GHSA-gj6x-q8rh-wj6x: Curio exposes database credentials to users with network access through verbose HTTP error responses
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/filecoin-project/curio (Go) 1.27.3-rc2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/filecoin-project/curio (Go) 1.27.3-rc2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Multiple HTTP handlers in Curio passed raw database error messages to HTTP clients via `http.Error()`. When the PostgreSQL/YugabyteDB driver (pgx) returned errors, these could contain the database connection string — including hostname, port, username, and password. Additionally, the internal connection string was constructed with the plaintext password embedded in the URL, which was also included in startup error messages and could surface in logs. ## Details Three components were affected: 1. **PDP handlers** (`pdp/handlers.go`) — 18+ HTTP error paths passed `err.Error()` directly to HTTP responses. While these endpoints require ECDSA JWT authentication, an authenticated client (e.g., a FilPay service) that triggered a database error would receive the raw pgx error in the HTTP response body. Present since PDP was introduced in v1.25.1. 2. **Market mk12 deal status** (`market/mk12/mk12_utils.go`) — The `GetDealStatus` handler included `err.Error()` in error responses: `"failed to query the db for deal status: %s"`. Present since v1.24.3. 3. **Market mk20 auth middleware** (`market/mk20/http/http.go`) — Authentication error responses included `err.Error()`, potentially leaking database error details during auth flows. Present since v1.27.2. ### Root Cause The database connection string was constructed as: ``` postgresql://username:password@host:port/database?... ``` The plaintext password was embedded directly in the URL. When pgx returned connection or query errors, the error text could contain fragments of this connection string. HTTP handlers forwarded these errors verbatim to clients. ## Impact An attacker with network access to Curio's PDP or Market HTTP endpoints and valid authentication credentials could intentionally trigger database errors (e.g., by sending malformed requests that cause SQL failures) and extract the YugabyteDB connection credentials from the error response. With these credentials, the attacker could directly access the database, which serves as Curio's control plane. Per Curio's [security boundary documentation](https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/blob/main/documentation/en/design/README.md#security-boundary), these endpoints are expected to be on a trusted network. However, defense-in-depth requires that credentials are never exposed through HTTP responses regardless of network trust assumptions. ## Remediation (PR #919) 1. **Connection string password masking:** The password in the connection string is replaced with `********`. The real password is set separately via `cfg.ConnConfig.Password`, so it never appears in error messages or logs. 2. **HTTP handler sanitization:** All affected handlers now log the detailed error server-side and return a generic error message to the HTTP client. 3. **Error filter (`errFilter`):** A new function in the database layer detects and redacts any error messages containing keywords like "password", "host", "port", or "://" before they can propagate. 4. **Prometheus metrics cleanup:** Database connection metrics that could expose connection details were removed from the metrics endpoint. 5. **Security boundary documentation:** A new section documents what Curio expects operators to secure. ## Resources - Fix: https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/pull/919 - Patched release: v1.27.3-rc2
- Published
- Feb 26, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 23, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-209
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/filecoin-project/curio | pkg:golang/github.com/filecoin-project/curio |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/filecoin-project/curio | from 1.24.3 · before 1.27.3-rc2 | 1.27.3-rc2 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4568Curio exposes database credentials to users with network access through verbose HTTP error responses in github.com/filecoin-project/curio0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/filecoin-project/curio | 1.27.3-rc2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-209 · Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive InformationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.