GHSA-fqf6-gxhh-2xhw: uutils coreutils: cp/install/mv/ln --suffix alone does not enable backup mode (silent data loss vs GNU)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: uucore (crates.io) 0.6.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to uucore (crates.io) 0.6.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`determine_backup_mode` in `src/uucore/src/lib/features/backup_control.rs` only checks `--backup`/`-b` and returns `BackupMode::None` when only `--suffix` is given. GNU enables backup mode when `--suffix` is used alone (defaulting to existing/numbered, or `$VERSION_CONTROL`). Affects `cp`, `install`, `mv`, `ln` which share this code. ``` # uutils: no backup created $ coreutils cp --suffix=.bak src dest # dest.bak NOT created # GNU: dest.bak created $ cp --suffix=.bak src dest ``` **Impact:** users/scripts relying on `--suffix` to back up a file before overwrite get silent data loss; breaks GNU compatibility across four utilities. Recommendation: enable backup mode when `--suffix` is present. _Note: this is primarily a GNU-compatibility/data-safety divergence rather than a classic exploitable vulnerability — review whether it warrants a CVE._ **Remediation:** Acknowledged by Canonical; fixed in PR #9741 (`uucore: use --suffix to enable backup mode`), commit `939ab037a`, merged 2025-12-21. `determine_backup_mode` now has a `--suffix`-alone branch that resolves the mode from `$VERSION_CONTROL` (defaulting to `existing`). Released in **uucore 0.6.0** and later (vulnerable: `< 0.6.0`). Regression tests added in the same file: `test_backup_mode_suffix_without_backup_option` and `test_backup_mode_suffix_without_backup_option_with_env_var`. --- _Reported by Zellic in the *uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment* (prepared for Canonical, Jan 20 2026), audited commit `3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242`. Finding 3.7. Credit: Zellic._
- Published
- Jul 7, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 7, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-440
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | uucore | pkg:cargo/uucore |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | uucore | before 0.6.0 | 0.6.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:uucore | 0.6.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-440 · Expected Behavior ViolationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.