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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-g5xx-c4hv-9ccc: CometBFT's state syncing validator from malicious node may lead to a chain split

MediumCVSS 4.7 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 18/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.37.11, 0.38.12; github.com/cometbft/cometbft/light (Go) 0.34.34, 0.37.11, 0.38.12.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.37.11, 0.38.12; github.com/cometbft/cometbft/light (Go) 0.34.34, 0.37.11, 0.38.12 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

**Name**: ASA-2024-009: State syncing validator from malicious node may lead to a chain split **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality**: Medium ([ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L: Possible) **Affected versions**: >= 0.34.0, <= 0.34.33, >=0.37.0, <= 0.37.10, >= 0.38.0, <= 0.38.11 ### Summary The state sync protocol retrieves a snapshot of the application and installs it in a fresh node. In order for this node to be ready to run consensus and block sync from the installed snapshot height, we also need to install a valid `State` in the node, which is the starting state from which it is able to validate new blocks and append them to the blockchain. The `State` object used by state sync is computed using the light client protocol, which retrieves information about committed blocks from at least two RPC endpoints. The light client protocol performs several state validations and, in particular, compares the state provided by different RPC endpoints, looking for inconsistencies. The `State` object contains, among other fields, a `Validators` field which stores the current validator set. A validator set is a list of validator addresses, public keys and associated voting powers, one per validator. It also stores, for historical reasons, the state of the proposer selection algorithm, in the form of the `ProposerPriority` field associated with each `Validator`. While the light client is able to validate the `ValidatorSet` retrieved from RPC endpoints, this validation does not include the `ProposerPriority` field associated with each `Validator`. As a result, when state sync adopts RPC endpoints that, for unknown reasons, provide an invalid state of the proposer selection algorithm, the node will not be able to properly run the consensus protocol, as their local view of which validator is the proposer of a given round and height will disagree with the views of the correct validators. If an increasing number of validators state sync using RPC endpoints with invalid states, the network eventually halts. ### Patches Release versions 0.34.34, 0.37.11, and 0.38.12 include a patch to address this issue. In the patched versions, the light client protocol compares the `ProposerPriority` fields of the `ValidatorSet` instances retrieved from the RPC endpoints configured for state sync. If they differ, the computed `State` object is considered invalid and state sync will fail with an error. ### Workarounds The issue is observed when validators run state sync using RPC nodes that are malicious or report invalid states for the proposer selection algorithm. It is worth noting that non-malicious nodes running upstream software should never report an invalid state for the proposer selection algorithm. This situation may result from the adoption of nodes with customized code or which had their state, stored in local databases, manually updated. When the network public's RPC endpoints have an invalid state for the proposer election algorithm, there, new validators should refrain from using state sync for bootstrapping or be sure that they configure for state sync RPC endpoints with a valid state of the proposer election algorithm. A validator with an invalid state for the proposer selection algorithm will reject most of the proposed blocks and will have the network rejecting blocks it has proposed. It is also possible to manually compare the state of the proposer election algorithm of nodes by comparing the outputs of the `/validators?height=_` RPC endpoints. The outputs must fully match, including the ProposerPriority field associated with each validator. ### References * [State Sync documentation](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/core/state-sync) This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 12/08/24. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see [https://hackerone.com/cosmos](https://hackerone.com/cosmos). If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about CometBFT, please see [https://docs.cometbft.com/](https://docs.cometbft.com/). For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see [https://github.com/interchainio/security](https://github.com/interchainio/security).

Published
Sep 3, 2024
Updated
Nov 18, 2024
EPSS
—
CWE
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

18

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
18 / 40 · 4.7 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft/light
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbftfrom 0.37.0 · before 0.37.110.37.11
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbftfrom 0.38.0 · before 0.38.120.38.12
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft/lightfrom 0.34.0 · before 0.34.340.34.34
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft/lightfrom 0.37.0 · before 0.37.110.37.11
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft/lightfrom 0.38.0 · before 0.38.120.38.12

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft0.37.11Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft0.38.12Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft/light0.34.34Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft/light0.37.11Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft/light0.38.12Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

Weakness class (CWE)

—

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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