GHSA-f5v5-ccqc-6w36: async-nats vulnerable to TLS certificate common name validation bypass
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: async-nats (crates.io) 0.29.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to async-nats (crates.io) 0.29.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
The NATS official Rust clients are vulnerable to MitM when using TLS. The common name of the server's TLS certificate is validated against the `host`name provided by the server's plaintext `INFO` message during the initial connection setup phase. A MitM proxy can tamper with the `host` field's value by substituting it with the common name of a valid certificate it controls, fooling the client into accepting it. ## Reproduction steps 1. The NATS Rust client tries to establish a new connection 2. The connection is intercepted by a MitM proxy 3. The proxy makes a separate connection to the NATS server 4. The NATS server replies with an `INFO` message 5. The proxy reads the `INFO`, alters the `host` JSON field and passes the tampered `INFO` back to the client 6. The proxy upgrades the client connection to TLS, presenting a certificate issued by a certificate authority present in the client's keychain. In the previous step the `host` was set to the common name of said certificate 7. `rustls` accepts the certificate, having verified that the common name matches the attacker-controlled value it was given 8. The client has been fooled by the MitM proxy into accepting the attacker-controlled certificate
- Published
- Mar 24, 2023
- Updated
- Nov 8, 2023
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | async-nats | pkg:cargo/async-nats |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | async-nats | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.29.0 | 0.29.0 |
| crates.io | async-nats | before 0.29.0 | 0.29.0 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- RUSTSEC-2023-0027TLS certificate common name validation bypass0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:async-nats | 0.29.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.