the Paperclip-managed `codex-home`, I also found cached OpenAI curated connector state for Gmail under a path like: - `codex-home/plugins/cache/openai-curated/gmail/.../.app.json` This strongly suggests that the runtime had access to an already connected OpenAI apps surface rather than a Paperclip-specific Gmail integration that I intentionally configured. Separately, in the installed Paperclip code, `codex_local` defaults `dangerouslyBypassApprovalsAndSandbox` to `true`, and the server-side agent creation path applies that default when the flag is omitted. In practice, that makes this boundary failure much more dangerous because a newly created `codex_local` agent can operate with approvals and sandbox bypassed by default. The key issue is this: I had connected Gmail only in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI. I had not intentionally connected Gmail inside Paperclip or separately inside Codex. Despite that, the Paperclip-managed `codex_local` runtime was able to use Gmail read/write actions. ### PoC Environment: - self-hosted Paperclip instance using `codex_local` - Gmail connected in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI - no explicit Gmail connection configured inside Paperclip for this test - `codex_local` agent created and run with default behavior Observed reproduction path: 1. Connect Gmail in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI. 2. Create or run a Paperclip `codex_local` agent. 3. Execute a task that inspects mailbox state or performs outward communication. 4. Observe successful Gmail connector calls such as: - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_profile` - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_search_emails` - `mcp__codex_apps__gmail_send_email` 5. Observe that the connected profile resolves to the ChatGPT/OpenAI-connected Gmail account and that mailbox reads and real sends are possible. Private evidence available on request: - successful `get_profile` / `search` / `send` logs - Paperclip-managed `codex-home` Gmail connector cache path(s) - screenshot showing Gmail write-capable actions such as `send_email`, `send_draft`, and `update_draft` exposed in the connected-app UI - incident timeline showing that a real outbound email was sent - recipient organizations, timestamps, message IDs, and sanitized evidence for both the original outbound email and the subsequent retraction messages ### Impact This was not only theoretical in my environment. It resulted in: - mailbox identity disclosure - mailbox search / thread access - a real outbound email being sent from a personal connected Gmail account to an external third party - follow-up retraction messages being sent after manual intervention, confirming repeated outward write/send capability From an operator/security perspective, connecting Gmail in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI should not automatically make that connector available to a Paperclip-managed local agent runtime, especially not for write/send actions. One or more of the following: - no inherited OpenAI app connectors by default in Paperclip-managed `codex_local` runs - send/write connectors blocked by default - explicit Paperclip-side opt-in before outward actions - auditable approval and provenance for connector-mediated actions - safer defaults, including `dangerouslyBypassApprovalsAndSandbox = false`
- Published
- Apr 16, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-284
Report tools
Action score
34
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 34 / 40 · 8.7 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | paperclipai | pkg:npm/paperclipai |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | paperclipai | up to and including 2026.403.0 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-284 · Improper Access ControlCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Embedding Scripts within ScriptsCAPEC-19likelihood: High · High
- Malicious Logic InsertionCAPEC-441likelihood: Medium · High
- Modification of Windows Service ConfigurationCAPEC-478likelihood: Low · High
- Malicious Root CertificateCAPEC-479likelihood: Low · Low
- Intent SpoofCAPEC-502
- WebView ExposureCAPEC-503
- Data Injected During ConfigurationCAPEC-536likelihood: Low · High
- Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant EnvironmentCAPEC-546likelihood: Low · Medium
ATT&CK techniques
- RootkitT1014
- Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsT1027.009
- Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsT1037
- Taint shared contentT1080
- Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLLT1505.005
- Pre-OS Boot:BootkitT1542.003
- Create or Modify System ProcessT1543
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch AgentT1543.001
- Create or Modify System Process:Windows ServiceT1543.003
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch DaemonT1543.004
- Event Triggered Execution:Change Default File AssociationT1546.001
- Event Triggered Execution:.bash_profile and .bashrcT1546.004
- Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility FeaturesT1546.008
- Event Triggered Execution: Installer PackagesT1546.016
- Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionT1547
- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Kernel Modules and ExtensionsT1547.006
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.