Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-fj2x-735w-74vq: gnark-crypto allows unchecked memory allocation during vector deserialization

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto (Go) 0.19.2, 0.18.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto (Go) 0.19.2, 0.18.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

The issue has been reported by @raefko from @fuzzinglabs. Excerpts from the report: > A critical vulnerability exists in the gnark-crypto library's `Vector.ReadFrom()` function that allows an attacker to trigger arbitrary memory allocation by crafting malicious input data. An attacker can cause the verifier to attempt allocating up to 128 GB of memory with a minimal malicious input, leading to out-of-memory crashes and denial of service. > ### **Root Cause** > > > The vulnerability stems from **unchecked deserialization** of attacker-controlled length fields in the gnark-crypto library's `Vector.ReadFrom()` function. The function reads a 4-byte unsigned integer from untrusted input and directly uses it to allocate memory without any validation or bounds checking. > > ### **Vulnerable Code Path** > > ``` > User Input (Malicious Proof/Data) > ↓ > gnark Proof/Data Deserialization > ↓ > Vector.ReadFrom() (ecc/bn254/fr/vector.go:136-144) > → sliceLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[:4]) // ← ATTACKER-CONTROLLED > → (*vector) = make(Vector, sliceLen) // ← UNCHECKED ALLOCATION > ↓ > runtime.makeslice attempts 100+ GB allocation > ↓ > fatal error: runtime: out of memory → SIGABRT > > ``` > > ### **Vulnerable Code** > > **File**: [`gnark-crypto@v0.14.0+/ecc/bn254/fr/vector.go:136-144`](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark-crypto/blob/8310aae2de6104d3fe3610e3370b2bed10c63111/ecc/bn254/fr/vector.go#L136) > > The code reads a 4-byte big-endian unsigned integer (`sliceLen`) directly from the input stream and uses it to allocate a slice without any bounds checking or validation. Each element is 32 bytes (fr.Element for BN254 curve), so an attacker can request up to: > > **Maximum Allocation**: `2^32 elements × 32 bytes = 137,438,953,472 bytes ≈ 128 GB` > > ## **Root Cause Analysis** > > The gnark-crypto library implements a generic serialization format for field element vectors. The format is: > > ``` > [4 bytes: length (n)] [n × 32 bytes: elements] > ``` > > The deserialization code **trusts** the length field implicitly without any validation. This is a classic **integer-to-allocation vulnerability** pattern, similar to issues that have affected many serialization libraries over the years. ### Impact The issue impacts users deserializing vectors directly from untrusted sources. In case of malicious input it would lead to OOM in case the server doesn't have sufficient memory (depending on the field, but could allocate from 32GB to 196GB). ### Patches The issue is patched in https://github.com/Consensys/gnark-crypto/pull/759. It will be backported to gnark-crypto v0.18 and v0.19. ### Workarounds The user could manually peek into the first 4 bytes of the serialized data to estimate if the header would allocate large amounts of memory.

Published
Oct 30, 2025
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-fj2x-735w-74vq

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/consensys/gnark-crypto

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/consensys/gnark-cryptofrom 0.19.0 · before 0.19.20.19.2
Gogithub.com/consensys/gnark-cryptofrom 0.9.1 · before 0.18.10.18.1

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2025-4087Unchecked memory allocation during vector deserialization in github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto
    0Monitor
  • GO-2023-2101Incorrect exponentiation results in github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-pffg-92cg-xf5cgnark-crypto's exponentiation in the pairing target group GT using GLV can give incorrect results
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto0.18.1Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto0.19.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

All records