GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g: Pheditor: Authentication Bypass in Forced Password-Change Flow via Unverified Current Password
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: pheditor/pheditor (Packagist) 2.0.8.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to pheditor/pheditor (Packagist) 2.0.8 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The forced password-change flow, triggered when the stored password is still the default (`admin`), does not verify that the password submitted by the client actually matches the current password. Any non-empty value in `pheditor_password` is enough to reach the password-change form, and submitting `pheditor_new_password` / `pheditor_confirm_password` in the same request is enough to set an arbitrary new password and obtain an authenticated session — without ever proving knowledge of the current password. ## Root Cause `pheditor.php` line 163: ```php if (PASSWORD == hash('sha512', 'admin')) { // still default — force change prompt ``` This checks whether the **stored** `PASSWORD` constant is still the default value. It does not check whether the **submitted** `pheditor_password` matches it. As a result, on any instance that hasn't changed the default password, the check passes regardless of what the client actually sends, and the subsequent password-change branch is reachable without authentication. ## PoC ```bash TARGET="https://victim.com/pheditor.php" # Any non-empty value works here — password is never actually verified curl -c /tmp/j.txt \ -d 'pheditor_password=anything' \ -d 'pheditor_new_password=attacker123' \ -d 'pheditor_confirm_password=attacker123' \ "$TARGET" -L -s -o /dev/null # Session is now authenticated as admin, with the password changed to attacker123 ``` ## Impact On any instance where the default password has not yet been changed, an unauthenticated attacker can set an arbitrary new admin password and obtain a fully authenticated session, without knowing the current password. This is a complete authentication bypass, not merely "default credentials in use" — it holds even if the operator believes the instance is protected because the login form is present. ## Remediation Verify the submitted password against the stored `PASSWORD` constant *before* entering the forced password-change branch, so the flow is reachable only by someone who actually knows the current password: ```php $submitted_hash = hash('sha512', $_POST['pheditor_password']); if (PASSWORD == hash('sha512', 'admin') && $submitted_hash === PASSWORD) { // proceed to forced password-change flow } else { // treat as a normal login attempt (including rate-limiting) } ``` ## Note on scope The original report submitted alongside this finding also included two additional items: - **Unrestricted PHP upload** — addressed as intended behavior (Pheditor is a single-admin PHP file editor; PHP file creation/editing is core to its function, and pattern-restricting only the upload path doesn't reduce risk since the same result is reachable via the `save`/`newfile` action). Documented explicitly in the README's new Security Model section. - **Terminal allowlist bypass (`php -r ...`)** — a duplicate of a previously reported and already-patched issue (GHSA-g3hq-hphg-8fhh, fixed in v2.0.7). This advisory has been scoped to the authentication bypass specifically, since it's a distinct root cause from both of those. Full responses to all three points are in the comments below.
- Published
- Jul 24, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 24, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1392
Report tools
Action score
40
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | pheditor/pheditor | pkg:composer/pheditor/pheditor |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | pheditor/pheditor | before 2.0.8 | 2.0.8 |
Same product
Packagist: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-g3hq-hphg-8fhhPheditor: Terminal command-allowlist bypass via argument injection leads to RCE — surviving vector after the metacharacter-sanitization fixes35Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:pheditor/pheditor | 2.0.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- GHSA-g3hq-hphg-8fhh0 days apartPheditor: Terminal command-allowlist bypass via argument injection leads to RCE — surviving vector after the metacharacter-sanitization fixes35Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1392 · Use of Default CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.