GHSA-g8fc-vrcg-8vjg: Constallation has pods exposed to peers in VPC
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 (Go) 2.16.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 (Go) 2.16.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact Cilium allows outside actors (`world` entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via `LoadBalancer`). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude `world` traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker _inside the cloud VPC_. ### Patches The issue has been patched in [v2.16.3](https://github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/releases/tag/v2.16.3). ### Workarounds This network policy excludes all `world` traffic. It mitigates the problem, but will also block all desired external traffic. If vulnerable pods are known, a policy can be crafted to only firewall those instead (see also https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/policy/language/#access-to-from-outside-cluster). ```yaml apiVersion: "cilium.io/v2" kind: CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy metadata: name: "from-world-to-role-public" spec: endpointSelector: matchLabels: {} # role: public ingressDeny: - fromEntities: - world ``` ### References The tracking bug for a Cilium-side fix is https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/25626.
- Published
- Apr 15, 2024
- Updated
- Jun 4, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-940
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 | pkg:golang/github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/constellation | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 | before 2.16.3 | 2.16.3 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-6w5f-5wgr-qjg5Constellation allows Emergency shell access during initramfs boot phase0Monitor
- GHSA-r2h5-3hgw-8j34User data in TPM attestation vulnerable to MITM0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 | 2.16.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-940 · Improper Verification of Source of a Communication ChannelAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.