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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr: esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows

LowCVSS 2.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 10/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: esbuild (npm) 0.28.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to esbuild (npm) 0.28.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from `servedir`. Due to the use of `path.Clean()` (which only normalizes forward-slash `/` separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (`\`) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured `servedir` root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem. This issue affects Windows environments only. ### Details The request path is sanitized using: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] ``` However: - `path.Clean()` is POSIX-style and only understands `/` (docs: `https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean`) - On Windows, `\` is a valid path separator - `path.Clean()` does not treat `\` as a separator Later, the server constructs the absolute path: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221 absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) ``` If `queryPath` contains sequences such as: ``` ..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini ``` `path.Clean()` will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret `\` as directory separators when resolving `absPath`. Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within `servedir`, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory. ### Vulnerable Code ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] .... // Check for a file in the "servedir" directory if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry { absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath { if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil { if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry { .... ``` ### Steps to reproduce ``` npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild echo "console.log(1)" > app.js .\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version 0.27.3 .\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini" <content of Windows\system.ini> ``` ### Impact - Arbitrary file read on Windows - Exposure of sensitive files

Published
Jun 12, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

10

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
10 / 40 · 2.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
npmesbuild

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmesbuildfrom 0.27.3 · before 0.28.10.28.1

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response
    21Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:esbuild0.28.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records