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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p: Signature verification failure in Tendermint

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Fixed version: github.com/tendermint/tendermint (Go) 0.34.9.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/tendermint/tendermint (Go) 0.34.9 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

_The root cause of this security vulnerability is in the Tendermint specification, and this advisory is a duplicate of https://github.com/tendermint/spec/security/advisories/GHSA-jqfc-687g-59pw._ ### Impact Tendermint light clients running versions 0.34.0 to 0.34.8 are unable to detect and punish a new kind of attack. We’re calling this a “forward lunatic attack,” or FLA. The severity of this vulnerability is _moderate_. Note that an FLA cannot be successfully executed unless there are already ⅓+ Byzantine validators, and therefore outside of Tendermint’s security model; however, it is important to be able to detect and punish these kinds of attacks in order to incentivize correct behavior. In an FLA, an attacking validator (with ⅓+ voting power) signs commit messages for arbitrary application state associated with a block height that hasn’t been seen yet, hence the name “forward lunatic attacks.” A malicious validator effectively executes a [lunatic attack](https://docs.tendermint.com/master/spec/light-client/accountability/#the-misbehavior-of-faulty-validators), but signs messages for a target block that is higher than the current block. This can be dangerous: Typically, misbehavior evidence is only created when there are conflicting blocks at the same height, but by targeting a block height that is far “ahead” of the current chain height, it’s possible that the chain will not produce a (conflicting) block at the target height in time to create evidence. Prior to Tendermint v0.34.9, the light client could accept a bad header from its primary witness, and would not be able to form evidence of this deception, even if all the secondary witnesses were correct. Because the light client is responsible for verifying cross-chain state for IBC, a successful FLA could result in loss of funds. However, it is important to note that FLAs are only possible outside the Tendermint security model. All FLAs, attempted and successful, leave traces of provable misbehavior on-chain. A faulty header contains signatures from the faulty validator, and even in unpatched versions of Tendermint Core, networks could use social consensus (off-chain action) to recover the network. The patches introduced in Tendermint Core v0.34.9 handle all evidence automatically and on-chain. Note that this fix also allows for successful automatic reporting of FLAs, even after a chain halt. By adding a time to FetchBlock, light clients effectively have a backup way to determine if a halted chain should have continued, and it will be able to submit evidence as soon as the chain resumes. ### Patches This problem has been patched in Tendermint Core v0.34.9. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds. All users are recommended to upgrade to Tendermint Core v0.34.9 at their earliest possible convenience. ### Credits Thank you to @MaximilianDiez for originally surfacing this issue, and to @cmwaters, @josef-widder, and @milosevic for creating fixes at both the implementation and specification level. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [tendermint/tendermint](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint) * Email us at [security@tendermint.com](mailto:security@tendermint.com)

Published
Dec 20, 2021
Updated
May 20, 2021
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/tendermint/tendermint

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/tendermint/tendermintfrom 0.34.0 · before 0.34.90.34.9

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/tendermint/tendermint0.34.9Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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