GHSA-g75f-g53v-794x: Bleach linkify(parse_email=True) CPU exhaustion via unbounded email regex scanning
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Bleach 6.3.0 exposes a documented email-linkification path through `bleach.linkify(..., parse_email=True)`. The implementation scans attacker-controlled text with `EMAIL_RE.finditer()` over the full character token and has no length, timeout, or linear prefilter before applying the dot-atom email regex. A non-email payload around 30 KB causes multi-second CPU consumption per request/call, creating a direct availability risk for applications that enable email linkification on user-submitted text. ## Affected Product - Package: `bleach` - Ecosystem: pip - Affected versions: verified in `6.3.0`; exact first affected version not established - Patched versions: none known at finalization time - Tested version: `6.3.0` - Audit commit/tag: `v6.3.0` / `5546d5dbce60d08ccb99d981778d74044d646d4e` - PyPI sdist SHA256: `6f3b91b1c0a02bb9a78b5a454c92506aa0fdf197e1d5e114d2e00c6f64306d22` ## Vulnerability Details - CWE: CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity; related availability impact maps to CWE-400 - Component: `bleach/linkifier.py`, `build_email_re()`, `LinkifyFilter.handle_email_addresses()` - Root cause: `handle_email_addresses()` calls `self.email_re.finditer(text)` on attacker-controlled text. `EMAIL_RE` includes a repeated dot-atom local-part pattern, so non-email strings such as repeated `a.` segments with no `@` force repeated long failing scans. - Security boundary violated: user-submitted text processed by a documented safe linkification helper should not allow an attacker to impose superlinear CPU cost through non-email text. - Direct impact: per-request CPU exhaustion / denial-of-service risk in applications that enable `parse_email=True` on attacker-controlled text. - Chain impact, if any: one proof run observed an unrelated `/health` request delayed during a concurrent attack request, but this was not reliable across reviewer retests. Treat cross-request service degradation as environment-dependent supporting evidence, not the primary impact. - Severity estimate: Medium / availability-only. The feature is opt-in and deployment body limits/timeouts affect practical severity. Relevant code path: - `bleach/__init__.py:85-125`: public `linkify(text, ..., parse_email=False)` constructs `Linker(..., parse_email=parse_email)` and calls `linker.linkify(text)`. - `bleach/linkifier.py:77-88`: `EMAIL_RE` is compiled from the dot-atom email pattern. - `bleach/linkifier.py:292-301`: `handle_email_addresses()` applies `self.email_re.finditer(text)` to each character token. - `bleach/linkifier.py:620-623`: character tokens are routed into email handling only when `parse_email` is true. - `docs/goals.rst:30-40`: Bleach documents user comments, profile bios, and descriptions as target untrusted text use cases. - `docs/linkify.rst:300-305`: `parse_email=True` is the documented option for creating `mailto:` links. ## Attack Preconditions - The consuming application enables the documented `parse_email=True` option, for example `bleach.linkify(user_text, parse_email=True)` or `Linker(parse_email=True).linkify(user_text)`. - The attacker can submit text that reaches that linkification path. Authentication depends on the host application; a public comment form would make this unauthenticated, while account-only text fields require user privileges. - The application allows roughly 20-30 KB of text to reach Bleach and lacks a strict timeout or input cap before linkification. - No custom bounded `email_re` is supplied. ## Reproduction Minimal API trigger: ```python import bleach payload = ("a." * 15000) + "a" bleach.linkify(payload, parse_email=True) ``` The saved HTTP proof uses a local harness with `POST /preview` calling `bleach.linkify(request_body, parse_email=True)` and a control endpoint using `parse_email=False` on the same payload. The exploit sends baseline/control/attack requests over HTTP to `127.0.0.1`. ## Proof Evidence The proof ran against Bleach `6.3.0` installed from the audited local checkout in an isolated temporary venv. It used Python `3.12.3` on Linux. Measured HTTP proof results: - Payload: `("a." * 15000) + "a"` (`30001` bytes) - Normal baseline `/preview` mean: `0.001425` seconds - Same 30 KB payload with `parse_email=False`: `0.048349` seconds - Attack payload with `parse_email=True`: `8.719818` seconds - Slowdown versus the larger baseline/control mean: `180.35x` - Requests sent by proof: `20` Evidence files: [poc.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27129729/poc.py) [poc_results.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27129737/poc_results.json) [exploit_proof.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27129751/exploit_proof.py) [exploit_results.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27129752/exploit_results.json) ## Scope and Limitations - This report does not claim XSS, authentication bypass, data disclosure, remote code execution, persistent crash, or persistent service outage. - `parse_email=True` is not the default. The affected path is a documented opt-in feature. - The exact first affected version is not established. - Practical impact depends on host application input limits, worker model, request timeout policy, and whether untrusted users can submit text to an email-linkification path. - A reviewer reproduced the direct CPU cost but did not reproduce the proof harness’s `/health` delay. The direct impact claim is therefore limited to per-request CPU exhaustion. - Bleach is marked deprecated in `README.rst`, and `SECURITY.md` has stale supported-version text, but the package still has a 2025 PyPI release and published Mozilla security reporting routes.
- Published
- Jun 16, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1333
Report tools
Action score
17
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | bleach | pkg:pypi/bleach |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | bleach | from 6.3.0 · up to and including 6.3.0 | — |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
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Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1333 · Inefficient Regular Expression ComplexityCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.