GHSA-f5v8-v6q3-q4h6: Meridian: Multiple defense-in-depth gaps (collection/depth caps, telemetry, retry, fan-out)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Meridian.Mapping (NuGet) 2.1.1; Meridian.Mediator (NuGet) 2.1.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Meridian.Mapping (NuGet) 2.1.1; Meridian.Mediator (NuGet) 2.1.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Meridian v2.1.0 (`Meridian.Mapping` and `Meridian.Mediator`) shipped with nine defense-in-depth gaps reachable through its public APIs. Two are HIGH severity — the advertised `DefaultMaxCollectionItems` and `DefaultMaxDepth` safety caps are silently bypassed on the `IMapper.Map(source, destination)` overload and anywhere `.UseDestinationValue()` is configured on a collection-typed property. Four are MEDIUM (constructor invariant bypass, OpenTelemetry stack-trace info disclosure, retry amplification, notification fan-out amplification). Three are LOW (exception message disclosure, dictionary duplicate-key echo, static mediator cache growth under closed-generic types). All nine are patched in **v2.1.1**. Upgrade is a drop-in NuGet bump; see the v2.1.1 CHANGELOG for the four behavioural changes (constructor selection, OTel default, publisher fan-out cap, retry caps). ## Severity Matrix | # | Severity | CWE | Finding | Fix | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | **HIGH** | CWE-770 | `MappingEngine.TryMapCollectionOntoExisting` enumerated the source without enforcing `DefaultMaxCollectionItems`. Reachable via `Mapper.Map<TSrc,TDst>(src, dst)` and any `.ForMember(..., o => o.UseDestinationValue())` on a collection member through a plain `Map(src)` call. | Shared cap enforcement helper between `MapCollection` and `TryMapCollectionOntoExisting`. | | 2 | **HIGH** | CWE-674 | Collection-item recursion in the existing-destination path did not increment `ResolutionContext.Depth`, so self-referential collection graphs could reach stack overflow before `DefaultMaxDepth` fired. | Depth increments at every collection-item boundary. | | 3 | MEDIUM | CWE-665 | `ObjectCreator.CreateWithConstructorMapping` always invoked the widest public constructor, silently filling unresolved parameters with `default(T)` and bypassing narrower-ctor invariants. | Widest-ctor selection now requires every parameter to be bound via explicit ctor mapping, source-name match, or a C# optional default. | | 4 | MEDIUM | CWE-532 | `Mediator.MarkActivityFailure` emitted the full `ex.ToString()` (stack + inner chain) to the OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` activity tag by default, leaking context to any shared trace sink. | Gated on `MediatorTelemetryOptions.RecordExceptionStackTrace` — opt-in, default `false`. | | 5 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `RetryBehavior` retried every exception type with unbounded `MaxRetries`; the exponential-backoff delay overflowed `TimeSpan` at ~30 attempts. No cancellation exclusion. | Server-side `MaxRetriesCap = 10`, `MaxBackoff = 5 min`, `OperationCanceledException` short-circuit, recommended `RetryPolicy.TransientOnly` helper. | | 6 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `TaskWhenAllPublisher` started every registered handler concurrently with no bound on fan-out. | New constructor parameter `maxDegreeOfParallelism` (default 16; `-1` restores legacy unbounded). | | 7 | LOW | CWE-209 | Public mapping exceptions leaked `FullName` of source/destination types and concatenated inner exception messages into top-level property-mapping errors. | Scrubbed to type `Name`; inner details only via `InnerException` chain. | | 8 | LOW | CWE-209 | Dictionary materialization threw `ArgumentException` on duplicate keys, echoing the attacker-supplied key's `.ToString()`. | Last-write-wins indexer semantics. | | 9 | LOW | CWE-1325 | Static mediator handler caches grow monotonically under closed-generic request types. **Doc-only mitigation**; no code change — consumers must not allow attacker-controlled runtime type materialization to reach `Send`, `Publish`, or `CreateStream`. | Documented in `docs/security-model.md`. | ## Exploitation **Finding 1 / 2 (headline):** A consumer that maps user-supplied collection payloads onto an existing destination list via `mapper.Map(userCollection, existingList)` — a documented and commonly used AutoMapper-style idiom — processes the full attacker-supplied collection with no size cap and no depth cap. An attacker sending a single request with a large (or self-referential) collection payload can block the worker thread for seconds and exhaust the managed heap or the call stack. Equivalent exposure through `.UseDestinationValue()` on a collection-typed destination member, reachable via a plain `Map(src)` call whose destination type default-initializes that member. **Finding 3:** A destination type with multiple public constructors that differ only in their parameter-binding invariants (e.g., `new UserAccount(string name, Email email)` enforcing a non-default `Email`) could be instantiated with the narrower ctor's invariants silently bypassed if any source field was absent — the widest ctor was always picked, with unbound parameters replaced by `default(T)`. **Findings 4 / 5 / 6:** Amplification / information-disclosure vectors described in the matrix above. Each requires moderate integration context (telemetry sink trust, handler count, retry policy) to weaponize, but each is reachable through public APIs without authentication. ## Patches - `Meridian.Mapping` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16) - `Meridian.Mediator` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16) Verified via: - GitHub Release assets at <https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1> - Sigstore attestation (`actions/attest-build-provenance@v2` → `gh attestation verify` green on both `.nupkg` from the GitHub Release) - NuGet.org indexed both packages within the release workflow run ## Workarounds Users who cannot upgrade immediately may: 1. Avoid `mapper.Map(src, dst)` and `.UseDestinationValue()` on collection-typed destination members. 2. Wrap input collection deserialization with an explicit size limit before handing the payload to Meridian. 3. Register `TaskWhenAllPublisher` with `maxDegreeOfParallelism` ≤ 16 manually (v2.1.1+ only). 4. Disable OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` tag emission at the trace exporter level if your trace sink is less trusted than your application. These are defense-in-depth; the only complete mitigation is upgrading to 2.1.1. ## Supported Versions As of this advisory the supported security branch is **2.1.x**. The 2.0.x line (published 2026-04-15) is not receiving the Phase 1 safety-defaults infrastructure needed to carry the HIGH-severity fixes, so 2.0.x is deprecated in favor of 2.1.x. See `SECURITY.md` for the updated supported-versions table. ## Credits - UmutKorkmaz (reporter and maintainer) ## References - v2.1.1 CHANGELOG section: <https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#211---2026-04-16> - `docs/security-model.md` threat model: <https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/docs/security-model.md> - `SECURITY.md` disclosure policy: <https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/SECURITY.md> - AutoMapper CVE-2026-32933 (motivating precedent for Meridian's safety-defaults)
- Published
- Apr 16, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1325
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| NuGet | Meridian.Mapping | pkg:nuget/Meridian.Mapping |
| NuGet | Meridian.Mediator | pkg:nuget/Meridian.Mediator |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| NuGet | Meridian.Mapping | from 2.0.0 · before 2.1.1 | 2.1.1 |
| NuGet | Meridian.Mediator | from 2.0.0 · before 2.1.1 | 2.1.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| NuGet:Meridian.Mapping | 2.1.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
| NuGet:Meridian.Mediator | 2.1.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1325 · Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory AllocationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.