GHSA-fcmh-qfxc-w685: kube-router: BGP Peer Passwords Exposed in Logs at Verbose Logging Level
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 16/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary When kube-router is configured with per-node BGP peer passwords using the `kube-router.io/peer.passwords` node annotation, and verbose logging is enabled (`--v=2` or higher), the raw Kubernetes node annotation map is logged verbatim — including the base64-encoded BGP MD5 passwords. Anyone with access to kube-router's logs (via `kubectl logs`, log aggregation systems, or shared log dumps during debugging) can extract and decode the BGP peer passwords. The official troubleshooting documentation instructs users to collect logs at `-v=2` before filing issues, making accidental disclosure during support interactions a realistic scenario. ## Details The vulnerability is at `pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go:1129`: ```go // pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go:1127-1133 // If the global routing peer is configured then peer with it // else attempt to get peers from node specific BGP annotations. if len(nrc.globalPeerRouters) == 0 { klog.V(2).Infof("Attempting to construct peer configs from annotation: %+v", node.Annotations) peerCfgs, err := bgpPeerConfigsFromAnnotations( ``` `node.Annotations` is of type `map[string]string`. This type does not implement `fmt.Stringer`, so `%+v` formatting dumps every key-value pair verbatim. When `kube-router.io/peer.passwords` is set on the node (the documented mechanism for providing per-node BGP MD5 passwords), its base64-encoded value appears in the log output. The BGP peer password annotation is documented in `docs/user-guide.md` and has the constant: ```go // pkg/controllers/routing/network_routes_controller.go:59 peerPasswordAnnotation = "kube-router.io/peer.passwords" ``` Note that a password-safe `String()` method exists on `PeerConfig` and `PeerConfigs` in `pkg/bgp/peer_config.go` and is tested: ```go // pkg/bgp/peer_config.go:63-79 // Custom Stringer to prevent leaking passwords when printed func (p PeerConfig) String() string { // ...password field is intentionally omitted... } ``` However, this protective method is never invoked by the vulnerable log statement, which dumps the raw annotation map before any parsing occurs. The password masking only applies after the annotation is parsed into `PeerConfig` structs. The second log statement at line 1510 (`klog.Infof("Peer config from %s annotation: %+v", peersAnnotation, peerConfigs)`) is **not vulnerable** — `peerConfigs` is of type `bgp.PeerConfigs` which implements `fmt.Stringer` and correctly masks passwords. The vulnerable path (`bgpPeerConfigsFromIndividualAnnotations`) is triggered when the `kube-router.io/peers` consolidated YAML annotation is not set — i.e., when operators use the older individual annotation format (`kube-router.io/peer.ips`, `kube-router.io/peer.asns`, `kube-router.io/peer.passwords`). This older format remains fully supported and documented. ## PoC **Setup**: Node has per-node BGP peer annotations including a password: ```bash kubectl annotate node worker-1 \ kube-router.io/peer.ips=192.0.2.1 \ kube-router.io/peer.asns=65001 \ "kube-router.io/peer.passwords=$(echo -n 's3cr3t-bgp-p@ss' | base64)" ``` **Trigger**: Start kube-router with verbose logging (e.g., following troubleshooting documentation): ```bash # As documented in docs/troubleshoot.md for debugging: kube-router ... --v=2 ``` **Observe**: In kube-router pod logs: ``` I0318 10:23:41.123456 1 network_routes_controller.go:1129] Attempting to construct peer configs from annotation: map[ kube-router.io/peer.asns:65001 kube-router.io/peer.ips:192.0.2.1 kube-router.io/peer.passwords:czNjcjN0LWJncC1wQHNz <-- base64-encoded password ...other annotations... ] ``` **Decode the password**: ```bash echo "czNjcjN0LWJncC1wQHNz" | base64 -d # Output: s3cr3t-bgp-p@ss ``` **Impact**: With the decoded password and network adjacency to the BGP peer, an attacker can establish an unauthorized BGP session, inject routes, or disrupt legitimate BGP peering. ## Impact - **BGP credential disclosure**: BGP MD5 authentication passwords are exposed to anyone with access to kube-router log output - **BGP session hijacking**: An attacker who obtains the password and has network-level access to a BGP neighbor can impersonate the kube-router node, injecting malicious routes into the BGP table - **Log forwarding risk**: Log aggregation systems (Fluentd, Loki, Elastic, Splunk) typically have different and often broader access controls than Kubernetes RBAC. Passwords aggregated into these systems may be accessible to personnel without Kubernetes node access - **Support workflow exposure**: The official troubleshooting documentation recommends collecting `--v=2` logs before filing issues, creating a realistic path for passwords to be shared in bug reports or support tickets ## Recommended Fix Remove or redact the vulnerable log statement at line 1129. The diagnostic information it provides (confirming that annotation-based peer configuration is being used) can be conveyed without exposing credential values: ```go // Before (vulnerable): klog.V(2).Infof("Attempting to construct peer configs from annotation: %+v", node.Annotations) // After (safe): klog.V(2).Infof("Attempting to construct peer configs from per-node annotations (kube-router.io/peer.ips, etc.)") ``` If full annotation content is needed for debugging (e.g., to show non-sensitive annotations), log a filtered version that explicitly excludes the password annotation: ```go // Safe alternative that preserves non-sensitive diagnostic info: safeAnnotations := make(map[string]string) for k, v := range node.Annotations { if k != peerPasswordAnnotation { safeAnnotations[k] = v } } klog.V(2).Infof("Attempting to construct peer configs from annotations: %+v", safeAnnotations) ```
- Published
- Apr 8, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-532
Report tools
Action score
16
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 16 / 40 · 4.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 | pkg:golang/github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 | from 2.7.0 · up to and including 2.8.0 | — |
| Go | github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2 | from 2.7.0 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-532 · Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log FileCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.